[Bug 222077] geli(8) writing uninitialized memory out to disk

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https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=222077

            Bug ID: 222077
           Summary: geli(8) writing uninitialized memory out to disk
           Product: Base System
           Version: 11.1-RELEASE
          Hardware: Any
                OS: Any
            Status: New
          Severity: Affects Some People
          Priority: ---
         Component: kern
          Assignee: freebsd-bugs at FreeBSD.org
          Reporter: max at mxcrypt.com

When geli(8) is configured to use authenticated encryption, it has to
interleave data with HMACs. A 4096-byte encrypted sector requires nine 512-byte
sectors from the underlying provider, with the last sector having 224 bytes
unused.

I was configuring an encrypted vnode-type memory disk and decided to look at
the metadata that geli writes to the end of the file with hexdump. To my
surprise, I also found other plain-text data in the 224 unused bytes of every
9th sector. For example (hex columns omitted):

000ff520  |om>.    <geom id|
000ff530  |="XXXXXXXXXXXXXX|
000ff540  |XXXX">.      <cl|
000ff550  |ass ref="XXXXXXX|
000ff560  |XXXXXXXXXXX"/>. |
000ff570  |     <name>diski|
000ff580  |d/XXXXXXXXXXXXX<|
000ff590  |/name>.      <ra|
000ff5a0  |nk>3</rank>..<co|
000ff5b0  |nsumer id="XXXXX|
000ff5c0  |XXXXXXXXXXXXX">.|
000ff5d0  |.  <geom ref="XX|
000ff5e0  |XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX|
000ff5f0  |"/>..  <provider|
000ff600  |................|

This is a portion of sysctl kern.geom.confxml (with real data replaced by Xs)
that made its way into my memory disk file. The script below can be used to
reproduce this problem, though the actual data will obviously vary. It may be
necessary to increase the memory disk size for this behavior to become
apparent.

It looks like geli is obtaining some uninitialized memory for the last output
sector and not erasing the unused bytes before writing the sector out to disk.
I took a brief look at the code, but couldn't figure out where the memory is
coming from, so I'm not sure of the severity of this bug and whether it may
expose some sensitive data.

Either way, the uninitialized bytes should be either set to zero or replaced
with random data to make them indistinguishable from the rest (though there is
probably no real security benefit from doing so because of the geli metadata at
the end of the device).

Script to create an authenticated memory disk (use `hd gelitest.md` to inspect
contents):

#!/bin/sh
dd if=/dev/zero of=gelitest.md bs=1M count=1 status=none
md=$(mdconfig -f gelitest.md) || exit
echo fakekey | geli init -a HMAC/SHA256 -B none -K - -P -s 4096 $md || exit
echo fakekey | geli attach -k - -p $md || exit
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/$md.eli bs=1M status=none
geli detach /dev/$md.eli
mdconfig -du $md

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