svn commit: r419464 - in branches/2016Q3: emulators/xen-kernel emulators/xen-kernel/files misc/seabios sysutils/xen-tools sysutils/xen-tools/files
Jason Unovitch
junovitch at FreeBSD.org
Tue Aug 2 02:16:30 UTC 2016
Author: junovitch
Date: Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016
New Revision: 419464
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/419464
Log:
MFH: r418136 r418138 r419430
seabios: update to 1.9.3
xen-tools: bump PORTREVISION after SeaBIOS update
xen: apply XSA-{182/183/184}
PR: 211482
Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D
Approved by: ports-secteam (with hat)
Security: CVE-2016-5403
Security: CVE-2016-6259
Security: CVE-2016-6258
Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/06574c62-5854-11e6-b334-002590263bf5.html
Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/04cf89e3-5854-11e6-b334-002590263bf5.html
Security: https://vuxml.FreeBSD.org/freebsd/032aa524-5854-11e6-b334-002590263bf5.html
Added:
branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch
- copied unchanged from r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch
branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch
- copied unchanged from r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch
branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch
- copied unchanged from r419430, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch
Modified:
branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/Makefile
branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/distinfo
branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
Directory Properties:
branches/2016Q3/ (props changed)
Modified: branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:07:56 2016 (r419463)
+++ branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464)
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PKGNAMESUFFIX= -kernel
PORTVERSION= 4.7.0
-PORTREVISION= 2
+PORTREVISION= 3
CATEGORIES= emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
@@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ PLIST_FILES= /boot/xen \
/boot/xen.4th
EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/0001-xen-logdirty-prevent-preemption-if-finished.patch:-p1 \
${FILESDIR}/0002-xen-rework-paging_log_dirty_op-to-work-with-hvm-gues.patch:-p1 \
- ${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1
+ ${FILESDIR}/kconf_arch.patch:-p1 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa182-unstable.patch:-p1 \
+ ${FILESDIR}/xsa183-unstable.patch:-p1
.include <bsd.port.options.mk>
Copied: branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch (from r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464, copy of r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa182-unstable.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+From 00593655e231ed5ea20704120037026e33b83fbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3 at citrix.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jul 2016 14:32:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/pv: Remove unsafe bits from the mod_l?_entry() fastpath
+
+All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
+re-validation.
+
+Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
+
+This is XSA-182
+
+Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille at ext.quarkslab.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3 at citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim at xen.org>
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++------------
+ xen/include/asm-x86/page.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+index dbcf6cb..56ca19f 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+@@ -1852,6 +1852,14 @@ static inline int update_intpte(intpte_t *p,
+ _t ## e_get_intpte(_o), _t ## e_get_intpte(_n), \
+ (_m), (_v), (_ad))
+
++/*
++ * PTE flags that a guest may change without re-validating the PTE.
++ * All other bits affect translation, caching, or Xen's safety.
++ */
++#define FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST \
++ (_PAGE_NX_BIT | _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH | _PAGE_AVAIL | _PAGE_GLOBAL | \
++ _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER)
++
+ /* Update the L1 entry at pl1e to new value nl1e. */
+ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+ unsigned long gl1mfn, int preserve_ad,
+@@ -1891,9 +1899,8 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl1e, l1_pgentry_t nl1e,
+ nl1e = l1e_from_pfn(page_to_mfn(page), l1e_get_flags(nl1e));
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w, presence, and cachability. */
+- if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e,
+- PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom);
+ rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu,
+@@ -1970,11 +1977,8 @@ static int mod_l2_entry(l2_pgentry_t *pl2e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e,
+- unlikely(opt_allow_superpage)
+- ? _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT
+- : _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l2e_has_changed(ol2e, nl2e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l2e(nl2e, d);
+ if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l2, pl2e, ol2e, nl2e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad) )
+@@ -2039,8 +2043,8 @@ static int mod_l3_entry(l3_pgentry_t *pl3e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l3e_has_changed(ol3e, nl3e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l3e(nl3e, d);
+ rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l3, pl3e, ol3e, nl3e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+@@ -2103,8 +2107,8 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e,
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- /* Fast path for identical mapping and presence. */
+- if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, _PAGE_PRESENT) )
++ /* Fast path for sufficiently-similar mappings. */
++ if ( !l4e_has_changed(ol4e, nl4e, ~FASTPATH_FLAG_WHITELIST) )
+ {
+ adjust_guest_l4e(nl4e, d);
+ rc = UPDATE_ENTRY(l4, pl4e, ol4e, nl4e, pfn, vcpu, preserve_ad);
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+index 224852a..4ae387f 100644
+--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h
+@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t);
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL2 _AC(0x800,U)
+ #define _PAGE_AVAIL _AC(0xE00,U)
+ #define _PAGE_PSE_PAT _AC(0x1000,U)
++#define _PAGE_AVAIL_HIGH (_AC(0x7ff, U) << 12)
+ #define _PAGE_NX (cpu_has_nx ? _PAGE_NX_BIT : 0)
+ /* non-architectural flags */
+ #define _PAGE_PAGED 0x2000U
+--
+2.1.4
+
Copied: branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch (from r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q3/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464, copy of r419430, head/emulators/xen-kernel/files/xsa183-unstable.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From 2fd4f34058fb5f87fbd80978dbd2cb458aff565d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3 at citrix.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jun 2016 18:32:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] x86/entry: Avoid SMAP violation in
+ compat_create_bounce_frame()
+
+A 32bit guest kernel might be running on user mappings.
+compat_create_bounce_frame() must whitelist its guest accesses to avoid
+risking a SMAP violation.
+
+For both variants of create_bounce_frame(), re-blacklist user accesses if
+execution exits via an exception table redirection.
+
+This is XSA-183 / CVE-2016-6259
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3 at citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap at citrix.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich at suse.com>
+---
+v2:
+ * Include CLAC on the exit paths from compat_create_bounce_frame which occur
+ from faults attempting to load %fs
+ * Reposition ASM_STAC to avoid breaking the macro-op fusion of test/jz
+---
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 3 +++
+ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+index 7f02afd..e80c53c 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ ENTRY(compat_int80_direct_trap)
+ compat_create_bounce_frame:
+ ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_ENABLED
+ mov %fs,%edi
++ ASM_STAC
+ testb $2,UREGS_cs+8(%rsp)
+ jz 1f
+ /* Push new frame at registered guest-OS stack base. */
+@@ -364,6 +365,7 @@ compat_create_bounce_frame:
+ movl TRAPBOUNCE_error_code(%rdx),%eax
+ .Lft8: movl %eax,%fs:(%rsi) # ERROR CODE
+ 1:
++ ASM_CLAC
+ /* Rewrite our stack frame and return to guest-OS mode. */
+ /* IA32 Ref. Vol. 3: TF, VM, RF and NT flags are cleared on trap. */
+ andl $~(X86_EFLAGS_VM|X86_EFLAGS_RF|\
+@@ -403,6 +405,7 @@ compat_crash_page_fault_4:
+ addl $4,%esi
+ compat_crash_page_fault:
+ .Lft14: mov %edi,%fs
++ ASM_CLAC
+ movl %esi,%edi
+ call show_page_walk
+ jmp dom_crash_sync_extable
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+index ad8c64c..f7178cd 100644
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -420,9 +420,11 @@ domain_crash_page_fault_16:
+ domain_crash_page_fault_8:
+ addq $8,%rsi
+ domain_crash_page_fault:
++ ASM_CLAC
+ movq %rsi,%rdi
+ call show_page_walk
+ ENTRY(dom_crash_sync_extable)
++ ASM_CLAC
+ # Get out of the guest-save area of the stack.
+ GET_STACK_END(ax)
+ leaq STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(guest_cpu_user_regs)(%rax),%rsp
+--
+2.1.4
+
Modified: branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:07:56 2016 (r419463)
+++ branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# $FreeBSD$
PORTNAME= seabios
-PORTVERSION= 1.9.2
+PORTVERSION= 1.9.3
CATEGORIES= misc
MASTER_SITES= http://code.coreboot.org/p/seabios/downloads/get/
Modified: branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/distinfo
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/distinfo Tue Aug 2 02:07:56 2016 (r419463)
+++ branches/2016Q3/misc/seabios/distinfo Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464)
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-SHA256 (seabios-1.9.2.tar.gz) = f01d459b0e50996fdfa021eea5010776c26f739adba73957af519233165ebbe5
-SIZE (seabios-1.9.2.tar.gz) = 570726
+TIMESTAMP = 1467646492
+SHA256 (seabios-1.9.3.tar.gz) = 1ae85dc049cdee1ca953612e9ab4cec3941a4a4e744b7036624c308781b0678d
+SIZE (seabios-1.9.3.tar.gz) = 571224
Modified: branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:07:56 2016 (r419463)
+++ branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/Makefile Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464)
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
PORTNAME= xen
PKGNAMESUFFIX= -tools
PORTVERSION= 4.7.0
-PORTREVISION= 2
+PORTREVISION= 4
CATEGORIES= sysutils emulators
MASTER_SITES= http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PORTVERSION}/
Copied: branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch (from r419430, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch)
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ branches/2016Q3/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch Tue Aug 2 02:16:28 2016 (r419464, copy of r419430, head/sysutils/xen-tools/files/xsa184-qemuu-master.patch)
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From e469db25d6b2e5c71cd15451889226641c53a5cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: P J P <ppandit at redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 17:37:18 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio: error out if guest exceeds virtqueue size
+
+A broken or malicious guest can submit more requests than the virtqueue
+size permits.
+
+The guest can submit requests without bothering to wait for completion
+and is therefore not bound by virtqueue size. This requires reusing
+vring descriptors in more than one request, which is incorrect but
+possible. Processing a request allocates a VirtQueueElement and
+therefore causes unbounded memory allocation controlled by the guest.
+
+Exit with an error if the guest provides more requests than the
+virtqueue size permits. This bounds memory allocation and makes the
+buggy guest visible to the user.
+
+Reported-by: Zhenhao Hong <zhenhaohong at gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha at redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/virtio/virtio.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio.c b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+index d24f775..f8ac0fb 100644
+--- a/hw/virtio/virtio.c
++++ b/hw/virtio/virtio.c
+@@ -483,6 +483,11 @@ int virtqueue_pop(VirtQueue *vq, VirtQueueElement *elem)
+
+ max = vq->vring.num;
+
++ if (vq->inuse >= max) {
++ error_report("Virtqueue size exceeded");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
+ i = head = virtqueue_get_head(vq, vq->last_avail_idx++);
+ if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
+ vring_set_avail_event(vq, vq->last_avail_idx);
+--
+2.1.4
+
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