svn commit: r280266 - in stable: 10/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1 10/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7 10/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto 10/crypto/openssl/ssl 10/secure/lib/libcrypto/man 8/crypto/openssl/crypto/...
Xin LI
delphij at FreeBSD.org
Thu Mar 19 17:40:47 UTC 2015
Author: delphij
Date: Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015
New Revision: 280266
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/280266
Log:
Fix multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities.
Security: FreeBSD-SA-15:06.openssl
Security: CVE-2015-0209
Security: CVE-2015-0286
Security: CVE-2015-0287
Security: CVE-2015-0288
Security: CVE-2015-0289
Security: CVE-2015-0293
Modified:
stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
stable/9/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
stable/9/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
Changes in other areas also in this revision:
Modified:
stable/10/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
stable/10/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
stable/10/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
stable/10/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
stable/10/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
stable/10/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
stable/10/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
stable/8/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
stable/8/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
stable/8/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
stable/8/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
stable/8/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
stable/8/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
stable/8/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
stable/8/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_type.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, co
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
+ case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+ result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
+ break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -125,16 +125,23 @@ unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag)
ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
- {
+{
ASN1_TLC c;
ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
- if (!pval)
- pval = &ptmpval;
c.valid = 0;
- if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
- return *pval;
- return NULL;
+ if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+ ptmpval = *pval;
+
+ if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) {
+ if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) {
+ if (*pval)
+ ASN1_item_free(*pval, it);
+ *pval = ptmpval;
+ }
+ return ptmpval;
}
+ return NULL;
+}
int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt)
@@ -309,13 +316,20 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it))
goto auxerr;
- /* Allocate structure */
- if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it))
- {
+ if (*pval) {
+ /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+ i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+ if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+ tt = it->templates + i;
+ pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+ ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+ asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+ }
+ } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I,
ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
- }
+ }
/* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
p = *in;
for (i = 0, tt=it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
@@ -405,6 +419,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it))
goto auxerr;
+ /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+ if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+ const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+ ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+ seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+ pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
{
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -151,6 +151,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+ * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+ *
+ * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+ * error.
+ *
+ * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+ * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+ */
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -344,6 +363,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKE
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -637,6 +666,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk=NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os=NULL;
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -668,6 +707,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
/* If detached data then the content is excluded */
if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ os = NULL;
p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
break;
@@ -678,6 +718,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
if(PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached)
{
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+ os = NULL;
p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
}
break;
@@ -813,8 +854,13 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
}
- if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7))
- {
+ if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
+ /*
+ * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+ * digested data support is broken.
+ */
+ if (os == NULL)
+ goto err;
btmp=BIO_find_type(bio,BIO_TYPE_MEM);
if (btmp == NULL)
{
@@ -849,6 +895,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_st
STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
X509 *x509;
+ if (p7 == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
{
cert=p7->d.sign->cert;
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long
switch (cmd)
{
+ /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed)
{
@@ -473,6 +474,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EV
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
{
+ if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+ return NULL;
if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7))
{
return(p7->d.sign->signer_info);
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -199,6 +199,12 @@ B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts
persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
+Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify B<*px> if an error occurs.
+If parsing succeeds then B<*px> is freed (if it is not NULL) and then
+set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result B<*px>
+B<must not> be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
+free an invalid pointer.
+
i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
@@ -210,7 +216,9 @@ always succeed.
d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
-L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. If the "reuse" capability has been used
+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via B<px> then the object is not
+modified in the event of error.
i2d_X509() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_lib.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ int ssl2_generate_key_material(SSL *s)
OPENSSL_assert(s->session->master_key_length >= 0
&& s->session->master_key_length
- < (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
+ <= (int)sizeof(s->session->master_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,&c,1);
c++;
Modified: stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/crypto/openssl/ssl/s2_srvr.c Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -446,9 +446,6 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
return(-1);
}
- i=ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert,s->s2->tmp.enc,
- &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
- (s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
@@ -467,23 +464,61 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
else
ek=5;
+ /*
+ * The format of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is
+ * 1 byte message type
+ * 3 bytes cipher
+ * 2-byte clear key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.clear)
+ * 2-byte encrypted key length (stored in s->s2->tmp.enc)
+ * 2-byte key args length (IV etc)
+ * clear key
+ * encrypted key
+ * key args
+ *
+ * If the cipher is an export cipher, then the encrypted key bytes
+ * are a fixed portion of the total key (5 or 8 bytes). The size of
+ * this portion is in |ek|. If the cipher is not an export cipher,
+ * then the entire key material is encrypted (i.e., clear key length
+ * must be zero).
+ */
+ if ((!is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear != 0) ||
+ (is_export && s->s2->tmp.clear + ek != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The encrypted blob must decrypt to the encrypted portion of the key.
+ * Decryption can't be expanding, so if we don't have enough encrypted
+ * bytes to fit the key in the buffer, stop now.
+ */
+ if ((is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < ek) ||
+ (!is_export && s->s2->tmp.enc < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_rsa_private_decrypt(s->cert, s->s2->tmp.enc,
+ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+ &(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
+ (s->s2->ssl2_rollback) ? RSA_SSLV23_PADDING :
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+
/* bad decrypt */
#if 1
/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
* random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
- if ((i < 0) ||
- ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+(unsigned int)i !=
- (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
- {
+ if ((i < 0) || ((!is_export && i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))
+ || (is_export && i != ek))) {
ERR_clear_error();
if (is_export)
i=ek;
else
i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&p[s->s2->tmp.clear], i) <= 0)
return 0;
- }
+ }
#else
if (i < 0)
{
@@ -505,7 +540,8 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
}
#endif
- if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
+ if (is_export)
+ i = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
if (i > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
Modified: stable/9/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3 Thu Mar 19 16:14:27 2015 (r280265)
+++ stable/9/secure/lib/libcrypto/man/d2i_X509.3 Thu Mar 19 17:40:43 2015 (r280266)
@@ -342,6 +342,12 @@ In some versions of OpenSSL the \*(L"reu
persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
of this \*(L"reuse\*(R" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
.PP
+Current versions of OpenSSL will not modify \fB*px\fR if an error occurs.
+If parsing succeeds then \fB*px\fR is freed (if it is not \s-1NULL\s0) and then
+set to the value of the newly decoded structure. As a result \fB*px\fR
+\&\fBmust not\fR be allocated on the stack or an attempt will be made to
+free an invalid pointer.
+.PP
\&\fIi2d_X509()\fR will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
@@ -352,7 +358,9 @@ always succeed.
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
\&\fId2i_X509()\fR, \fId2i_X509_bio()\fR and \fId2i_X509_fp()\fR return a valid \fBX509\fR structure
or \fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
-\&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
+\&\fIERR_get_error\fR\|(3). If the \*(L"reuse\*(R" capability has been used
+with a valid X509 structure being passed in via \fBpx\fR then the object is not
+modified in the event of error.
.PP
\&\fIi2d_X509()\fR returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative
value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by
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