Feature Proposal: Transparent upgrade of crypt() algorithms

[Eitan Adler]

On 27 February 2014 20:14, Allan Jude <freebsd at allanjude.com> wrote:
> With r262501
> (http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=262501) importing
> the upgraded bcrypt from OpenBSD and eventually changing the default
> identifier for bcrypt to $2b$ it reminded me of a feature that is often
> seen in Forum software and other web apps.
>
> Transparent algorithm upgrade.
...

I would strongly support this

> I think Nick's point is you do want passwords using the "old" hash to expire
are some point if they haven't been auto-converted.

Password expiry is an orthogonal issue and should be up to administrator policy.

> This might actually be more applicable with my next suggestion, exposing
> tuneables to control the number of rounds for bcrypt and sha512crypt. As
> this would make it easy to upgrade all existing bcrypt/sha512crypt
> hashes from the default number of rounds (10^4 and 5000 respectively) to
> higher values.

Another orthogonal issue: I'd like to see the results of the password
hashing competition (see: https://password-hashing.net/.


-- 
Eitan Adler