[Bug 200185] [PATCH] Deprecate net.link.tap.user_open sysctl: opening by user is based on node permissions, no need for this variable

[bugzilla-noreply at freebsd.org]

https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=200185

Kyle Evans <kevans at freebsd.org> changed:

           What    |Removed                     |Added
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                 CC|                            |rwatson at FreeBSD.org

--- Comment #2 from Kyle Evans <kevans at freebsd.org> ---
CC'ing rwatson at - PRIV_NET_TAP is allocated and also used for allowing opening
of tap devices, because this is historically a superuser-only privilege. It was
added after the user_open sysctl and we currently honor PRIV_NET_TAP xor
user_open; it seems like PRIV_NET_TAP should've pushed user_open towards
deprecation in favor of MAC policy to more cleanly do the same thing.

I'm not sure now what the correct behavior is- your point about groups is good,
but do we want to (also, can we?) do away with PRIV_NET_TAP in favor of relying
on group membership?

> Also, I doubt that PRIV_NET_IFCREATE even works properly, because I wasn't able to clone /dev/tapN even when my user is in wheel and network groups, and /dev is owned by root:wheel and has 0777 mask. I still got 'Permission denied'.

Basically all PRIV_* are only granted to root by default without a policy to
grant them otherwise, so this is correct behavior.

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