svn commit: r437732 - in head/emulators/xen-kernel: . files
Roger Pau Monné
royger at FreeBSD.org
Tue Apr 4 13:32:54 UTC 2017
Author: royger (src committer)
Date: Tue Apr 4 13:32:53 2017
New Revision: 437732
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/437732
Log:
xen: apply XSA-212
And do some portlint fixing (thanks to Li-Wen Hsu).
Approved by: lwshu
Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D
MFH: 2017Q1
Added:
head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch (contents, props changed)
Modified:
head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
Modified: head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Tue Apr 4 13:16:05 2017 (r437731)
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Tue Apr 4 13:32:53 2017 (r437732)
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# $FreeBSD$
PORTNAME= xen
-PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
PORTVERSION= 4.7.2
-PORTREVISION= 0
+PORTREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${PORTVERSION}/
+PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
MAINTAINER= royger at FreeBSD.org
COMMENT= Hypervisor using a microkernel design
@@ -41,16 +41,17 @@ EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logd
${FILESDIR}/0002-xen-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/0001-x86-drop-unneeded-__packed-attributes.patch:-p1 \
- ${FILESDIR}/0002-build-clang-fix-XSM-dummy-policy-when-using-clang-4..patch:-p1
+ ${FILESDIR}/0002-build-clang-fix-XSM-dummy-policy-when-using-clang-4..patch:-p1 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa212.patch:-p1
.include <bsd.port.options.mk>
.if ${OPSYS} != FreeBSD
-IGNORE= Only supported on FreeBSD
+IGNORE= only supported on FreeBSD
.endif
.if ${OSVERSION} < 1100055
-IGNORE= Only supported on recent FreeBSD 11
+IGNORE= only supported on recent FreeBSD 11
.endif
pre-build:
Added: head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa212.patch Tue Apr 4 13:32:53 2017 (r437732)
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+memory: properly check guest memory ranges in XENMEM_exchange handling
+
+The use of guest_handle_okay() here (as introduced by the XSA-29 fix)
+is insufficient here, guest_handle_subrange_okay() needs to be used
+instead.
+
+Note that the uses are okay in
+- XENMEM_add_to_physmap_batch handling due to the size field being only
+ 16 bits wide,
+- livepatch_list() due to the limit of 1024 enforced on the
+ number-of-entries input (leaving aside the fact that this can be
+ called by a privileged domain only anyway),
+- compat mode handling due to counts there being limited to 32 bits,
+- everywhere else due to guest arrays being accessed sequentially from
+ index zero.
+
+This is XSA-212.
+
+Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh at google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich at suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3 at citrix.com>
+
+--- a/xen/common/memory.c
++++ b/xen/common/memory.c
+@@ -436,8 +436,8 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ goto fail_early;
+ }
+
+- if ( !guest_handle_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.in.nr_extents) ||
+- !guest_handle_okay(exch.out.extent_start, exch.out.nr_extents) )
++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.in.extent_start, exch.nr_exchanged,
++ exch.in.nr_extents - 1) )
+ {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto fail_early;
+@@ -447,11 +447,27 @@ static long memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HA
+ {
+ in_chunk_order = exch.out.extent_order - exch.in.extent_order;
+ out_chunk_order = 0;
++
++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start,
++ exch.nr_exchanged >> in_chunk_order,
++ exch.out.nr_extents - 1) )
++ {
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ goto fail_early;
++ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ in_chunk_order = 0;
+ out_chunk_order = exch.in.extent_order - exch.out.extent_order;
++
++ if ( !guest_handle_subrange_okay(exch.out.extent_start,
++ exch.nr_exchanged << out_chunk_order,
++ exch.out.nr_extents - 1) )
++ {
++ rc = -EFAULT;
++ goto fail_early;
++ }
+ }
+
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(exch.in.domid);
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
+@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long *
+ /*
+ * Valid if in +ve half of 48-bit address space, or above Xen-reserved area.
+ * This is also valid for range checks (addr, addr+size). As long as the
+- * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area then we will access a
+- * non-canonical address (and thus fault) before ever reaching VIRT_START.
++ * start address is outside the Xen-reserved area, sequential accesses
++ * (starting at addr) will hit a non-canonical address (and thus fault)
++ * before ever reaching VIRT_START.
+ */
+ #define __addr_ok(addr) \
+ (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<47)) || \
+@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ extern void *xlat_malloc(unsigned long *
+ (__addr_ok(addr) || is_compat_arg_xlat_range(addr, size))
+
+ #define array_access_ok(addr, count, size) \
+- (access_ok(addr, (count)*(size)))
++ (likely(((count) ?: 0UL) < (~0UL / (size))) && \
++ access_ok(addr, (count) * (size)))
+
+ #define __compat_addr_ok(d, addr) \
+ ((unsigned long)(addr) < HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d))
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