Re: Practical suggestions for resolving the Brazilian problem

The 'thesmartski' from X implemented some simple workaround:
- https://x.com/thesmartski/status/2029116808066646416

Regards,
vermaden



Temat: Practical suggestions for resolving the Brazilian problem
Data: 2026-03-05 13:32
Nadawca: "Vincent Bentley" <vince@vincentbentley.co.uk>
Adresat: freebsd-pkg@freebsd.org; 

>> Originally posted to forum:
> https://forums.freebsd.org/threads/practical-suggestions-for-resolving-the-brazilian-problem.101913/#post-748010
> 
> I am not conversant in Portuguese so I don't know if this is already 
> being discussed on the Brazilian list. I apologise if this is already 
> being dealt with.
> 
> On March 17, 2026 the Brazilian government will be enforcing a new law
> that requires age verification of the users of a computer operating 
> system. This thread is to discuss how the FreeBSD developers could 
> resolve this problem within the next 11 days. Please add your own ideas 
> and pick apart any/all that have been posted.
> 
> Summary in English
> https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Issue-Brief-Brazils-Digital-ECA.pdf
> 
> 1. Geo-block Brazil from image downloads and from pkg repositories.
> This is an extreme solution that will alienate the Brazilian user 
> community, but it is the quickest to achieve given the lack of time.
> 
> 2. Modify pkg so that it can accurately geo-locate by the public IP address.
> If a Brazilian IP address is detected, pkg requests the email address of 
> a human installer over the age of 18 that is responsible for the system. 
> Pkg will no longer install or update until a token received by email 
> from pkgtoken@freebsd.org is entered into pkg.
> 
> Pkg will also have to state on every execution that the FreeBSD package 
> repo is for 18+ users only and it is the responsibility of the system 
> administrator not to permit use of the system by minors. All existing 
> FreeBSD systems will remain usable in a pre-enforcement date state. 
> However, they will not be able to update until the sysadmin confirms to 
> pkg that the system is for 18+ users only. If the public IP address 
> changes, pkg will have to request a new authorisation token to continue. 
> This is the only way to deal with geo-locating dynamic IP or portable 
> systems that are travelling (visiting laptops).
> 
> The authorisation token does not need to be individual to the machine.
> A simple method of using a token matching the last 8-bits of an IPv4 or 
> IPv6 address is good enough. Every quarter, regenerate those 256 tokens 
> and save them on a private system area of the package repo. An already

> authorised pkg will automatically rollover to the new token without 
> human intervention. Yes, someone could map the bit to token
assignments 
> every quarter and publish them, but the new pkg program must save the 
> email address and display it every time pkg is run. Whoever runs
package 
> will see the email address that was used to obtain the token.
> 
> If a fake email address is used with published tokens, then the 
> Brazilian authorities have the problem of identifying the sysadmin and

> the token publisher. The sysadmin becomes the criminal.
> 
> Pkg gets updated every quarter to recognise the new set of 256 tokens 
> used by the FreeBSD repo. If pkg is used in Brazil without a valid
token 
> it fails safe (legally, not functionally) by not updating and not 
> installing software until a sysadmin has submitted an email address to

> receive an unlock token.
> 
> If pkg is used against a private repo, such as a Poudriere built repo,

> then no email address or token checking is required. Whoever operates 
> the Poudriere repo is the software distributor.
> 
> -Vince-
> 
>