fsck this shit

[Jan Bramkamp]

On 03.06.20 22:18, Thomas Mueller wrote:
> from goatshit54108 at national.shitposting.agency:
>
>> Once upon a time, the power ran out, and then...
>> ** SU+J Recovering /dev/<...>
>> ** Reading 33554432 byte journal from inode 4.
>> ** Building recovery table.
>> ** Resolving unreferenced inode list.
>> ** Processing journal entries.
>> fsck: /dev/<...>: Segmentation fault
> GAAAY.
>
>> OK, let's check the core dump... oh, wait... tough luck. Fortunately, subsequent runs of fsck ended up likewise, so I was able to get a core dump by re-executing fsck while being inside a TMPFS-backed directory. (On the other hand, unfortunately, fsck was never able to replay the journal.) Furthermore, I saved the .sujournal file, but saving the contents of the whole filesystem was beyond my resources. (It would have been adequate to use a tool that collected (only) the blocks that fsck read before segfaulting (thus constructing a small test case), but no such tool was at hand.)
>> Before running "fsck -y" (because I had no other options) I looked at "fsck -n" to see whether a particular, large file would get idiotically removed as part of "fixing" the filesystem. This routine is prompted by (1) personal experiences of files getting lost or truncated to 0 length, and (2) past reports of disasterous behaviors involving soft updates, such as untouched (read-only) files getting lost; "lost" means not even relinked to /lost+found or anything. And wouldn't ya know it, fsck did ask whether to remove something that had an unambiguously large size (to be exact, IIRC: "DUP ... REMOVE?", whatever that means). That's it, either (a) remove the file, or (b) stay dirty; take it or leave it. It's not like there was some 3rd option to relink the file to /lost+found. After "fsck -y", the file disappeared without a trace. GAAAAAAAAAY.
>
>> The fsck_ffs (or fsck_ufs) file was the one distributed with the 12.1-RELEASE, the one with the SHA3-256 checksum of 447592ae05dc7829823901700bb90940968cae006719964d39b1212bb312d164. Let's see the backtrace:
>> * thread #1, name = 'fsck_ufs', stop reason = signal SIGSEGV
>>     * frame #0: 0x0000000000219d93 fsck_ffs`blk_free(bno=10692928, mask=0, frags=134643471) at suj.c:653:34
>>       frame #1: 0x000000000021a481 fsck_ffs`ino_trunc(ino=5296913, size=134610944) at suj.c:1547:3
>>       frame #2: 0x0000000000216fee fsck_ffs`suj_check [inlined] cg_adj_blk(sc=0x0000000801574540) at suj.c:1788:5
>>       frame #3: 0x0000000000216fc3 fsck_ffs`suj_check [inlined] cg_apply at suj.c:1900
>>       frame #4: 0x0000000000216fa5 fsck_ffs`suj_check(filesys="/dev/<...>") at suj.c:2737
>>       frame #5: 0x000000000020ef54 fsck_ffs`main [inlined] checkfilesys(filesys="/dev/<...>") at main.c:427:9
>>       frame #6: 0x000000000020ef07 fsck_ffs`main(argc=1, argv=0x00007fffffffec48) at main.c:205
>>       frame #7: 0x000000000020810f fsck_ffs`_start(ap=<unavailable>, cleanup=<unavailable>) at crt1.c:76:7
>> Some analysis:
> (snip)
>
> I have had times when fsck_ffs from FreeBSD didn't succeed, but fsck_ffs from NetBSD did succeed.  That was on a FreeBSD installation, but I also had/have NetBSD installed.
>
> I use GPT with no traditional BSD disklabels, so FreeBSD and NetBSD can read and write each other's partitions.
>
> I ran "host national.shitposting.agency", and got
>
> national.shitposting.agency has address 52.11.159.5
> national.shitposting.agency mail is handled by 20 mx2.cock.li.
> national.shitposting.agency mail is handled by 10 mx1.cock.li.
>
> so the domain really exists.
Yes as you can see in the MX records its run by a bunch of well known 
racists and faschists who also brought us nice domains like 
hitler.rocks, nigge.rs. nuke.africa and rape.lol.