git: dbbddbaef0f6 - releng/15.2 - lookup_cap_dotdot test: check dotdot VV_ROOT escape
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Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:09:40 UTC
The branch releng/15.2 has been updated by markj:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=dbbddbaef0f678a51d40fbf87666355d765f7237
commit dbbddbaef0f678a51d40fbf87666355d765f7237
Author: Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-10-23 04:01:41 +0000
Commit: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-11-17 13:35:05 +0000
lookup_cap_dotdot test: check dotdot VV_ROOT escape
Approved by: re (cperciva)
Approved by: so
Security: FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs
---
tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 71 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
index fa26a13568ca..08c3f81b0d57 100644
--- a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
+++ b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
@@ -26,8 +26,10 @@
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/capsicum.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <atf-c.h>
#include <errno.h>
@@ -255,6 +257,74 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__root, tc)
ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "..", O_DIRECTORY));
}
+/*
+ * ".." from a directory that is a mount root: the lookup must not cross
+ * to the covered vnode and leave its starting directory.
+ */
+static char mntpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+static void
+mount_tmpfs(void)
+{
+ struct iovec iov[4];
+ char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE(getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) != NULL);
+ snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
+ ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir(mntpath, 0777) == 0);
+ iov[0].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "fstype");
+ iov[0].iov_len = sizeof("fstype");
+ iov[1].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "tmpfs");
+ iov[1].iov_len = sizeof("tmpfs");
+ iov[2].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "fspath");
+ iov[2].iov_len = sizeof("fspath");
+ iov[3].iov_base = mntpath;
+ iov[3].iov_len = strlen(mntpath) + 1;
+ ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(nmount(iov, nitems(iov), 0) == 0, "nmount: %s",
+ strerror(errno));
+}
+
+ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
+ATF_TC_HEAD(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
+{
+ atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "descr",
+ "Validate that .. from a mount root stays beneath it");
+ atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
+}
+
+ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
+{
+ int dfd;
+
+ check_capsicum();
+ mount_tmpfs();
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE((dfd = open(mntpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)) >= 0);
+ ATF_REQUIRE(mkdirat(dfd, "sub", 0777) == 0);
+
+ /* A ".." that ends at the start is fine. */
+ ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(openat(dfd, "sub/..", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY |
+ O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) >= 0, "%s", strerror(errno));
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "..", O_RDONLY |
+ O_DIRECTORY | O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) < 0);
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE(cap_enter() >= 0);
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE,
+ openat(dfd, "..", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY) < 0);
+}
+
+ATF_TC_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
+{
+ char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
+ return;
+ snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
+ (void)unmount(mntpath, MNT_FORCE);
+}
+
ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
{
@@ -267,6 +337,7 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__advanced);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__negative);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__root);
+ ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
return (atf_no_error());
}