[Bug 121073] [kernel] [patch] run chroot as an unprivileged user

[bz-noreply at freebsd.org]

https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=121073

Robert Watson <rwatson at FreeBSD.org> changed:

           What    |Removed                     |Added
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                 CC|                            |rwatson at FreeBSD.org

--- Comment #8 from Robert Watson <rwatson at FreeBSD.org> ---
A appreciate the desirability for the features implied by this change, but
given the propensity for vulnerabilities relating to chroot() in the past,
think we should take a very conservative approach to potentially adopting it. 
There's a particular concern with how it interacts with non-UNIX-ID-based
models -- e.g., MAC, Capsicum, Audit, Jail, as well as a future fine-grained
privilege model.

Overall, I'd rate this proposed change as "extremely high risk; we will fix
multiple vulnerabilities in it in the future," and so that cost would need to
be carefully weighed against presumed benefit -- a fine-grained privilege model
in which PRIV_CHROOT is delegable to only specific users or roles would help
mitigate that risk.

I wonder if a more suitable name for the proposed P_NOSUGID would be
P_NOCREDCHANGE, and I also wonder if it should be CR_NOCREDCHANGE.

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