svn commit: r361804 - head/sys/opencrypto
John Baldwin
jhb at FreeBSD.org
Thu Jun 4 20:12:35 UTC 2020
Author: jhb
Date: Thu Jun 4 20:12:34 2020
New Revision: 361804
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/361804
Log:
Use separate output buffers for OCF requests in KTLS.
KTLS encryption requests for file-backed data such as from sendfile(2)
require the encrypted data to be stored in a separate buffer from the
unencrypted file input data. Previously the OCF backend for KTLS
manually copied the data from the input buffer to the output buffer
before queueing the crypto request. Now the OCF backend will use a
separate output buffer for such requests and avoid the copy. This
mostly helps when an async co-processor is used by saving CPU cycles
used on the copy.
Reviewed by: gallatin (earlier version)
Sponsored by: Netflix
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24545
Modified:
head/sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
Modified: head/sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c Thu Jun 4 19:54:25 2020 (r361803)
+++ head/sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c Thu Jun 4 20:12:34 2020 (r361804)
@@ -73,6 +73,16 @@ SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO,
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_gcm_crypts,
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 GCM encryption operations");
+static counter_u64_t ocf_inplace;
+SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, inplace,
+ CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_inplace,
+ "Total number of OCF in-place operations");
+
+static counter_u64_t ocf_separate_output;
+SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, separate_output,
+ CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_separate_output,
+ "Total number of OCF operations with a separate output buffer");
+
static counter_u64_t ocf_retries;
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, retries, CTLFLAG_RD,
&ocf_retries,
@@ -97,22 +107,34 @@ ktls_ocf_tls12_gcm_encrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
struct iovec *outiov, int iovcnt, uint64_t seqno,
uint8_t record_type __unused)
{
- struct uio uio;
+ struct uio uio, out_uio, *tag_uio;
struct tls_aead_data ad;
struct cryptop *crp;
struct ocf_session *os;
struct ocf_operation *oo;
- struct iovec *iov;
+ struct iovec *iov, *out_iov;
int i, error;
uint16_t tls_comp_len;
+ bool inplace;
os = tls->cipher;
- oo = malloc(sizeof(*oo) + (iovcnt + 2) * sizeof(*iov), M_KTLS_OCF,
+ oo = malloc(sizeof(*oo) + (iovcnt + 2) * sizeof(*iov) * 2, M_KTLS_OCF,
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
oo->os = os;
iov = oo->iov;
+ out_iov = iov + iovcnt + 2;
+ uio.uio_iov = iov;
+ uio.uio_offset = 0;
+ uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ uio.uio_td = curthread;
+
+ out_uio.uio_iov = out_iov;
+ out_uio.uio_offset = 0;
+ out_uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ out_uio.uio_td = curthread;
+
crp = crypto_getreq(os->sid, M_WAITOK);
/* Setup the IV. */
@@ -129,44 +151,50 @@ ktls_ocf_tls12_gcm_encrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
ad.tls_length = htons(tls_comp_len);
iov[0].iov_base = &ad;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(ad);
- uio.uio_resid = sizeof(ad);
+ crp->crp_aad_start = 0;
+ crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
- /*
- * OCF always does encryption in place, so copy the data if
- * needed. Ugh.
- */
+ /* Copy iov's. */
+ memcpy(iov + 1, iniov, iovcnt * sizeof(*iov));
+ uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt + 1;
+ memcpy(out_iov, outiov, iovcnt * sizeof(*out_iov));
+ out_uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt;
+
+ /* Compute payload length and determine if encryption is in place. */
+ inplace = true;
+ crp->crp_payload_start = sizeof(ad);
for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
- iov[i + 1] = outiov[i];
if (iniov[i].iov_base != outiov[i].iov_base)
- memcpy(outiov[i].iov_base, iniov[i].iov_base,
- outiov[i].iov_len);
- uio.uio_resid += outiov[i].iov_len;
+ inplace = false;
+ crp->crp_payload_length += iniov[i].iov_len;
}
+ uio.uio_resid = sizeof(ad) + crp->crp_payload_length;
+ out_uio.uio_resid = crp->crp_payload_length;
- iov[iovcnt + 1].iov_base = trailer;
- iov[iovcnt + 1].iov_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
- uio.uio_resid += AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
+ if (inplace)
+ tag_uio = &uio;
+ else
+ tag_uio = &out_uio;
- uio.uio_iov = iov;
- uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt + 2;
- uio.uio_offset = 0;
- uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
- uio.uio_td = curthread;
+ tag_uio->uio_iov[tag_uio->uio_iovcnt].iov_base = trailer;
+ tag_uio->uio_iov[tag_uio->uio_iovcnt].iov_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
+ tag_uio->uio_iovcnt++;
+ crp->crp_digest_start = tag_uio->uio_resid;
+ tag_uio->uio_resid += AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
crypto_use_uio(crp, &uio);
+ if (!inplace)
+ crypto_use_output_uio(crp, &out_uio);
crp->crp_opaque = oo;
crp->crp_callback = ktls_ocf_callback;
- crp->crp_aad_start = 0;
- crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
- crp->crp_payload_start = sizeof(ad);
- crp->crp_payload_length = uio.uio_resid -
- (sizeof(ad) + AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN);
- crp->crp_digest_start = uio.uio_resid - AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
-
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls12_gcm_crypts, 1);
+ if (inplace)
+ counter_u64_add(ocf_inplace, 1);
+ else
+ counter_u64_add(ocf_separate_output, 1);
for (;;) {
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if (error)
@@ -198,22 +226,35 @@ ktls_ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, uint8_t *trailer, struct iovec *iniov,
struct iovec *outiov, int iovcnt, uint64_t seqno, uint8_t record_type)
{
- struct uio uio;
+ struct uio uio, out_uio;
struct tls_aead_data_13 ad;
char nonce[12];
struct cryptop *crp;
struct ocf_session *os;
struct ocf_operation *oo;
- struct iovec *iov;
+ struct iovec *iov, *out_iov;
int i, error;
+ bool inplace;
os = tls->cipher;
- oo = malloc(sizeof(*oo) + (iovcnt + 2) * sizeof(*iov), M_KTLS_OCF,
+ oo = malloc(sizeof(*oo) + (iovcnt + 2) * sizeof(*iov) * 2, M_KTLS_OCF,
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
oo->os = os;
iov = oo->iov;
+ out_iov = iov + iovcnt + 2;
+
+ uio.uio_iov = iov;
+ uio.uio_offset = 0;
+ uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ uio.uio_td = curthread;
+
+ out_uio.uio_iov = out_iov;
+ out_uio.uio_offset = 0;
+ out_uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
+ out_uio.uio_td = curthread;
+
crp = crypto_getreq(os->sid, M_WAITOK);
/* Setup the nonce. */
@@ -227,46 +268,59 @@ ktls_ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
ad.tls_length = hdr->tls_length;
iov[0].iov_base = &ad;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(ad);
- uio.uio_resid = sizeof(ad);
+ crp->crp_aad_start = 0;
+ crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
- /*
- * OCF always does encryption in place, so copy the data if
- * needed. Ugh.
- */
+ /* Copy iov's. */
+ memcpy(iov + 1, iniov, iovcnt * sizeof(*iov));
+ uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt + 1;
+ memcpy(out_iov, outiov, iovcnt * sizeof(*out_iov));
+ out_uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt;
+
+ /* Compute payload length and determine if encryption is in place. */
+ inplace = true;
+ crp->crp_payload_start = sizeof(ad);
for (i = 0; i < iovcnt; i++) {
- iov[i + 1] = outiov[i];
if (iniov[i].iov_base != outiov[i].iov_base)
- memcpy(outiov[i].iov_base, iniov[i].iov_base,
- outiov[i].iov_len);
- uio.uio_resid += outiov[i].iov_len;
+ inplace = false;
+ crp->crp_payload_length += iniov[i].iov_len;
}
+ uio.uio_resid = sizeof(ad) + crp->crp_payload_length;
+ out_uio.uio_resid = crp->crp_payload_length;
+ /*
+ * Always include the full trailer as input to get the
+ * record_type even if only the first byte is used.
+ */
trailer[0] = record_type;
iov[iovcnt + 1].iov_base = trailer;
iov[iovcnt + 1].iov_len = AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN + 1;
+ uio.uio_iovcnt++;
uio.uio_resid += AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN + 1;
+ if (inplace) {
+ crp->crp_digest_start = uio.uio_resid - AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
+ } else {
+ out_iov[iovcnt] = iov[iovcnt + 1];
+ out_uio.uio_iovcnt++;
+ out_uio.uio_resid += AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN + 1;
+ crp->crp_digest_start = out_uio.uio_resid - AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
+ }
- uio.uio_iov = iov;
- uio.uio_iovcnt = iovcnt + 2;
- uio.uio_offset = 0;
- uio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
- uio.uio_td = curthread;
-
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
crypto_use_uio(crp, &uio);
+ if (!inplace)
+ crypto_use_output_uio(crp, &out_uio);
crp->crp_opaque = oo;
crp->crp_callback = ktls_ocf_callback;
- crp->crp_aad_start = 0;
- crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
- crp->crp_payload_start = sizeof(ad);
- crp->crp_payload_length = uio.uio_resid -
- (sizeof(ad) + AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN);
- crp->crp_digest_start = uio.uio_resid - AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN;
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_gcm_crypts, 1);
+ if (inplace)
+ counter_u64_add(ocf_inplace, 1);
+ else
+ counter_u64_add(ocf_separate_output, 1);
for (;;) {
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
if (error)
@@ -313,6 +367,7 @@ ktls_ocf_try(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *t
int error;
memset(&csp, 0, sizeof(csp));
+ csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT;
switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
@@ -376,6 +431,8 @@ ktls_ocf_modevent(module_t mod, int what, void *arg)
case MOD_LOAD:
ocf_tls12_gcm_crypts = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
ocf_tls13_gcm_crypts = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
+ ocf_inplace = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
+ ocf_separate_output = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
ocf_retries = counter_u64_alloc(M_WAITOK);
return (ktls_crypto_backend_register(&ocf_backend));
case MOD_UNLOAD:
@@ -384,6 +441,8 @@ ktls_ocf_modevent(module_t mod, int what, void *arg)
return (error);
counter_u64_free(ocf_tls12_gcm_crypts);
counter_u64_free(ocf_tls13_gcm_crypts);
+ counter_u64_free(ocf_inplace);
+ counter_u64_free(ocf_separate_output);
counter_u64_free(ocf_retries);
return (0);
default:
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