cvs commit: src/sys/kern kern_jail.c src/sys/sys jail.h src/sys/ufs/ufs ufs_vnops.c src/usr.sbin/jail jail.8

[Pawel Jakub Dawidek]

On Wed, Feb 09, 2005 at 05:24:26PM +0000, Colin Percival wrote:
+> Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote:
+> >On Tue, Feb 08, 2005 at 09:31:11PM +0000, Colin Percival wrote:
+> >+>   Add a new sysctl, "security.jail.chflags_allowed", which controls the
+> >+>   behaviour of chflags within a jail.  If set to 0 (the default), then a
+> >+>   jailed root user is treated as an unprivileged user; if set to 1, then
+> >+>   a jailed root user is treated the same as an unjailed root user.
+> >
+> >More than that. It should be allowed in the future by default 
+> 
+> Don't you think it's better to err on the side of security?  There
+> are certainly times when allowing a jailed user to manipulate system
+> file flags could cause (non-obvious) problems, while any failure
+> caused by an inability to set these flags will be immediately obvious.

I think, this behaviour was introduced in RELENG_4, because of lack
per-jail securelevels. Now we have those and I think we should not add
yet another sysctl for jails, securelevel is enough IMHO.

+> Also, I'm planning on MFCing this to RELENG_5, and we definitely don't
+> want the default behaviour to change there.

Sure.

-- 
Pawel Jakub Dawidek                       http://www.wheel.pl
pjd at FreeBSD.org                           http://www.FreeBSD.org
FreeBSD committer                         Am I Evil? Yes, I Am!
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