From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Aug 5 17:54:25 2020 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 17:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:21.usb_net Message-ID: <20200805175425.189A21B5B9@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-20:21.usb_net Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Potential memory corruption in USB network device drivers Category: core Module: kernel Announced: 2020-08-05 Credits: Ilja van Sprundel, IOActive Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2020-06-14 05:25:06 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:11:18 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p8) 2020-06-14 05:27:37 UTC (stable/11, 11.4-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:11:18 UTC (releng/11.4, 11.4-RELEASE-p2) 2020-08-05 17:11:18 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p12) CVE Name: CVE-2020-7459 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background FreeBSD includes a number of USB Ethernet network interface device drivers, including: - smsc(4), supporting SMSC (now Microchip) devices - muge(4), supporting Microchip devices - cdceem(4), supporting USB Communication Device Class compatible devices II. Problem Description A missing length validation code common to these three drivers means that a malicious USB device could write beyond the end of an allocated network packet buffer. III. Impact An attacker with physical access to a USB port and the ability to bring a network interface up may be able to use a specially crafted USB device to gain kernel or user-space code execution. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. Systems with no active (i.e., UP) interface supported by any of the smsc(4), muge(4), and cdceem(4) drivers are not vulnerable. Exploitation likely requires malicious USB hardware that emulates hardware supported by one of these device drivers. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update" 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 12.x] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/usb_net.12.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/usb_net.12.patch.asc # gpg --verify usb_net.12.patch.asc [FreeBSD 11.x] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/usb_net.11.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/usb_net.11.patch.asc # gpg --verify usb_net.11.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/12/ r362166 releng/12.1/ r363921 stable/11/ r362167 releng/11.4/ r363921 releng/11.3/ r363921 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAl8q63dfFIAAAAAALgAo aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n 5cIp7g//ZGKbxNKWsYEFXwNbBVbtkWMCQbj0V0TG2NReOsbYYhOolfkErZBpeTHt iFJr5m3WY21a6ks/8up02HJyZ5oZwFFeMOMF/CKibZuym/8L8XgoU0uh/eHLiTvZ qRf3p43xegcKgatFPggKA0yewNxMNETHI7BeO6+pkwYFQgb7f9GhM4JzC+DmaX6i kyGcrnYoZzgKo2BGt65VRbvzucw/Su7wL4JutKhZlXDz7kxFv1gxB8Dqk9BBW9QM EHejzhMCo6T0doYKLuZnz+SI2a/LOcTuNgR+5RnnxsVziLx+8csMNYy3YVw6JNXe XC+8aJ7Un8BLKDoNJjoZ/J9IygJoaWgUa9+SH0pAtOeWhrfRUgd74ZZWfhiZkK5U AXgY46c6Ce28TbEHTWgOAQgXRNB7iJgxVo6mTSnDt8t3YWh4t3g/rjHPKHagTNYC aCd6gcJewb1Pw/8X/7H1FXRtUleHgMaxQ7ec8V5BwcXSexo4xZfq8qQTUbCuRmDg 4GaF8SondVb1TJxHwfq2wWvFhiwMWnRxwwjY6jkxiIjecc5vtrb2bwRq7nmKWciT uV0jRj9ttP73ftE/zO94avXCbpCfHXMSpwaJMcs8PH+sHYXNhy0awuIped1ANXlh E2jrNBW85gyKpnjfcAgECFid3Cu1V1xWo1BCTOWJXQjKi2Gaoa0= =xbKP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Aug 5 17:54:30 2020 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 17:54:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:22.sqlite Message-ID: <20200805175429.DDBF41B725@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-20:22.sqlite Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in sqlite3 Category: contrib Module: sqlite3 Announced: 2020-08-05 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2020-06-15 03:10:53 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:13:08 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p8) 2020-06-15 03:10:53 UTC (stable/11, 11.4-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:13:08 UTC (releng/11.4, 11.4-RELEASE-p2) 2020-08-05 17:13:08 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p12) CVE Name: CVE-2020-11655, CVE-2020-11656, CVE-2020-13434, CVE-2020-13435, CVE-2020-13630, CVE-2020-13631, CVE-2020-13632 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background SQLite is an SQL database engine in a C library. Programs that link the SQLite library can have SQL database access without running a separate RDBMS process. The distribution comes with a standalone command-line access program (sqlite3) that can be used to administer an SQLite database and which serves as an example of how to use the SQLite library. FreeBSD includes SQLite as a private library for base system usage that is not generally exposed for third party packages to use. II. Problem Description Multiple vulnerabilities have been published including improper input validation (CVE-2020-11655), use after free (CVE-2020-11656, CVE-2020-13630), integer overflow (CVE-2020-13434), null pointer dereference (CVE-2020-13435, CVE-2020-13632), and namespace collision (CVE-2020-13631). III. Impact Malicious SQL statements could crash, hijack processes, or cause data corruption. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. The FreeBSD security team is not aware of any base system components that use SQLite in such a way as to expose these vulnerabilities to untrusted or remote users, but is updating SQLite out of an abundance of caution. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update" 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 12.1] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch.asc # gpg --verify sqlite.12.1.patch.asc [FreeBSD 11.4] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch.asc # gpg --verify sqlite.11.4.patch.asc [FreeBSD 11.3] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch.asc # gpg --verify sqlite.11.3.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all daemons that use the library, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/12/ r362190 releng/12.1/ r363922 stable/11/ r362190 releng/11.4/ r363922 releng/11.3/ r363922 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAl8q63dfFIAAAAAALgAo aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n 5cIJdw/9FSXst26ZsA63KixpJbWMnlzJkSPEPiGQ0SlrfeE7co6qukiAnxKzL9rW P5ztBbqqcqu/mISIDDRaOp03ex1oAwhYf4cMRCX4v1wZmGfdH6L9s0LwgfFXtT2G RwucImiAKHwLo7YTxUs54qrSu6gmDUp9u440ac1tVHSEsKzvD557sg4sp248tSZx +/W667F2xsed4plRvNostfFD1aIbBsgMl0vz4FPZ3dToxrjpeSW+9aHrv6iIgsSA jheXF/Fol5AABrHrOHc8HbKBsDEsmz/AdwHiX1ngH1dXRRze95YEJy64Ee0C7/Fj MXlhg3JqctCFXy2e2nTHna5xKd3YW4Gy2b2xquIAg/W9rZRxy1ZwQEOO5R+DyteF s/YN6oD4jJPsR2uTUMq4Z6q7IKDwb7PT2ncTblxIG7vBs6V6NuM0Yd0cqMdPnEdt rn7hIaPvvsp3nFYMPhIX9gMRl5K9Vl11BWtfEFv3Egh5c5jA0/LWvMP1DLkpKV8c lXP5C/cltod7zTAkCk8XxOOCi5fLnP8qPQhAy3etq2dtREMgkHfnIxPSmjqsPgBI uU4CXW3dDlh9RrsePwls++BItUcueKDUJYBAS98Z+XLxaapjj4R3fYa2ygbyjqno nprfR9X6QW6MPv0xL9wCTGqwQXrvWxDxlnTPEQ5Ah6eOCKEfWD8= =nB/p -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From security-advisories at freebsd.org Wed Aug 5 17:54:36 2020 From: security-advisories at freebsd.org (FreeBSD Security Advisories) Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 17:54:34 +0000 (UTC) Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:23.sendmsg Message-ID: <20200805175434.E1C5C1B801@freefall.freebsd.org> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-20:23.sendmsg Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: sendmsg(2) privilege escalation Category: core Module: kernel compat32 Announced: 2020-08-05 Credits: m00nbsd working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2020-08-05 17:07:13 UTC (stable/12, 12.1-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:14:01 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p8) 2020-08-05 17:08:02 UTC (stable/11, 11.4-STABLE) 2020-08-05 17:14:01 UTC (releng/11.4, 11.4-RELEASE-p2) 2020-08-05 17:14:01 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p12) CVE Name: CVE-2020-7460 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background FreeBSD provides the compat32 subsystem, used to enable execution of 32-bit binaries on amd64 and other 64-bit platforms. System calls whose parameters require translation are handled by compat32 before being dispatched to the native system call handler. sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2) may be used to transmit or receive control messages whose contents are evaluated by the kernel. Such messages have different alignment constraints on 32-bit and 64-bit platforms and thus must be translated by the compat32 subsystem when sendmsg(2) or recvmsg(2) are invoked by a 32-bit process. II. Problem Description When handling a 32-bit sendmsg(2) call, the compat32 subsystem copies the control message to be transmitted (if any) into kernel memory, and adjusts alignment of control message headers. The code which performs this work contained a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability which allows a malicious userspace program to modify control message headers after they were validated by the kernel. III. Impact The TOCTOU bug can be exploited by an unprivileged malicious userspace program to trigger privilege escalation. IV. Workaround i386 and other 32-bit platforms are not vulnerable. No workaround is available for amd64 or arm64. Kernels compiled without the COMPAT_FREEBSD32 option are not vulnerable, but this option is configured in GENERIC kernels. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update" 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:23/sendmsg.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:23/sendmsg.patch.asc # gpg --verify sendmsg.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/12/ r363918 releng/12.1/ r363923 stable/11/ r363919 releng/11.4/ r363923 releng/11.3/ r363923 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAl8q63hfFIAAAAAALgAo aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n 5cJDxw/+PML4MB46paBDyLvebprXe5Z/FrUN1ybH8YjrJTYFyX+aw8K3hAa2K+PB kUc3VwbIv0BAylSCgULXdTxx8JKpMnmHcN3Bk8LKdMCvp0gJvkzcAP/a7Kj1EKfY m04p3/7ka9f7u99n1QX1jnZP2XWEFKOoyWbEJWuDk0+NBW3ICQWqQLoiXaWAS4HD BrXAqowtyoR1vaMrAjmSyWaFSDFjQeiHw8nxCzRF1E6cKF/rwCt37cnpEGqSCAYi /ZyB1qy1s67F9hHnZp9+JhffWqUZAuLse8HTWgBG+svpzDrx2gNxE/C/Tui0lYXg S3akC3DbiySZpP007J8yR5PvytYAbSuECJVVRoC0dukmBabFqSFlacInpfIn363m fOg1nmq/oRh9MAJzaBKG+N6SD+mP3kvcV9Ad5fOKr4yLQtlwYEYyiN1WbCs0O/ve fnRIGB9xtibIr1i9IEY7+KNMAH3Di2F0E4ixFPMrBcJiStuZmCTqJRx99QLYtb0G p9p1bzjPUaWAMDi9mteFu1I+NO836MeLydbCZnSa5KLe+vc1PjP4kSvt6XQ9HFtO nXMddWxdcus8BmxZ04K5a4WaaSYOiN4e4O72WWuA714io+EWJAEaqleMr7KbYTCv f1fCmoKxyoFJcHL9z3oOOi5DqrBoFPnE0p/gPGFc8qyTNEbI428= =tTSr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From shuriku at shurik.kiev.ua Mon Aug 10 14:21:28 2020 From: shuriku at shurik.kiev.ua (Oleksandr Kryvulia) Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 17:21:12 +0300 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:22.sqlite In-Reply-To: <20200805175429.DDBF41B725@freefall.freebsd.org> References: <20200805175429.DDBF41B725@freefall.freebsd.org> Message-ID: <0f00291d-e681-9cfc-bdb2-f7635ed81f33@shurik.kiev.ua> 05.08.20 20:54, FreeBSD Security Advisories ?????: > a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the > detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. > > [FreeBSD 12.1] > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch.asc > # gpg --verify sqlite.12.1.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 11.4] > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch.asc > # gpg --verify sqlite.11.4.patch.asc > > [FreeBSD 11.3] > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch > # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch.asc > # gpg --verify sqlite.11.3.patch.asc Hi, there is a typo in links -please replace "SA-20:21" with "SA-20:22" From gordon at tetlows.org Mon Aug 10 15:18:18 2020 From: gordon at tetlows.org (Gordon Tetlow) Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2020 08:18:09 -0700 Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-20:22.sqlite In-Reply-To: <0f00291d-e681-9cfc-bdb2-f7635ed81f33@shurik.kiev.ua> References: <20200805175429.DDBF41B725@freefall.freebsd.org> <0f00291d-e681-9cfc-bdb2-f7635ed81f33@shurik.kiev.ua> Message-ID: <7B867168-6474-4286-A48D-F35925C9FADB@tetlows.org> > On Aug 10, 2020, at 7:21 AM, Oleksandr Kryvulia wrote: > > 05.08.20 20:54, FreeBSD Security Advisories ?????: >> a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the >> detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. >> >> [FreeBSD 12.1] >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.12.1.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify sqlite.12.1.patch.asc >> >> [FreeBSD 11.4] >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.4.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify sqlite.11.4.patch.asc >> >> [FreeBSD 11.3] >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch >> # fetchhttps://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:21/sqlite.11.3.patch.asc >> # gpg --verify sqlite.11.3.patch.asc > > Hi, > there is a typo in links -please replace "SA-20:21" with "SA-20:22" Thanks for the report. I've already updated it on the website (https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-20:22.sqlite.asc ) based on a previous report. Gordon From shuriku at shurik.kiev.ua Tue Aug 11 07:21:44 2020 From: shuriku at shurik.kiev.ua (Oleksandr Kryvulia) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 10:21:34 +0300 Subject: A question about Security Advisories Message-ID: <49a1d50c-34d1-239f-1d52-1ebba6799d62@shurik.kiev.ua> ?Hi, Last years all Security Advisories regarding base system in the "update your vulnerable system via a source code patch " section recommends to rebuild a whole world instead of an affected part of a base system. This is in a most cases an overhead. For example 9 years old SA-11:04 [1] offers: b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/usr.bin/compress # make obj && make depend && make && make install # cd /usr/src/usr.bin/gzip # make obj && make depend && make && make install What is a reason we stop to do it? I understand that the preferred way now is a binary upgrade. Thank you. [1] https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-11:04.compress.asc From eugen at grosbein.net Tue Aug 11 07:36:40 2020 From: eugen at grosbein.net (Eugene Grosbein) Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 14:36:14 +0700 Subject: A question about Security Advisories In-Reply-To: <49a1d50c-34d1-239f-1d52-1ebba6799d62@shurik.kiev.ua> References: <49a1d50c-34d1-239f-1d52-1ebba6799d62@shurik.kiev.ua> Message-ID: <08936836-2303-5bf4-f8a0-873b6dc830b8@grosbein.net> 11.08.2020 14:21, Oleksandr Kryvulia wrote: > > Hi, > Last years all Security Advisories regarding base system in the "update your vulnerable system via a source code patch " section recommends to rebuild a whole world instead of an affected part of a base system. This is in a most cases an overhead. > > For example 9 years old SA-11:04 [1] offers: > > b) Execute the following commands as root: > > # cd /usr/src > # patch < /path/to/patch > # cd /usr/src/usr.bin/compress > # make obj && make depend && make && make install > # cd /usr/src/usr.bin/gzip > # make obj && make depend && make && make install > > What is a reason we stop to do it? I understand that the preferred way now is a binary upgrade. > Thank you. Also binary upgrade is not an option for STABLE users. From FreeBSD at chroot.pl Tue Aug 18 07:41:22 2020 From: FreeBSD at chroot.pl (Lukasz) Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 09:41:10 +0200 Subject: The certificate for pkg0.pkt.freebsd.org expired on August 17, 2020. Message-ID: Regards, Lukasz