svn commit: r184425 - in head/sys: conf security/mac
Robert Watson
rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Tue Oct 28 14:53:11 PDT 2008
Author: rwatson
Date: Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008
New Revision: 184425
URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/184425
Log:
Break out strictly credential-related portions of mac_process.c into a
new file, mac_cred.c.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Added:
head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c (contents, props changed)
- copied, changed from r184412, head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
Modified:
head/sys/conf/files
head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
Modified: head/sys/conf/files
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/conf/files Tue Oct 28 21:05:09 2008 (r184424)
+++ head/sys/conf/files Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425)
@@ -2175,6 +2175,7 @@ security/audit/audit_trigger.c optional
security/audit/audit_worker.c optional audit
security/mac/mac_atalk.c optional mac netatalk
security/mac/mac_audit.c optional mac audit
+security/mac/mac_cred.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_framework.c optional mac
security/mac/mac_inet.c optional mac inet
security/mac/mac_inet6.c optional mac inet6
Copied and modified: head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c (from r184412, head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c)
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 12:49:07 2008 (r184412, copy source)
+++ head/sys/security/mac/mac_cred.c Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425)
@@ -71,19 +71,6 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
-static int mac_mmap_revocation = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject "
- "relabel");
-
-static int mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 0;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
- &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via "
- "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access");
-
-static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td,
- struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
-
struct label *
mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
{
@@ -104,26 +91,6 @@ mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
cred->cr_label = NULL;
}
-static struct label *
-mac_proc_label_alloc(void)
-{
- struct label *label;
-
- label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
- MAC_PERFORM(proc_init_label, label);
- return (label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_proc_init(struct proc *p)
-{
-
- if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_PROC)
- p->p_label = mac_proc_label_alloc();
- else
- p->p_label = NULL;
-}
-
void
mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
{
@@ -142,24 +109,6 @@ mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
}
}
-static void
-mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(proc_destroy_label, label);
- mac_labelzone_free(label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p)
-{
-
- if (p->p_label != NULL) {
- mac_proc_label_free(p->p_label);
- p->p_label = NULL;
- }
-}
-
/*
* When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
* updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
@@ -219,13 +168,6 @@ mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label
return (error);
}
-void
-mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
-}
-
/*
* When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
* this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
@@ -238,252 +180,6 @@ mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct
MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
}
-int
-mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p)
-{
- struct label *label;
- struct mac mac;
- char *buffer;
- int error;
-
- if (mac_p == NULL)
- return (0);
-
- if (!(mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED))
- return (EINVAL);
-
- error = copyin(mac_p, &mac, sizeof(mac));
- if (error)
- return (error);
-
- error = mac_check_structmac_consistent(&mac);
- if (error)
- return (error);
-
- buffer = malloc(mac.m_buflen, M_MACTEMP, M_WAITOK);
- error = copyinstr(mac.m_string, buffer, mac.m_buflen, NULL);
- if (error) {
- free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
- return (error);
- }
-
- label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
- error = mac_cred_internalize_label(label, buffer);
- free(buffer, M_MACTEMP);
- if (error) {
- mac_cred_label_free(label);
- return (error);
- }
- imgp->execlabel = label;
- return (0);
-}
-
-void
-mac_execve_exit(struct image_params *imgp)
-{
- if (imgp->execlabel != NULL) {
- mac_cred_label_free(imgp->execlabel);
- imgp->execlabel = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-void
-mac_execve_interpreter_enter(struct vnode *interpvp,
- struct label **interpvplabel)
-{
-
- if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_VNODE) {
- *interpvplabel = mac_vnode_label_alloc();
- mac_vnode_copy_label(interpvp->v_label, *interpvplabel);
- } else
- *interpvplabel = NULL;
-}
-
-void
-mac_execve_interpreter_exit(struct label *interpvplabel)
-{
-
- if (interpvplabel != NULL)
- mac_vnode_label_free(interpvplabel);
-}
-
-/*
- * When relabeling a process, call out to the policies for the maximum
- * permission allowed for each object type we know about in its memory space,
- * and revoke access (in the least surprising ways we know) when necessary.
- * The process lock is not held here.
- */
-void
-mac_proc_vm_revoke(struct thread *td)
-{
- struct ucred *cred;
-
- PROC_LOCK(td->td_proc);
- cred = crhold(td->td_proc->p_ucred);
- PROC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc);
-
- /* XXX freeze all other threads */
- mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(td, cred,
- &td->td_proc->p_vmspace->vm_map);
- /* XXX allow other threads to continue */
-
- crfree(cred);
-}
-
-static __inline const char *
-prot2str(vm_prot_t prot)
-{
-
- switch (prot & VM_PROT_ALL) {
- case VM_PROT_READ:
- return ("r--");
- case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE:
- return ("rw-");
- case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
- return ("r-x");
- case VM_PROT_READ | VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
- return ("rwx");
- case VM_PROT_WRITE:
- return ("-w-");
- case VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
- return ("--x");
- case VM_PROT_WRITE | VM_PROT_EXECUTE:
- return ("-wx");
- default:
- return ("---");
- }
-}
-
-static void
-mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td, struct ucred *cred,
- struct vm_map *map)
-{
- struct vm_map_entry *vme;
- int vfslocked, result;
- vm_prot_t revokeperms;
- vm_object_t backing_object, object;
- vm_ooffset_t offset;
- struct vnode *vp;
- struct mount *mp;
-
- if (!mac_mmap_revocation)
- return;
-
- vm_map_lock_read(map);
- for (vme = map->header.next; vme != &map->header; vme = vme->next) {
- if (vme->eflags & MAP_ENTRY_IS_SUB_MAP) {
- mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(td, cred,
- vme->object.sub_map);
- continue;
- }
- /*
- * Skip over entries that obviously are not shared.
- */
- if (vme->eflags & (MAP_ENTRY_COW | MAP_ENTRY_NOSYNC) ||
- !vme->max_protection)
- continue;
- /*
- * Drill down to the deepest backing object.
- */
- offset = vme->offset;
- object = vme->object.vm_object;
- if (object == NULL)
- continue;
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object);
- while ((backing_object = object->backing_object) != NULL) {
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK(backing_object);
- offset += object->backing_object_offset;
- VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object);
- object = backing_object;
- }
- VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object);
- /*
- * At the moment, vm_maps and objects aren't considered by
- * the MAC system, so only things with backing by a normal
- * object (read: vnodes) are checked.
- */
- if (object->type != OBJT_VNODE)
- continue;
- vp = (struct vnode *)object->handle;
- vfslocked = VFS_LOCK_GIANT(vp->v_mount);
- vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
- result = vme->max_protection;
- mac_vnode_check_mmap_downgrade(cred, vp, &result);
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
- /*
- * Find out what maximum protection we may be allowing now
- * but a policy needs to get removed.
- */
- revokeperms = vme->max_protection & ~result;
- if (!revokeperms) {
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- continue;
- }
- printf("pid %ld: revoking %s perms from %#lx:%ld "
- "(max %s/cur %s)\n", (long)td->td_proc->p_pid,
- prot2str(revokeperms), (u_long)vme->start,
- (long)(vme->end - vme->start),
- prot2str(vme->max_protection), prot2str(vme->protection));
- vm_map_lock_upgrade(map);
- /*
- * This is the really simple case: if a map has more
- * max_protection than is allowed, but it's not being
- * actually used (that is, the current protection is still
- * allowed), we can just wipe it out and do nothing more.
- */
- if ((vme->protection & revokeperms) == 0) {
- vme->max_protection -= revokeperms;
- } else {
- if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_WRITE) {
- /*
- * In the more complicated case, flush out all
- * pending changes to the object then turn it
- * copy-on-write.
- */
- vm_object_reference(object);
- (void) vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT);
- vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY);
- VM_OBJECT_LOCK(object);
- vm_object_page_clean(object,
- OFF_TO_IDX(offset),
- OFF_TO_IDX(offset + vme->end - vme->start +
- PAGE_MASK),
- OBJPC_SYNC);
- VM_OBJECT_UNLOCK(object);
- VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0);
- vn_finished_write(mp);
- vm_object_deallocate(object);
- /*
- * Why bother if there's no read permissions
- * anymore? For the rest, we need to leave
- * the write permissions on for COW, or
- * remove them entirely if configured to.
- */
- if (!mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow) {
- vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE;
- vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_WRITE;
- } if ((revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) == 0)
- vme->eflags |= MAP_ENTRY_COW |
- MAP_ENTRY_NEEDS_COPY;
- }
- if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) {
- vme->max_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
- vme->protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;
- }
- if (revokeperms & VM_PROT_READ) {
- vme->max_protection = 0;
- vme->protection = 0;
- }
- pmap_protect(map->pmap, vme->start, vme->end,
- vme->protection & ~revokeperms);
- vm_map_simplify_entry(map, vme);
- }
- vm_map_lock_downgrade(map);
- VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT(vfslocked);
- }
- vm_map_unlock_read(map);
-}
-
/*
* When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
* to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
@@ -515,160 +211,3 @@ mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1
return (error);
}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_debug, cred, p);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_sched, cred, p);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p, int signum)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_signal, cred, p, signum);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setuid, cred, uid);
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_seteuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t euid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_seteuid, cred, euid);
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t gid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgid, cred, gid);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setegid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t egid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setegid, cred, egid);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setgroups(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, int ngroups,
- gid_t *gidset)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setgroups, cred, ngroups, gidset);
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setreuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
- uid_t euid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setreuid, cred, ruid, euid);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setregid(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
- gid_t egid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(proc, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setregid, cred, rgid, egid);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setresuid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, uid_t ruid,
- uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresuid, cred, ruid, euid, suid);
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_setresgid(struct proc *p, struct ucred *cred, gid_t rgid,
- gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_setresgid, cred, rgid, egid, sgid);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_proc_check_wait(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
-{
- int error;
-
- PROC_LOCK_ASSERT(p, MA_OWNED);
-
- MAC_CHECK(proc_check_wait, cred, p);
-
- return (error);
-}
Modified: head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 21:05:09 2008 (r184424)
+++ head/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c Tue Oct 28 21:53:10 2008 (r184425)
@@ -84,26 +84,6 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap
static void mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread *td,
struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
-struct label *
-mac_cred_label_alloc(void)
-{
- struct label *label;
-
- label = mac_labelzone_alloc(M_WAITOK);
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_init_label, label);
- return (label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
- if (mac_labeled & MPC_OBJECT_CRED)
- cred->cr_label = mac_cred_label_alloc();
- else
- cred->cr_label = NULL;
-}
-
static struct label *
mac_proc_label_alloc(void)
{
@@ -124,24 +104,6 @@ mac_proc_init(struct proc *p)
p->p_label = NULL;
}
-void
-mac_cred_label_free(struct label *label)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_destroy_label, label);
- mac_labelzone_free(label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
- if (cred->cr_label != NULL) {
- mac_cred_label_free(cred->cr_label);
- cred->cr_label = NULL;
- }
-}
-
static void
mac_proc_label_free(struct label *label)
{
@@ -160,65 +122,6 @@ mac_proc_destroy(struct proc *p)
}
}
-/*
- * When a thread becomes an NFS server daemon, its credential may need to be
- * updated to reflect this so that policies can recognize when file system
- * operations originate from the network.
- *
- * At some point, it would be desirable if the credential used for each NFS
- * RPC could be set based on the RPC context (i.e., source system, etc) to
- * provide more fine-grained access control.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_associate_nfsd(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_associate_nfsd, cred);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize MAC label for the first kernel process, from which other kernel
- * processes and threads are spawned.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_create_swapper(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_swapper, cred);
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize MAC label for the first userland process, from which other
- * userland processes and threads are spawned.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_create_init(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_create_init, cred);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_externalize_label(struct label *label, char *elements,
- char *outbuf, size_t outbuflen)
-{
- int error;
-
- MAC_EXTERNALIZE(cred, label, elements, outbuf, outbuflen);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_internalize_label(struct label *label, char *string)
-{
- int error;
-
- MAC_INTERNALIZE(cred, label, string);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
void
mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
{
@@ -226,18 +129,6 @@ mac_thread_userret(struct thread *td)
MAC_PERFORM(thread_userret, td);
}
-/*
- * When a new process is created, its label must be initialized. Generally,
- * this involves inheritence from the parent process, modulo possible deltas.
- * This function allows that processing to take place.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_copy_label, src->cr_label, dest->cr_label);
-}
-
int
mac_execve_enter(struct image_params *imgp, struct mac *mac_p)
{
@@ -484,38 +375,6 @@ mac_proc_vm_revoke_recurse(struct thread
vm_map_unlock_read(map);
}
-/*
- * When the subject's label changes, it may require revocation of privilege
- * to mapped objects. This can't be done on-the-fly later with a unified
- * buffer cache.
- */
-void
-mac_cred_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
-{
-
- MAC_PERFORM(cred_relabel, cred, newlabel);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_check_relabel(struct ucred *cred, struct label *newlabel)
-{
- int error;
-
- MAC_CHECK(cred_check_relabel, cred, newlabel);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_cred_check_visible(struct ucred *cr1, struct ucred *cr2)
-{
- int error;
-
- MAC_CHECK(cred_check_visible, cr1, cr2);
-
- return (error);
-}
-
int
mac_proc_check_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *p)
{
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