Text relocations in kernel modules

[Shawn Webb]

If there is malicious code in a kernel module, then discussions of
relocations become moot.

Sent from my Android 4.0 device. Please forgive any spelling or grammatical
errors.
On Apr 4, 2012 11:35 AM, "jb" <jb.1234abcd at gmail.com> wrote:

> Peter Wemm <peter <at> wemm.org> writes:
>
> > ...
> > There is no way to interfere because it is done outside of user space
> > entirely, **after** the file has been copied out of the file system.
> > You can do whatever you like to the file, but it has no effect because
> > all the relocation is done in a private kernel copy.
> > ...
>
> What if attack code (broadly understood) is part of module code, and is
> based
> on either or both of:
> - hidden (as to meaning and reloc targets) arrangement of relocations
> needed
> - has an ability of (self) activation during load/link and *relocations*
> process
> already under the privilege of the kernel ?
>
> Is that possible at all ?
> Would there be any protection against it (except giving up relocations as
> an enabling vehicle) ?
>
> jb
>
>
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