Environment Poisoning and login -p

[D J Hawkey Jr]

On Feb 27, at 01:20 PM, Peter Pentchev wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Feb 27, 2004 at 05:13:53AM -0600, D J Hawkey Jr wrote:
> > On Feb 26, at 03:03 PM, Tim Kientzle wrote:
> > > 
> > > Andrey Chernov wrote:
> > > >On Wed, Feb 25, 2004 at 10:54:31AM -0800, Tim Kientzle wrote:
> > > >
> > > >>Possible fix:  Have login unconditionally discard LD_LIBRARY_PATH
> > > >>and LD_PRELOAD from the environment, even if "-p" is specified.
> > > >
> > > >Yes! It is what I say from very beginning. It is so obvious that I wonder 
> > > >why others not see it first.
> > > 
> > > Instead, I've decided to follow Jacques Vidrine's
> > > suggestion of using a whitelist of environment variables
> > > that are "known-safe."
> > 
> > Coming in from left field... Will there be some sort of mechanism for
> > an admin to set/modify this list?
> 
> Surely you are aware of the consequences of s/admin/intruder/? :)
> Still, it might be useful indeed.

Of course I do; it would have to be a "secure" mechanism (and more
flexible than recompiling the utility). But OTOH, how can the developers
foresee all the possibilities of all the deployed systems Out There(tm)?

Dave

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