PERFORCE change 40045 for review

Robert Watson rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Mon Oct 20 23:46:37 GMT 2003


http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=40045

Change 40045 by rwatson at rwatson_tislabs on 2003/10/20 16:46:01

	Trim system privilege checks from kern_mac.c since they now
	live in mac_system.c.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#414 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#414 (text+ko) ====

@@ -145,11 +145,6 @@
     &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
 
-static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
-
 static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
@@ -165,11 +160,6 @@
     &mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket);
 
-static int	mac_enforce_system = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_system, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_system, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on system operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_system", &mac_enforce_system);
-
 static int	mac_enforce_sysv = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_sysv, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_sysv, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on System V IPC objects");
@@ -2672,99 +2662,6 @@
 }
 
 int
-mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_dump, cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_get, cred, name);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_set, cred, name, value);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kenv_unset, cred, name);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load");
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_kld)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
 mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -2948,122 +2845,6 @@
 }
 
 int
-mac_check_sysarch_ioperm(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_sysarch_ioperm, cred);
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_acct(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (vp != NULL) {
-		ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_acct");
-	}
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_acct, cred, vp,
-	    vp != NULL ? &vp->v_label : NULL);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_nfsd, cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_reboot(struct ucred *cred, int howto)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_reboot, cred, howto);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_settime(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_settime, cred);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_swapon");
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_swapon, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_swapoff(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_system_swapoff");
-
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_swapoff, cred, vp, &vp->v_label);
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_check_system_sysctl(struct ucred *cred, int *name, u_int namelen,
-    void *old, size_t *oldlenp, int inkernel, void *new, size_t newlen)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	/*
-	 * XXXMAC: We're very much like to assert the SYSCTL_LOCK here,
-	 * but since it's not exported from kern_sysctl.c, we can't.
-	 */
-	if (!mac_enforce_system)
-		return (0);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(check_system_sysctl, cred, name, namelen, old, oldlenp,
-	    inkernel, new, newlen);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
 mac_ioctl_ifnet_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
     struct ifnet *ifnet)
 {
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