svn commit: r364402 - head/sys/kern

[Shawn Webb]

On Wed, Aug 19, 2020 at 05:10:05PM +0000, Warner Losh wrote:
> Author: imp
> Date: Wed Aug 19 17:10:04 2020
> New Revision: 364402
> URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/364402
> 
> Log:
>   Add VFS FS events for mount and unmount to devctl/devd
>   
>   Report when a filesystem is mounted, remounted or unmounted via devd, along with
>   details about the mount point and mount options.
>   
>   Discussed with:	kib@
>   Reviewed by: kirk@ (prior version)
>   Sponsored by: Netflix
>   Diffential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25969
> 
> Modified:
>   head/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c
> 
> Modified: head/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c
> ==============================================================================
> --- head/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c	Wed Aug 19 17:09:58 2020	(r364401)
> +++ head/sys/kern/vfs_mount.c	Wed Aug 19 17:10:04 2020	(r364402)
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
>  #include <sys/param.h>
>  #include <sys/conf.h>
>  #include <sys/smp.h>
> +#include <sys/bus.h>
>  #include <sys/eventhandler.h>
>  #include <sys/fcntl.h>
>  #include <sys/jail.h>
> @@ -101,6 +102,8 @@ MTX_SYSINIT(mountlist, &mountlist_mtx, "mountlist", MT
>  EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(vfs_mounted);
>  EVENTHANDLER_LIST_DEFINE(vfs_unmounted);
>  
> +static void dev_vfs_event(const char *type, struct mount *mp, bool donew);
> +
>  /*
>   * Global opts, taken by all filesystems
>   */
> @@ -1020,6 +1023,7 @@ vfs_domount_first(
>  	VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
>  	EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(vfs_mounted, mp, newdp, td);
>  	VOP_UNLOCK(newdp);
> +	dev_vfs_event("MOUNT", mp, false);
>  	mountcheckdirs(vp, newdp);
>  	vn_seqc_write_end(vp);
>  	vn_seqc_write_end(newdp);
> @@ -1221,6 +1225,7 @@ vfs_domount_update(
>  	if (error != 0)
>  		goto end;
>  
> +	dev_vfs_event("REMOUNT", mp, true);
>  	if (mp->mnt_opt != NULL)
>  		vfs_freeopts(mp->mnt_opt);
>  	mp->mnt_opt = mp->mnt_optnew;
> @@ -1839,6 +1844,7 @@ dounmount(struct mount *mp, int flags, struct thread *
>  	TAILQ_REMOVE(&mountlist, mp, mnt_list);
>  	mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
>  	EVENTHANDLER_DIRECT_INVOKE(vfs_unmounted, mp, td);
> +	dev_vfs_event("UNMOUNT", mp, false);
>  	if (coveredvp != NULL) {
>  		coveredvp->v_mountedhere = NULL;
>  		vn_seqc_write_end(coveredvp);
> @@ -2425,4 +2431,72 @@ kernel_vmount(int flags, ...)
>  
>  	error = kernel_mount(ma, flags);
>  	return (error);
> +}
> +
> +/* Map from mount options to printable formats. */
> +static struct mntoptnames optnames[] = {
> +	MNTOPT_NAMES
> +};
> +
> +static void
> +dev_vfs_event_mntopt(struct sbuf *sb, const char *what, struct vfsoptlist *opts)
> +{
> +	struct vfsopt *opt;
> +
> +	if (opts == NULL || TAILQ_EMPTY(opts))
> +		return;
> +	sbuf_printf(sb, " %s=\"", what);
> +	TAILQ_FOREACH(opt, opts, link) {
> +		if (opt->name[0] == '\0' || (opt->len > 0 && *(char *)opt->value == '\0'))
> +			continue;
> +		devctl_safe_quote_sb(sb, opt->name);
> +		if (opt->len > 0) {
> +			sbuf_putc(sb, '=');
> +			devctl_safe_quote_sb(sb, opt->value);
> +		}
> +		sbuf_putc(sb, ';');
> +	}
> +	sbuf_putc(sb, '"');
> +}
> +
> +#define DEVCTL_LEN 1024
> +static void
> +dev_vfs_event(const char *type, struct mount *mp, bool donew)
> +{
> +	const uint8_t *cp;
> +	struct mntoptnames *fp;
> +	struct sbuf sb;
> +	struct statfs *sfp = &mp->mnt_stat;
> +	char *buf;
> +
> +	buf = malloc(DEVCTL_LEN, M_MOUNT, M_WAITOK);
> +	if (buf == NULL)
> +		return;

buf can't be NULL.

> +	sbuf_new(&sb, buf, DEVCTL_LEN, SBUF_FIXEDLEN);
> +	sbuf_cpy(&sb, "mount-point=\"");
> +	devctl_safe_quote_sb(&sb, sfp->f_mntonname);
> +	sbuf_cat(&sb, "\" mount-dev=\"");
> +	devctl_safe_quote_sb(&sb, sfp->f_mntfromname);
> +	sbuf_cat(&sb, "\" mount-type=\"");
> +	devctl_safe_quote_sb(&sb, sfp->f_fstypename);
> +	sbuf_cat(&sb, "\" fsid=0x");
> +	cp = (const uint8_t *)&sfp->f_fsid.val[0];
> +	for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(sfp->f_fsid); i++)
> +		sbuf_printf(&sb, "%02x", cp[i]);
> +	sbuf_printf(&sb, " owner=%u flags=\"", sfp->f_owner);
> +	for (fp = optnames; fp->o_opt != 0; fp++) {
> +		if ((mp->mnt_flag & fp->o_opt) != 0) {
> +			sbuf_cat(&sb, fp->o_name);
> +			sbuf_putc(&sb, ';');
> +		}
> +	}
> +	sbuf_putc(&sb, '"');
> +	dev_vfs_event_mntopt(&sb, "opt", mp->mnt_opt);
> +	if (donew)
> +		dev_vfs_event_mntopt(&sb, "optnew", mp->mnt_optnew);
> +	sbuf_finish(&sb);
> +
> +	devctl_notify("VFS", "FS", type, sbuf_data(&sb));
> +	sbuf_delete(&sb);
> +	free(buf, M_MOUNT);
>  }

I don't really see much attention paid to checking for sbuf overflow.
Could that cause issues, especially in case of impartial quotation
termination? Could not performing those checks have security
implications? Would performing those checks adhere to good code
development practices?

Thanks,

-- 
Shawn Webb
Cofounder / Security Engineer
HardenedBSD

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