svn commit: r326052 - head/usr.bin/gzip

[Xin Li]

On 3/10/20 18:26, Conrad Meyer wrote:
> Hi Xin Li,
> 
> Sorry to reply to an old commit.
> 
> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 12:14 AM Xin LI <delphij at freebsd.org> wrote:
>>
>> Author: delphij
>> Date: Tue Nov 21 08:14:30 2017
>> New Revision: 326052
>> URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/326052
>>
>> Log:
>>   Support SIGINFO.
>> ...
>> --- head/usr.bin/gzip/unpack.c  Tue Nov 21 07:35:29 2017        (r326051)
>> +++ head/usr.bin/gzip/unpack.c  Tue Nov 21 08:14:30 2017        (r326052)
>> ...
>> @@ -152,6 +155,9 @@ unpack_parse_header(int in, int out, char *pre, size_t
>>         ssize_t bytesread;              /* Bytes read from the file */
>>         int i, j, thisbyte;
>>
>> +       if (prelen > sizeof hdr)
>> +               maybe_err("prelen too long");
> 
> This check should perhaps be >=, rather than >.
> 
>> +
>>         /* Prepend the header buffer if we already read some data */
>>         if (prelen != 0)
>>                 memcpy(hdr, pre, prelen);
>> @@ -160,6 +166,7 @@ unpack_parse_header(int in, int out, char *pre, size_t
>>         bytesread = read(in, hdr + prelen, PACK_HEADER_LENGTH - prelen);
> 
> In the case where prelen == sizeof(hdr), we invoke read(, pointer past
> end of hdr, 0) above.  This should have no effect, but looks
> unintended, and tickles Coverity (CID 1383554).

Thanks for the analysis.  It seems that this is a false positive because
the situation can never happen with the current code (the passed prelen
has to be either 0 or 4).

I've created a changeset at: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24034 to
address it.

Cheers,



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