[Bug 206551] Integer overflow in iconv kernel module
bugzilla-noreply at freebsd.org
bugzilla-noreply at freebsd.org
Sun Jan 24 00:13:59 UTC 2016
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=206551
Bug ID: 206551
Summary: Integer overflow in iconv kernel module
Product: Base System
Version: 11.0-CURRENT
Hardware: Any
OS: Any
Status: New
Severity: Affects Only Me
Priority: ---
Component: kern
Assignee: freebsd-bugs at FreeBSD.org
Reporter: ertl.chris at gmail.com
After loading the iconv kernel module, a new sysctl name, "kern.iconv.add" is
accessible for `root` user.
This is handled with the following code:
static int
iconv_sysctl_add(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
...
if (din.ia_datalen > ICONV_CSMAXDATALEN)
return EINVAL;
...
if (din.ia_datalen) {
csp->cp_data = malloc(din.ia_datalen, M_ICONVDATA, M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(din.ia_data, csp->cp_data, din.ia_datalen);
if (error)
goto bad;
}
...
}
Since the `ia_datalen` member of `struct iconv_add_in` is signed:
struct iconv_add_in {
int ia_version;
char ia_converter[ICONV_CNVNMAXLEN];
char ia_to[ICONV_CSNMAXLEN];
char ia_from[ICONV_CSNMAXLEN];
int ia_datalen;
const void *ia_data;
};
The check on user supplied `din.ia_datalen` is insufficient. If a negative
value is passed, it will bypass the check, and then wraparound to a huge value
when converted to an `unsigned` type to be passed to `malloc` and `copyin`. For
example, passing `-1` will bypass the check, and then attempt to allocate and
copy to a buffer of size `0xffffffff`.
The impact of this is low, since it is only triggerable as `root`, and could at
most result in DoS.
The solution is to replace this check:
if (din.ia_datalen > ICONV_CSMAXDATALEN)
With this:
if (din.ia_datalen > ICONV_CSMAXDATALEN || din.ia_datalen < 0)
--
You are receiving this mail because:
You are the assignee for the bug.
More information about the freebsd-bugs
mailing list