chroot() as non-root user?

[Pawel Jakub Dawidek]

On Sun, Apr 13, 2003 at 06:41:46PM +0300, Ruslan Ermilov wrote:
+> chroot(2) has no effect on the process's current directory; you
+> could hide (hard-link) the setuid program (su(1)) there, so
+> removing this protection on the syscall level can easily result
+> in a compromise.
+> 
+> chroot(8) changes the current working directory, but it's not
+> setuid root.

And if kern.chroot_allow_open_directories is set to 0?

-- 
Pawel Jakub Dawidek                       pawel at dawidek.net
UNIX Systems Programmer/Administrator     http://garage.freebsd.pl
Am I Evil? Yes, I Am!                     http://cerber.sourceforge.net
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