svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec...

[Edward Tomasz Napierała]

Wiadomość napisana przez Andrey Chernov w dniu 24 gru 2011, o godz. 11:50:
> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:45:21AM -0800, Xin LI wrote:
>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 2:39 AM, Andrey Chernov <ache at freebsd.org> wrote:
>>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 02:26:20AM -0800, Xin LI wrote:
>>>> chroot(2) can create legitimate and secure environment where dlopen(2)
>>>> is safe and necessary.
>>> 
>>> Yes, so ischroot() check can be used only into that places where libc's
>>> libc_dlopen() currently used, i.e. placed into libc_dlopen() itself.
>> 
>> So it's Okay to break NSS in chroot jail?
> 
> We need general solution. We simple can't count all possible and future 
> ftpd's arround the world and insert __FreeBSD_libc_enter_restricted_mode() 
> into them. I even not mention other programs that may use chroot() too. If 
> some component like auth is critical for chroot, it should be restricted 
> in general scope.

How about adding a check in dlopen(3) to make sure the file being opened
is owned either by us (getuid(3)) or root and is not writable by anyone else?