svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec...

[Andrey Chernov]

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:26:20AM -0800, Xin LI wrote:
> chroot(2) can create legitimate and secure environment where dlopen(2)
> is safe and necessary.

It seems it is internal contradiction in your argumentation:
1) You state that chroot(2) can create legitimate environment.
2) For ftpd's you disable .so loading in any case, i.e. even for 
legitimate environment too and you want to do so intentionally refusing 
passing responsibility to chroot(2) environment creator.

In that situation the only suggestion of something like public interface 
is setting enviroment variable like "LD_SO_DISABLE" which prevents .so 
loading in libc.

This is more clear than your stopgap.

And please don't say that enviroment variable can be overwritten by the 
user inside ftpd itself, it is not so. And for case when some ftpd allows 
to call _any_ external program, it could do anything, like with your 
stopgap too.

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