svn commit: r474803 - head/security/vuxml
Jochen Neumeister
joneum at FreeBSD.org
Tue Jul 17 15:29:25 UTC 2018
Author: joneum
Date: Tue Jul 17 15:29:24 2018
New Revision: 474803
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/474803
Log:
Document vulberability for typo3-7 and typo3-8
Modified:
head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
==============================================================================
--- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Tue Jul 17 15:01:56 2018 (r474802)
+++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Tue Jul 17 15:29:24 2018 (r474803)
@@ -58,6 +58,64 @@ Notes:
* Do not forget port variants (linux-f10-libxml2, libxml2, etc.)
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+ <vuln vid="ef013039-89cd-11e8-84e9-00e04c1ea73d">
+ <topic>typo3 -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>typo3-7</name>
+ <range><lt>7.6.30</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ <package>
+ <name>typo3-8</name>
+ <range><lt>8.7.17</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>Typo3 core team reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="https://typo3.org/article/typo3-931-8717-and-7630-security-releases-published/">
+ <p>It has been discovered that TYPO3’s Salted Password system extension (which is a mandatory system component)
+ is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass when using hashing methods which are related by PHP class inheritance.
+ In standard TYPO3 core distributions stored passwords using the blowfish hashing algorithm can be overridden
+ when using MD5 as the default hashing algorithm by just knowing a valid username.
+ Per default the Portable PHP hashing algorithm (PHPass) is used which is not vulnerable.</p>
+ <p>Phar files (formerly known as "PHP archives") can act als self extracting archives which leads to the fact
+ that source code is executed when Phar files are invoked. The Phar file format is not limited to be stored
+ with a dedicated file extension - "bundle.phar" would be valid as well as "bundle.txt" would be. This way,
+ Phar files can be obfuscated as image or text file which would not be denied from being uploaded and persisted
+ to a TYPO3 installation. Due to a missing sanitization of user input, those Phar files can be invoked by
+ manipulated URLs in TYPO3 backend forms. A valid backend user account is needed to exploit this vulnerability.
+ In theory the attack vector would be possible in the TYPO3 frontend as well, however no functional exploit
+ has been identified so far.</p>
+ <p>Failing to properly dissociate system related configuration from user generated configuration,
+ the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to SQL injection and Privilege Escalation.
+ Basically instructions can be persisted to a form definition file that were not configured to be modified -
+ this applies to definitions managed using the form editor module as well as direct file upload using the regular
+ file list module. A valid backend user account as well as having system extension form activated are needed
+ in order to exploit this vulnerability.</p>
+ <p>It has been discovered that the Form Framework (system extension "form") is vulnerable to Insecure Deserialization
+ when being used with the additional PHP PECL package “yaml”, which is capable of unserializing YAML contents
+ to PHP objects. A valid backend user account as well as having PHP setting "yaml.decode_php" enabled is needed
+ to exploit this vulnerability.</p>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <cvename>CORE-SA-2018-001</cvename>
+ <cvename>CORE-SA-2018-002</cvename>
+ <cvename>CORE-SA-2018-003</cvename>
+ <cvename>CORE-SA-2018-004</cvename>
+ <url>https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-001/</url>
+ <url>https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-002/</url>
+ <url>https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-003/</url>
+ <url>https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2018-004/</url>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2018-07-12</discovery>
+ <entry>2018-07-17</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
<vuln vid="fe93803c-883f-11e8-9f0c-001b216d295b">
<topic>Several Security Defects in the Bouncy Castle Crypto APIs</topic>
<affects>
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