steve at sohara.org
Mon Jul 10 08:06:15 UTC 2017
On Mon, 10 Jul 2017 07:22:28 +0200
Matthias Apitz <guru at unixarea.de> wrote:
> I do not think that this approach worked in the sense of overwriting all
> blocks of the disk. While walking through at some point the kernel will
I see no reason why it shouldn't, provided the dd process doing the
work never needs to swap anything in (likely it's small and running a
> miss sectors of the disk, for example of memory mapped files of shared
> libs of other running processes or swapped out memory to disk. And the
The sectors are still there, just filled with 0s or random data the
kernel will have no trouble reading them.
> kernel will just crash or halt and you will notice that as terminating
The kernel will not crash or halt, processes will if they have to
page in corrupted data but that's all. Processes that don't page in
anything will just carry on running - if they don't read the disc they'll
never know it's been overwritten.
> ssh session.
Unless sshd has to page something in it won't crash.
> Do not rely on the fact that the (sensitive) information on
> the disk was overwritten.
I see no reason to expect that the dd process won't finish clearing
the disk and exit normally.
> The only secure way is doing this from a system
> running on some other disk and even this would allow to recover
> information with forensic tools reading beside of the tracks. Only
> physical destruction will help, for example burning the thing, as you
Sure, but absent a motive to spend the money forensic data analysis
costs writing 0s or random numbers over the whole drive will do fine. If
you fear forensic analysis then use thermite.
Steve O'Hara-Smith <steve at sohara.org>
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