svn commit: r223637 - in head: . contrib/pf/authpf
contrib/pf/ftp-proxy contrib/pf/man contrib/pf/pfctl
contrib/pf/pflogd sbin/pflogd sys/conf sys/contrib/altq/altq
sys/contrib/pf/net sys/modules s...
Bjoern A. Zeeb
bz at FreeBSD.org
Tue Jun 28 11:57:26 UTC 2011
Author: bz
Date: Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011
New Revision: 223637
URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/223637
Log:
Update packet filter (pf) code to OpenBSD 4.5.
You need to update userland (world and ports) tools
to be in sync with the kernel.
Submitted by: mlaier
Submitted by: eri
Added:
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/if_pflow.h (contents, props changed)
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_lb.c (contents, props changed)
head/sys/modules/pfsync/
head/sys/modules/pfsync/Makefile (contents, props changed)
Deleted:
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_subr.c
Modified:
head/UPDATING
head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.8
head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.c
head/contrib/pf/authpf/pathnames.h
head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.c
head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.h
head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy.8
head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy.c
head/contrib/pf/man/pf.4
head/contrib/pf/man/pf.conf.5
head/contrib/pf/man/pf.os.5
head/contrib/pf/man/pflog.4
head/contrib/pf/man/pfsync.4
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/parse.y
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pf_print_state.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl.8
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl.h
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_altq.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_optimize.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_osfp.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_parser.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_parser.h
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_qstats.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_radix.c
head/contrib/pf/pfctl/pfctl_table.c
head/contrib/pf/pflogd/pflogd.8
head/contrib/pf/pflogd/pflogd.c
head/contrib/pf/pflogd/privsep.c
head/contrib/pf/pflogd/privsep_fdpass.c
head/sbin/pflogd/Makefile
head/sys/conf/files
head/sys/contrib/altq/altq/altq_red.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/if_pflog.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/if_pflog.h
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/if_pfsync.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/if_pfsync.h
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_if.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_ioctl.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_mtag.h
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_norm.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_osfp.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_ruleset.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pf_table.c
head/sys/contrib/pf/net/pfvar.h
head/sys/modules/Makefile
head/sys/modules/pf/Makefile
head/sys/modules/pflog/Makefile
head/sys/netinet/in_gif.c
head/sys/netinet/ip_icmp.c
head/sys/netinet/ipfw/ip_fw2.c
head/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
head/sys/netinet6/icmp6.c
head/sys/netinet6/in6_gif.c
head/sys/netipsec/ipsec_input.c
head/sys/netipsec/ipsec_output.c
head/sys/netipsec/xform_ipip.c
head/sys/sys/mbuf.h
head/sys/sys/param.h
head/usr.sbin/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy/Makefile
Modified: head/UPDATING
==============================================================================
--- head/UPDATING Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/UPDATING Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ NOTE TO PEOPLE WHO THINK THAT FreeBSD 9.
machines to maximize performance. (To disable malloc debugging, run
ln -s aj /etc/malloc.conf.)
+20110628:
+ The packet filter (pf) code has been updated to OpenBSD 4.5.
+ You need to update userland tools to be in sync with kernel.
+
20110608:
The following sysctls and tunables are retired on x86 platforms:
machdep.hlt_cpus
Modified: head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.8
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.8 Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.8 Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
.\" $FreeBSD$
-.\" $OpenBSD: authpf.8,v 1.43 2007/02/24 17:21:04 beck Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: authpf.8,v 1.47 2009/01/06 03:11:50 mcbride Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1998-2007 Bob Beck (beck at openbsd.org>. All rights reserved.
.\"
@@ -15,14 +15,16 @@
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
-.Dd March 28, 2006
+.Dd January 6 2009
.Dt AUTHPF 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.Nm authpf
+.Nm authpf ,
+.Nm authpf-noip
.Nd authenticating gateway user shell
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm authpf
+.Nm authpf-noip
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a user shell for authenticating gateways.
@@ -31,47 +33,63 @@ It is used to change
rules when a user authenticates and starts a session with
.Xr sshd 8
and to undo these changes when the user's session exits.
-It is designed for changing filter and translation rules for an individual
-source IP address as long as a user maintains an active
-.Xr ssh 1
-session.
Typical use would be for a gateway that authenticates users before
allowing them Internet use, or a gateway that allows different users into
different places.
+Combined with properly set up filter rules and secure switches,
.Nm
-logs the successful start and end of a session to
-.Xr syslogd 8 .
-This, combined with properly set up filter rules and secure switches,
can be used to ensure users are held accountable for their network traffic.
-.Pp
-.Nm
-can add filter and translation rules using the syntax described in
-.Xr pf.conf 5 .
-.Nm
-requires that the
+It is meant to be used with users who can connect via
+.Xr ssh 1
+only, and requires the
.Xr pf 4
-system be enabled and a
-.Xr fdescfs 5
-file system be mounted at
-.Pa /dev/fd
-before use.
+subsystem to be enabled.
+.Pp
+.Nm authpf-noip
+is a user shell
+which allows multiple connections to take
+place from the same IP address.
+It is useful primarily in cases where connections are tunneled via
+the gateway system, and can be directly associated with the user name.
+It cannot ensure accountability when
+classifying connections by IP address;
+in this case the client's IP address
+is not provided to the packet filter via the
+.Ar client_ip
+macro or the
+.Ar authpf_users
+table.
+Additionally, states associated with the client IP address
+are not purged when the session is ended.
+.Pp
+To use either
.Nm
-can also maintain the list of IP address of connected users
-in the "authpf_users"
-.Pa table .
+or
+.Nm authpf-noip ,
+the user's shell needs to be set to
+.Pa /usr/sbin/authpf
+or
+.Pa /usr/sbin/authpf-noip .
.Pp
.Nm
-is meant to be used with users who can connect via
+uses the
+.Xr pf.conf 5
+syntax to change filter and translation rules for an individual
+user or client IP address as long as a user maintains an active
.Xr ssh 1
-only.
-On startup,
+session, and logs the successful start and end of a session to
+.Xr syslogd 8 .
.Nm
retrieves the client's connecting IP address via the
.Ev SSH_CLIENT
environment variable and, after performing additional access checks,
reads a template file to determine what filter and translation rules
-(if any) to add.
-On session exit the same rules that were added at startup are removed.
+(if any) to add, and
+maintains the list of IP addresses of connected users in the
+.Ar authpf_users
+table.
+On session exit the same rules and table entries that were added at startup
+are removed, and all states associated with the client's IP address are purged.
.Pp
Each
.Nm
@@ -185,6 +203,9 @@ It is also possible to configure
to only allow specific users access.
This is done by listing their login names, one per line, in
.Pa /etc/authpf/authpf.allow .
+A group of users can also be indicated by prepending "%" to the group name,
+and all members of a login class can be indicated by prepending "@" to the
+login class name.
If "*" is found on a line, then all usernames match.
If
.Nm
@@ -297,7 +318,8 @@ They have a
wireless network which they would like to protect from unauthorized use.
To accomplish this, they create the file
.Pa /etc/authpf/authpf.allow
-which lists their login ids, one per line.
+which lists their login ids, group prepended with "%", or login class
+prepended with "@", one per line.
At this point, even if eve could authenticate to
.Xr sshd 8 ,
she would not be allowed to use the gateway.
@@ -501,6 +523,31 @@ table <authpf_users> persist
anchor "authpf/*" from <authpf_users>
rdr-anchor "authpf/*" from <authpf_users>
.Ed
+.Pp
+.Sy Tunneled users
+\- normally
+.Nm
+allows only one session per client IP address.
+However in some cases, such as when connections are tunneled via
+.Xr ssh 1
+or
+.Xr ipsec 4 ,
+the connections can be authorized based on the userid of the user instead of
+the client IP address.
+In this case it is appropriate to use
+.Nm authpf-noip
+to allow multiple users behind a NAT gateway to connect.
+In the
+.Pa /etc/authpf/authpf.rules
+example below, the remote user could tunnel a remote desktop session to their
+workstation:
+.Bd -literal
+internal_if="bge0"
+workstation_ip="10.2.3.4"
+
+pass out on $internal_if from (self) to $workstation_ip port 3389 \e
+ user $user_id
+.Ed
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width "/etc/authpf/authpf.conf" -compact
.It Pa /etc/authpf/authpf.conf
@@ -512,7 +559,6 @@ rdr-anchor "authpf/*" from <authpf_users
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr pf 4 ,
.Xr pf.conf 5 ,
-.Xr fdescfs 5 ,
.Xr securelevel 7 ,
.Xr ftp-proxy 8
.Sh HISTORY
Modified: head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.c
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.c Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/authpf/authpf.c Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authpf.c,v 1.104 2007/02/24 17:35:08 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authpf.c,v 1.112 2009/01/10 19:08:53 miod Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2007 Bob Beck (beck at openbsd.org).
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
-#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#endif
#include <login_cap.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -48,10 +49,11 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "pathnames.h"
static int read_config(FILE *);
-static void print_message(char *);
-static int allowed_luser(char *);
-static int check_luser(char *, char *);
+static void print_message(const char *);
+static int allowed_luser(struct passwd *);
+static int check_luser(const char *, char *);
static int remove_stale_rulesets(void);
+static int recursive_ruleset_purge(char *, char *);
static int change_filter(int, const char *, const char *);
static int change_table(int, const char *);
static void authpf_kill_states(void);
@@ -60,8 +62,10 @@ int dev; /* pf device */
char anchorname[PF_ANCHOR_NAME_SIZE] = "authpf";
char rulesetname[MAXPATHLEN - PF_ANCHOR_NAME_SIZE - 2];
char tablename[PF_TABLE_NAME_SIZE] = "authpf_users";
+int user_ip = 1; /* controls whether $user_ip is set */
FILE *pidfp;
+int pidfd = -1;
char luser[MAXLOGNAME]; /* username */
char ipsrc[256]; /* ip as a string */
char pidfile[MAXPATHLEN]; /* we save pid in this file. */
@@ -75,6 +79,7 @@ static __dead2 void do_death(int);
#else
static __dead void do_death(int);
#endif
+extern char *__progname; /* program name */
/*
* User shell for authenticating gateways. Sole purpose is to allow
@@ -83,21 +88,24 @@ static __dead void do_death(int);
* up. Meant to be used only from ssh(1) connections.
*/
int
-main(int argc, char *argv[])
+main(void)
{
- int lockcnt = 0, n, pidfd;
+ int lockcnt = 0, n;
FILE *config;
struct in6_addr ina;
struct passwd *pw;
char *cp;
gid_t gid;
uid_t uid;
- char *shell;
+ const char *shell;
login_cap_t *lc;
+ if (strcmp(__progname, "-authpf-noip") == 0)
+ user_ip = 0;
+
config = fopen(PATH_CONFFILE, "r");
if (config == NULL) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "can not open %s (%m)", PATH_CONFFILE);
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot open %s (%m)", PATH_CONFFILE);
exit(1);
}
@@ -142,23 +150,34 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) != NULL)
- shell = (char *)login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", pw->pw_shell,
+ shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", pw->pw_shell,
pw->pw_shell);
else
shell = pw->pw_shell;
+#ifndef __FreeBSD__
login_close(lc);
+#endif
- if (strcmp(shell, PATH_AUTHPF_SHELL)) {
+ if (strcmp(shell, PATH_AUTHPF_SHELL) &&
+ strcmp(shell, PATH_AUTHPF_SHELL_NOIP)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "wrong shell for user %s, uid %u",
pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid);
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+ login_close(lc);
+#else
if (shell != pw->pw_shell)
free(shell);
+#endif
goto die;
}
+#ifdef __FreeBSD__
+ login_close(lc);
+#else
if (shell != pw->pw_shell)
free(shell);
+#endif
/*
* Paranoia, but this data _does_ come from outside authpf, and
@@ -181,13 +200,22 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
- /* Make our entry in /var/authpf as /var/authpf/ipaddr */
- n = snprintf(pidfile, sizeof(pidfile), "%s/%s", PATH_PIDFILE, ipsrc);
+ /* Make our entry in /var/authpf as ipaddr or username */
+ n = snprintf(pidfile, sizeof(pidfile), "%s/%s",
+ PATH_PIDFILE, user_ip ? ipsrc : luser);
if (n < 0 || (u_int)n >= sizeof(pidfile)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "path to pidfile too long");
goto die;
}
+ signal(SIGTERM, need_death);
+ signal(SIGINT, need_death);
+ signal(SIGALRM, need_death);
+ signal(SIGPIPE, need_death);
+ signal(SIGHUP, need_death);
+ signal(SIGQUIT, need_death);
+ signal(SIGTSTP, need_death);
+
/*
* If someone else is already using this ip, then this person
* wants to switch users - so kill the old process and exit
@@ -241,15 +269,17 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
/*
- * we try to kill the previous process and acquire the lock
+ * We try to kill the previous process and acquire the lock
* for 10 seconds, trying once a second. if we can't after
- * 10 attempts we log an error and give up
+ * 10 attempts we log an error and give up.
*/
- if (++lockcnt > 10) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot kill previous authpf (pid %d)",
- otherpid);
+ if (want_death || ++lockcnt > 10) {
+ if (!want_death)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot kill previous authpf (pid %d)",
+ otherpid);
fclose(pidfp);
pidfp = NULL;
+ pidfd = -1;
goto dogdeath;
}
sleep(1);
@@ -260,6 +290,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
*/
fclose(pidfp);
pidfp = NULL;
+ pidfd = -1;
} while (1);
/* whack the group list */
@@ -277,7 +308,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
openlog("authpf", LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, LOG_DAEMON);
- if (!check_luser(PATH_BAN_DIR, luser) || !allowed_luser(luser)) {
+ if (!check_luser(PATH_BAN_DIR, luser) || !allowed_luser(pw)) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "user %s prohibited", luser);
do_death(0);
}
@@ -302,19 +333,12 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
printf("Unable to modify filters\r\n");
do_death(0);
}
- if (change_table(1, ipsrc) == -1) {
+ if (user_ip && change_table(1, ipsrc) == -1) {
printf("Unable to modify table\r\n");
change_filter(0, luser, ipsrc);
do_death(0);
}
- signal(SIGTERM, need_death);
- signal(SIGINT, need_death);
- signal(SIGALRM, need_death);
- signal(SIGPIPE, need_death);
- signal(SIGHUP, need_death);
- signal(SIGQUIT, need_death);
- signal(SIGTSTP, need_death);
while (1) {
printf("\r\nHello %s. ", luser);
printf("You are authenticated from host \"%s\"\r\n", ipsrc);
@@ -337,8 +361,6 @@ dogdeath:
sleep(180); /* them lusers read reaaaaal slow */
die:
do_death(0);
-
- /* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
@@ -361,6 +383,8 @@ read_config(FILE *f)
}
i++;
len = strlen(buf);
+ if (len == 0)
+ continue;
if (buf[len - 1] != '\n' && !feof(f)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "line %d too long in %s", i,
PATH_CONFFILE);
@@ -413,7 +437,7 @@ parse_error:
* they've been bad or we're unavailable.
*/
static void
-print_message(char *filename)
+print_message(const char *filename)
{
char buf[1024];
FILE *f;
@@ -436,6 +460,7 @@ print_message(char *filename)
* allowed_luser checks to see if user "luser" is allowed to
* use this gateway by virtue of being listed in an allowed
* users file, namely /etc/authpf/authpf.allow .
+ * Users may be listed by <username>, %<group>, or @<login_class>.
*
* If /etc/authpf/authpf.allow does not exist, then we assume that
* all users who are allowed in by sshd(8) are permitted to
@@ -444,9 +469,9 @@ print_message(char *filename)
* the session terminates in the same manner as being banned.
*/
static int
-allowed_luser(char *luser)
+allowed_luser(struct passwd *pw)
{
- char *buf, *lbuf;
+ char *buf,*lbuf;
int matched;
size_t len;
FILE *f;
@@ -476,8 +501,14 @@ allowed_luser(char *luser)
* "public" gateway, such as it is, so let
* everyone use it.
*/
+ int gl_init = 0, ngroups = NGROUPS + 1;
+ gid_t groups[NGROUPS + 1];
+
lbuf = NULL;
+ matched = 0;
+
while ((buf = fgetln(f, &len))) {
+
if (buf[len - 1] == '\n')
buf[len - 1] = '\0';
else {
@@ -488,7 +519,40 @@ allowed_luser(char *luser)
buf = lbuf;
}
- matched = strcmp(luser, buf) == 0 || strcmp("*", buf) == 0;
+ if (buf[0] == '@') {
+ /* check login class */
+ if (strcmp(pw->pw_class, buf + 1) == 0)
+ matched++;
+ } else if (buf[0] == '%') {
+ /* check group membership */
+ int cnt;
+ struct group *group;
+
+ if ((group = getgrnam(buf + 1)) == NULL) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR,
+ "invalid group '%s' in %s (%s)",
+ buf + 1, PATH_ALLOWFILE,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!gl_init) {
+ (void) getgrouplist(pw->pw_name,
+ pw->pw_gid, groups, &ngroups);
+ gl_init++;
+ }
+
+ for ( cnt = 0; cnt < ngroups; cnt++) {
+ if (group->gr_gid == groups[cnt]) {
+ matched++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* check username and wildcard */
+ matched = strcmp(pw->pw_name, buf) == 0 ||
+ strcmp("*", buf) == 0;
+ }
if (lbuf != NULL) {
free(lbuf);
@@ -496,13 +560,13 @@ allowed_luser(char *luser)
}
if (matched)
- return (1); /* matched an allowed username */
+ return (1); /* matched an allowed user/group */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "denied access to %s: not listed in %s",
- luser, PATH_ALLOWFILE);
+ pw->pw_name, PATH_ALLOWFILE);
/* reuse buf */
- buf = "\n\nSorry, you are not allowed to use this facility!\n";
+ sprintf(buf, "%s", "\n\nSorry, you are not allowed to use this facility!\n");
fputs(buf, stdout);
}
fflush(stdout);
@@ -520,13 +584,13 @@ allowed_luser(char *luser)
* going to be un-banned.)
*/
static int
-check_luser(char *luserdir, char *luser)
+check_luser(const char *luserdir, char *l_user)
{
FILE *f;
int n;
char tmp[MAXPATHLEN];
- n = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s/%s", luserdir, luser);
+ n = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s/%s", luserdir, l_user);
if (n < 0 || (u_int)n >= sizeof(tmp)) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "provided banned directory line too long (%s)",
luserdir);
@@ -555,7 +619,7 @@ check_luser(char *luserdir, char *luser)
* tell what they can do and where they can go.
*/
syslog(LOG_INFO, "denied access to %s: %s exists",
- luser, tmp);
+ l_user, tmp);
/* reuse tmp */
strlcpy(tmp, "\n\n-**- Sorry, you have been banned! -**-\n\n",
@@ -581,7 +645,7 @@ static int
remove_stale_rulesets(void)
{
struct pfioc_ruleset prs;
- u_int32_t nr, mnr;
+ u_int32_t nr;
memset(&prs, 0, sizeof(prs));
strlcpy(prs.path, anchorname, sizeof(prs.path));
@@ -592,13 +656,12 @@ remove_stale_rulesets(void)
return (1);
}
- mnr = prs.nr;
- nr = 0;
- while (nr < mnr) {
+ nr = prs.nr;
+ while (nr) {
char *s, *t;
pid_t pid;
- prs.nr = nr;
+ prs.nr = nr - 1;
if (ioctl(dev, DIOCGETRULESET, &prs))
return (1);
errno = 0;
@@ -610,119 +673,159 @@ remove_stale_rulesets(void)
if (!prs.name[0] || errno ||
(*s && (t == prs.name || *s != ')')))
return (1);
- if (kill(pid, 0) && errno != EPERM) {
- int i;
- struct pfioc_trans_e t_e[PF_RULESET_MAX+1];
- struct pfioc_trans t;
-
- bzero(&t, sizeof(t));
- bzero(t_e, sizeof(t_e));
- t.size = PF_RULESET_MAX+1;
- t.esize = sizeof(t_e[0]);
- t.array = t_e;
- for (i = 0; i < PF_RULESET_MAX+1; ++i) {
- t_e[i].rs_num = i;
- snprintf(t_e[i].anchor, sizeof(t_e[i].anchor),
- "%s/%s", anchorname, prs.name);
- }
- t_e[PF_RULESET_MAX].rs_num = PF_RULESET_TABLE;
- if ((ioctl(dev, DIOCXBEGIN, &t) ||
- ioctl(dev, DIOCXCOMMIT, &t)) &&
- errno != EINVAL)
+ if ((kill(pid, 0) && errno != EPERM) || pid == getpid()) {
+ if (recursive_ruleset_purge(anchorname, prs.name))
return (1);
- mnr--;
- } else
- nr++;
+ }
+ nr--;
}
return (0);
}
+static int
+recursive_ruleset_purge(char *an, char *rs)
+{
+ struct pfioc_trans_e *t_e = NULL;
+ struct pfioc_trans *t = NULL;
+ struct pfioc_ruleset *prs = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+
+ /* purge rules */
+ errno = 0;
+ if ((t = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pfioc_trans))) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ if ((t_e = calloc(PF_RULESET_MAX+1,
+ sizeof(struct pfioc_trans_e))) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ t->size = PF_RULESET_MAX+1;
+ t->esize = sizeof(struct pfioc_trans_e);
+ t->array = t_e;
+ for (i = 0; i < PF_RULESET_MAX+1; ++i) {
+ t_e[i].rs_num = i;
+ snprintf(t_e[i].anchor, sizeof(t_e[i].anchor), "%s/%s", an, rs);
+ }
+ t_e[PF_RULESET_MAX].rs_num = PF_RULESET_TABLE;
+ if ((ioctl(dev, DIOCXBEGIN, t) ||
+ ioctl(dev, DIOCXCOMMIT, t)) &&
+ errno != EINVAL)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* purge any children */
+ if ((prs = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pfioc_ruleset))) == NULL)
+ goto no_mem;
+ snprintf(prs->path, sizeof(prs->path), "%s/%s", an, rs);
+ if (ioctl(dev, DIOCGETRULESETS, prs)) {
+ if (errno != EINVAL)
+ goto cleanup;
+ errno = 0;
+ } else {
+ int nr = prs->nr;
+
+ while (nr) {
+ prs->nr = 0;
+ if (ioctl(dev, DIOCGETRULESET, prs))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (recursive_ruleset_purge(prs->path, prs->name))
+ goto cleanup;
+ nr--;
+ }
+ }
+
+no_mem:
+ if (errno == ENOMEM)
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "calloc failed");
+
+cleanup:
+ free(t);
+ free(t_e);
+ free(prs);
+ return (errno);
+}
+
/*
* Add/remove filter entries for user "luser" from ip "ipsrc"
*/
static int
-change_filter(int add, const char *luser, const char *ipsrc)
+change_filter(int add, const char *l_user, const char *ip_src)
{
- char *pargv[13] = {
- "pfctl", "-p", "/dev/pf", "-q", "-a", "anchor/ruleset",
- "-D", "user_ip=X", "-D", "user_id=X", "-f",
- "file", NULL
- };
char *fdpath = NULL, *userstr = NULL, *ipstr = NULL;
char *rsn = NULL, *fn = NULL;
pid_t pid;
gid_t gid;
int s;
- if (luser == NULL || !luser[0] || ipsrc == NULL || !ipsrc[0]) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "invalid luser/ipsrc");
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (asprintf(&rsn, "%s/%s", anchorname, rulesetname) == -1)
- goto no_mem;
- if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/dev/fd/%d", dev) == -1)
- goto no_mem;
- if (asprintf(&ipstr, "user_ip=%s", ipsrc) == -1)
- goto no_mem;
- if (asprintf(&userstr, "user_id=%s", luser) == -1)
- goto no_mem;
-
if (add) {
struct stat sb;
+ char *pargv[13] = {
+ "pfctl", "-p", "/dev/pf", "-q", "-a", "anchor/ruleset",
+ "-D", "user_id=X", "-D", "user_ip=X", "-f", "file", NULL
+ };
- if (asprintf(&fn, "%s/%s/authpf.rules", PATH_USER_DIR, luser)
- == -1)
+ if (l_user == NULL || !l_user[0] || ip_src == NULL || !ip_src[0]) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "invalid luser/ipsrc");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (asprintf(&rsn, "%s/%s", anchorname, rulesetname) == -1)
+ goto no_mem;
+ if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/dev/fd/%d", dev) == -1)
+ goto no_mem;
+ if (asprintf(&ipstr, "user_ip=%s", ip_src) == -1)
+ goto no_mem;
+ if (asprintf(&userstr, "user_id=%s", l_user) == -1)
+ goto no_mem;
+ if (asprintf(&fn, "%s/%s/authpf.rules",
+ PATH_USER_DIR, l_user) == -1)
goto no_mem;
if (stat(fn, &sb) == -1) {
free(fn);
if ((fn = strdup(PATH_PFRULES)) == NULL)
goto no_mem;
}
- }
- pargv[2] = fdpath;
- pargv[5] = rsn;
- pargv[7] = userstr;
- pargv[9] = ipstr;
- if (!add)
- pargv[11] = "/dev/null";
- else
- pargv[11] = fn;
+ pargv[2] = fdpath;
+ pargv[5] = rsn;
+ pargv[7] = userstr;
+ if (user_ip) {
+ pargv[9] = ipstr;
+ pargv[11] = fn;
+ } else {
+ pargv[8] = "-f";
+ pargv[9] = fn;
+ pargv[10] = NULL;
+ }
- switch (pid = fork()) {
- case -1:
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork failed");
- goto error;
- case 0:
- /* revoke group privs before exec */
- gid = getgid();
- if (setregid(gid, gid) == -1) {
- err(1, "setregid");
- }
- execvp(PATH_PFCTL, pargv);
- warn("exec of %s failed", PATH_PFCTL);
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- /* parent */
- waitpid(pid, &s, 0);
- if (s != 0) {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, "pfctl exited abnormally");
- goto error;
- }
+ switch (pid = fork()) {
+ case -1:
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork failed");
+ goto error;
+ case 0:
+ /* revoke group privs before exec */
+ gid = getgid();
+ if (setregid(gid, gid) == -1) {
+ err(1, "setregid");
+ }
+ execvp(PATH_PFCTL, pargv);
+ warn("exec of %s failed", PATH_PFCTL);
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* parent */
+ waitpid(pid, &s, 0);
+ if (s != 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_ERR, "pfctl exited abnormally");
+ goto error;
+ }
- if (add) {
gettimeofday(&Tstart, NULL);
- syslog(LOG_INFO, "allowing %s, user %s", ipsrc, luser);
+ syslog(LOG_INFO, "allowing %s, user %s", ip_src, l_user);
} else {
+ remove_stale_rulesets();
+
gettimeofday(&Tend, NULL);
-#ifdef __FreeBSD__
- syslog(LOG_INFO, "removed %s, user %s - duration %jd seconds",
- ipsrc, luser, (intmax_t)(Tend.tv_sec - Tstart.tv_sec));
-#else
- syslog(LOG_INFO, "removed %s, user %s - duration %ld seconds",
- ipsrc, luser, Tend.tv_sec - Tstart.tv_sec);
-#endif
+ syslog(LOG_INFO, "removed %s, user %s - duration %ju seconds",
+ ip_src, l_user, (uintmax_t)(Tend.tv_sec - Tstart.tv_sec));
}
return (0);
no_mem:
@@ -740,7 +843,7 @@ error:
* Add/remove this IP from the "authpf_users" table.
*/
static int
-change_table(int add, const char *ipsrc)
+change_table(int add, const char *ip_src)
{
struct pfioc_table io;
struct pfr_addr addr;
@@ -753,12 +856,12 @@ change_table(int add, const char *ipsrc)
io.pfrio_size = 1;
bzero(&addr, sizeof(addr));
- if (ipsrc == NULL || !ipsrc[0])
+ if (ip_src == NULL || !ip_src[0])
return (-1);
- if (inet_pton(AF_INET, ipsrc, &addr.pfra_ip4addr) == 1) {
+ if (inet_pton(AF_INET, ip_src, &addr.pfra_ip4addr) == 1) {
addr.pfra_af = AF_INET;
addr.pfra_net = 32;
- } else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, ipsrc, &addr.pfra_ip6addr) == 1) {
+ } else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, ip_src, &addr.pfra_ip6addr) == 1) {
addr.pfra_af = AF_INET6;
addr.pfra_net = 128;
} else {
@@ -769,7 +872,7 @@ change_table(int add, const char *ipsrc)
if (ioctl(dev, add ? DIOCRADDADDRS : DIOCRDELADDRS, &io) &&
errno != ESRCH) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot %s %s from table %s: %s",
- add ? "add" : "remove", ipsrc, tablename,
+ add ? "add" : "remove", ip_src, tablename,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
@@ -821,7 +924,7 @@ authpf_kill_states(void)
/* signal handler that makes us go away properly */
static void
-need_death(int signo)
+need_death(int signo __unused)
{
want_death = 1;
}
@@ -840,11 +943,12 @@ do_death(int active)
if (active) {
change_filter(0, luser, ipsrc);
- change_table(0, ipsrc);
- authpf_kill_states();
- remove_stale_rulesets();
+ if (user_ip) {
+ change_table(0, ipsrc);
+ authpf_kill_states();
+ }
}
- if (pidfile[0] && (pidfp != NULL))
+ if (pidfile[0] && pidfd != -1)
if (unlink(pidfile) == -1)
syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot unlink %s (%m)", pidfile);
exit(ret);
Modified: head/contrib/pf/authpf/pathnames.h
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/authpf/pathnames.h Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/authpf/pathnames.h Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.7 2004/04/25 18:40:42 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.8 2008/02/14 01:49:17 mcbride Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 2002 Chris Kuethe (ckuethe at ualberta.ca)
@@ -35,4 +35,5 @@
#define PATH_DEVFILE "/dev/pf"
#define PATH_PIDFILE "/var/authpf"
#define PATH_AUTHPF_SHELL "/usr/sbin/authpf"
+#define PATH_AUTHPF_SHELL_NOIP "/usr/sbin/authpf-noip"
#define PATH_PFCTL "/sbin/pfctl"
Modified: head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.c
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.c Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.c Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: filter.c,v 1.5 2006/12/01 07:31:21 camield Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: filter.c,v 1.8 2008/06/13 07:25:26 claudio Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Camiel Dobbelaar, <cd at sentia.nl>
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct pfioc_rule pfr;
static struct pfioc_trans pft;
static struct pfioc_trans_e pfte[TRANS_SIZE];
static int dev, rule_log;
-static char *qname;
+static const char *qname, *tagname;
int
add_filter(u_int32_t id, u_int8_t dir, struct sockaddr *src,
@@ -159,11 +159,12 @@ do_rollback(void)
}
void
-init_filter(char *opt_qname, int opt_verbose)
+init_filter(const char *opt_qname, const char *opt_tagname, int opt_verbose)
{
struct pf_status status;
qname = opt_qname;
+ tagname = opt_tagname;
if (opt_verbose == 1)
rule_log = PF_LOG;
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ init_filter(char *opt_qname, int opt_ver
dev = open("/dev/pf", O_RDWR);
if (dev == -1)
- err(1, "/dev/pf");
+ err(1, "open /dev/pf");
if (ioctl(dev, DIOCGETSTATUS, &status) == -1)
err(1, "DIOCGETSTATUS");
if (!status.running)
@@ -280,9 +281,9 @@ prepare_rule(u_int32_t id, int rs_num, s
switch (rs_num) {
case PF_RULESET_FILTER:
/*
- * pass quick [log] inet[6] proto tcp \
+ * pass [quick] [log] inet[6] proto tcp \
* from $src to $dst port = $d_port flags S/SA keep state
- * (max 1) [queue qname]
+ * (max 1) [queue qname] [tag tagname]
*/
pfr.rule.action = PF_PASS;
pfr.rule.quick = 1;
@@ -293,6 +294,11 @@ prepare_rule(u_int32_t id, int rs_num, s
pfr.rule.max_states = 1;
if (qname != NULL)
strlcpy(pfr.rule.qname, qname, sizeof pfr.rule.qname);
+ if (tagname != NULL) {
+ pfr.rule.quick = 0;
+ strlcpy(pfr.rule.tagname, tagname,
+ sizeof pfr.rule.tagname);
+ }
break;
case PF_RULESET_NAT:
/*
Modified: head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.h
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.h Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/filter.h Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: filter.h,v 1.3 2005/06/07 14:12:07 camield Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: filter.h,v 1.4 2007/08/01 09:31:41 henning Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Camiel Dobbelaar, <cd at sentia.nl>
@@ -26,6 +26,6 @@ int add_rdr(u_int32_t, struct sockaddr *
struct sockaddr *, u_int16_t);
int do_commit(void);
int do_rollback(void);
-void init_filter(char *, int);
+void init_filter(const char *, const char *, int);
int prepare_commit(u_int32_t);
int server_lookup(struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *);
Modified: head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy.8
==============================================================================
--- head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy.8 Tue Jun 28 11:03:39 2011 (r223636)
+++ head/contrib/pf/ftp-proxy/ftp-proxy.8 Tue Jun 28 11:57:25 2011 (r223637)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ftp-proxy.8,v 1.7 2006/12/30 13:01:54 camield Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ftp-proxy.8,v 1.11 2008/02/26 18:52:53 henning Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Camiel Dobbelaar, <cd at sentia.nl>
.\"
@@ -16,14 +16,15 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
-.Dd November 28, 2004
+.Dd February 26, 2008
.Dt FTP-PROXY 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ftp-proxy
.Nd Internet File Transfer Protocol proxy daemon
.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.Nm ftp-proxy
+.Nm
+.Bk -words
.Op Fl 6Adrv
.Op Fl a Ar address
.Op Fl b Ar address
@@ -33,7 +34,9 @@
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl q Ar queue
*** DIFF OUTPUT TRUNCATED AT 1000 LINES ***
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