PERFORCE change 18570 for review

Robert Watson rwatson at freebsd.org
Thu Oct 3 03:16:25 GMT 2002


http://people.freebsd.org/~peter/p4db/chv.cgi?CH=18570

Change 18570 by rwatson at rwatson_tislabs on 2002/10/02 20:16:02

	Implement two new MAC framework and policy entry points:
	
	mac_check_socket_receive(cred, so)
	mpo_check_socket_receive(cred, so, solabel)
	
	        Authorize reception of data from socket 'so' by cred 'cred'.
	
	mac_check_socket_send(cred, so)
	mpo_check_socket_send(cred, so, solabel)
	
	        Authorize transmission of data over socket 'so' by cred 'cred'
	
	These entry points are implemented above the per-protocol
	pru_send(), pru_sosend(), pru_rcv*(), and pru_soreceive()
	calls.  Currently we don't enforce these protections for
	sockets used in fifos, since we already provide above-VFS
	protection of fifo over fifofs.
	
	In the future, we may want to pass additional context information to
	these entry points.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_stream.c#9 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#289 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/sys_socket.c#14 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c#24 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#169 edit
.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#130 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/compat/svr4/svr4_stream.c#9 (text+ko) ====

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
 
 #define COMPAT_43 1
 
+#include "opt_mac.h"
+
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <sys/lock.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
 #include <sys/file.h> 		/* Must come after sys/malloc.h */
+#include <sys/mac.h>
 #include <sys/mbuf.h>
 #include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/proc.h>
@@ -165,6 +168,13 @@
 
 	if ((error = fgetsock(td, s, &so, NULL)) != 0)
 		return (error);
+
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_send(td->td_ucred, so);
+	if (error)
+		goto done1;
+#endif
+
 	auio.uio_iov = mp->msg_iov;
 	auio.uio_iovcnt = mp->msg_iovlen;
 	auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
@@ -262,6 +272,13 @@
 
 	if ((error = fgetsock(td, s, &so, NULL)) != 0)
 		return (error);
+
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_receive(td->td_ucred, so);
+	if (error)
+		goto done1;
+#endif
+
 	auio.uio_iov = mp->msg_iov;
 	auio.uio_iovcnt = mp->msg_iovlen;
 	auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/kern_mac.c#289 (text+ko) ====

@@ -856,10 +856,18 @@
 			mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_socket_listen =
 			    mpe->mpe_function;
 			break;
+		case MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RECEIVE:
+			mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_socket_receive =
+			    mpe->mpe_function;
+			break;
 		case MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RELABEL:
 			mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_socket_relabel =
 			    mpe->mpe_function;
 			break;
+		case MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_SEND:
+			mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_socket_send =
+			    mpe->mpe_function;
+			break;
 		case MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_VISIBLE:
 			mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_check_socket_visible =
 			    mpe->mpe_function;
@@ -3308,6 +3316,16 @@
 	return (error);
 }
 
+int
+mac_check_socket_receive(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_socket_receive, cred, so, &so->so_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
 static int
 mac_check_socket_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
     struct label *newlabel)
@@ -3320,6 +3338,20 @@
 	return (error);
 }
 
+/*
+ * XXXMAC: It might eventually be desirable to pass in address information
+ * to the send and possibly receive calls.
+ */
+int
+mac_check_socket_send(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	MAC_CHECK(check_socket_send, cred, so, &so->so_label);
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
 int
 mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket)
 {

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/sys_socket.c#14 (text+ko) ====

@@ -68,6 +68,13 @@
 	int error;
 
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_receive(active_cred, so);
+	if (error) {
+		mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+		return (error);
+	}
+#endif
 	error = so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_soreceive(so, 0, uio, 0, 0, 0);
 	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
 	return (error);
@@ -86,6 +93,13 @@
 	int error;
 
 	mtx_lock(&Giant);
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_send(active_cred, so);
+	if (error) {
+		mtx_unlock(&Giant);
+		return (error);
+	}
+#endif
 	error = so->so_proto->pr_usrreqs->pru_sosend(so, 0, uio, 0, 0, 0,
 						    uio->uio_td);
 	mtx_unlock(&Giant);

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/kern/uipc_syscalls.c#24 (text+ko) ====

@@ -605,6 +605,13 @@
 
 	if ((error = fgetsock(td, s, &so, NULL)) != 0)
 		return (error);
+
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_send(td->td_ucred, so);
+	if (error)
+		goto bad;
+#endif
+
 	auio.uio_iov = mp->msg_iov;
 	auio.uio_iovcnt = mp->msg_iovlen;
 	auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
@@ -882,6 +889,15 @@
 
 	if ((error = fgetsock(td, s, &so, NULL)) != 0)
 		return (error);
+
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_receive(td->td_ucred, so);
+	if (error) {
+		fputsock(so);
+		return (error);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	auio.uio_iov = mp->msg_iov;
 	auio.uio_iovcnt = mp->msg_iovlen;
 	auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
@@ -1732,6 +1748,12 @@
 		goto done;
 	}
 
+#ifdef MAC
+	error = mac_check_socket_send(td->td_ucred, so);
+	if (error)
+		goto done;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * If specified, get the pointer to the sf_hdtr struct for
 	 * any headers/trailers.

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac.h#169 (text+ko) ====

@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@
 	    struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
 int	mac_check_socket_deliver(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
 int	mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
+int	mac_check_socket_receive(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
+int	mac_check_socket_send(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
 int	mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
 int	mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
 	    int flags);

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/sys/mac_policy.h#130 (text+ko) ====

@@ -308,9 +308,13 @@
 		    struct label *mbuflabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_socket_listen)(struct ucred *cred,
 		    struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
+	int	(*mpo_check_socket_receive)(struct ucred *cred,
+		    struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_socket_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
 		    struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
 		    struct label *newlabel);
+	int	(*mpo_check_socket_send)(struct ucred *cred,
+		    struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_socket_visible)(struct ucred *cred,
 		    struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
 	int	(*mpo_check_vnode_access)(struct ucred *cred,
@@ -503,7 +507,9 @@
 	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_CONNECT,
 	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_DELIVER,
 	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_LISTEN,
+	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RECEIVE,
 	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RELABEL,
+	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_SEND,
 	MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_VISIBLE,
 	MAC_CHECK_VNODE_ACCESS,
 	MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHDIR,
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