svn commit: r334543 - head/usr.bin/top
Eitan Adler
eadler at freebsd.org
Sun Jun 3 05:08:45 UTC 2018
On 2 June 2018 at 16:56, Rodney W. Grimes
<freebsd at pdx.rh.cn85.dnsmgr.net> wrote:
>> Author: eadler
>> Date: Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018
>> New Revision: 334543
>> URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/334543
>>
>> Log:
>> top(1): chdir to / as init; remove unneeded comment
>>
>> - chdir to / to allow unmounting of wd
>> - remove warning about running top(1) as setuid. If this is a concern we
>> should just drop privs instead.
>>
>> Modified:
>> head/usr.bin/top/machine.c
>> head/usr.bin/top/top.c
>>
>> Modified: head/usr.bin/top/machine.c
>> ==============================================================================
>> --- head/usr.bin/top/machine.c Sat Jun 2 21:50:00 2018 (r334542)
>> +++ head/usr.bin/top/machine.c Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018 (r334543)
>> @@ -1613,11 +1613,6 @@ compare_ivcsw(const void *arg1, const void *arg2)
>> /*
>> * proc_owner(pid) - returns the uid that owns process "pid", or -1 if
>> * the process does not exist.
>> - * It is EXTREMELY IMPORTANT that this function work correctly.
>> - * If top runs setuid root (as in SVR4), then this function
>> - * is the only thing that stands in the way of a serious
>> - * security problem. It validates requests for the "kill"
>> - * and "renice" commands.
>> */
>>
>> int
>>
>> Modified: head/usr.bin/top/top.c
>> ==============================================================================
>> --- head/usr.bin/top/top.c Sat Jun 2 21:50:00 2018 (r334542)
>> +++ head/usr.bin/top/top.c Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018 (r334543)
>> @@ -260,6 +260,15 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
>> #define CMD_order 26
>> #define CMD_pid 27
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Since top(1) is often long running and
>> + * doesn't typically care about where its running from
>> + * chdir to the root to allow unmounting of its
>> + * originall wd. Failure is alright as this is
>> + * just a courtesy for users.
>> + */
>> + chdir("/");
>> +
>
> Bad side effect of doing that is it is not hard to get a "core"
> from top when run as a user, as it is going to try to write
> to /, and it probably does not have permission for that.
Another person made the point that other similar applications don't do
this, so I just reverted it.
thanks!
--
Eitan Adler
Source, Ports, Doc committer
Bugmeister, Ports Security teams
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