svn commit: r228843 - head/contrib/telnet/libtelnet head/crypto/heimdal/appl/telnet/libtelnet head/include head/lib/libc/gen head/lib/libc/iconv head/lib/libc/include head/lib/libc/net head/libexec...

John Baldwin jhb at freebsd.org
Thu Dec 29 20:03:29 UTC 2011


On Thursday, December 29, 2011 2:10:37 pm Xin LI wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 29, 2011 at 11:00 AM, John Baldwin <jhb at freebsd.org> wrote:
> > On Thursday, December 29, 2011 1:44:01 pm Xin Li wrote:
> >> On 12/29/11 10:43, John Baldwin wrote:
> >> > On Thursday, December 29, 2011 1:26:17 pm Xin Li wrote:
> >> >> On 12/29/11 06:39, John Baldwin wrote:
> >> >>> Can you give some more details on why ftpd is triggering a
> >> >>> dlopen inside of the chroot?  It would appear that that is
> >> >>> unrelated to helper programs (since setting a flag in libc in
> >> >>> ftpd can't possibly affect helper programs ability to use
> >> >>> dlopen() from within libc).
> >> >>
> >> >> Sure.  That's because nsdispatch(3) would reload
> >> >> /etc/nsswitch.conf if it notices a change.  After chroot() the
> >> >> file is considered as "chang"ed and thus it reloads the file as
> >> >> well as designated shared libraries.
> >> >
> >> > But ftpd has to be doing some operation that invokes an nss lookup
> >> > after entering the chroot for that to trigger, correct?
> >>
> >> Oh ok, that was the built-in ls(1).
> >
> > Were we not able to drop privilege before doing that?  I.e. if you
> > forked a new process that dropped privilege before doing the ls
> > (similar to if you were to exec /bin/ls as a helper), would that not
> > have fixed this?
> 
> No, it won't.  This is arbitrary code execution and not just privilege
> escalation :(

So how is there not still a problem for helper programs?  Is ls the only
way a user can initiate a helper program?  Hmm, looks like ftpd will only
ever invoke ls, and thus only ls_main(), so there's lots of dead code (e.g. 
where ftpd invokes execv() in ftpd_popen() is a dead code path).  That clears 
up some confusion on my part as I didn't understand why it was ok to execute 
arbitrary programs from ftpd but the built-in ls was special.  I still find 
the symbol name incredibly ugly.  Another route might have been set an env var 
to disable use of dlopen() in libc.  That would have worked even if ftpd 
invoked an external program, whereas the built-in ls is now key to security 
and no longer a simple optimization.

-- 
John Baldwin


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