[HACKERS] semaphore usage "port based"?

[Marc G. Fournier]

yOn Mon, 3 Apr 2006, Robert Watson wrote:

>
> On Mon, 3 Apr 2006, Marc G. Fournier wrote:
>
>> This falls under "well,we broke kill() so that it now reports a PID is not 
>> in use even though it is, so its has to be the application that fixes it" 
>> ... and you *still* haven't shown *why* kill() reporting a PID is in use, 
>> even if its not in the current jail, is such a security threat ...
>
> It is an issue of completeness and consistency.  We implement a single set of 
> access control checks between processes, and try to avoid exceptions to them. 
> This is one of my largest architectural gripes about access control in 4.x, 
> actually: everywhere you look, the same "check" is implemented differently. 
> Sometimes signal checks are done way, other times, other ways.  Likewise, 
> debugging, monitoring, etc.  In 5.x forward, we use a centralized set of 
> access control checks in order to provide consistent, reliable, and easy to 
> analyze policy.  The more exceptions we introduced, the further we get from 
> that goal.

Agreed, in principle ... its just locking down something without a way 
around it is ... painful :(

----
Marc G. Fournier           Hub.Org Networking Services (http://www.hub.org)
Email: scrappy at hub.org           Yahoo!: yscrappy              ICQ: 7615664