git: 8aac90f18aef - main - mac_do: add a new MAC/do policy and mdo(1) utility
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Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 12:02:28 UTC
The branch main has been updated by bapt:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=8aac90f18aef7c9eea906c3ff9a001ca7b94f375
commit 8aac90f18aef7c9eea906c3ff9a001ca7b94f375
Author: Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2024-05-09 22:03:28 +0000
Commit: Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2024-05-22 12:01:41 +0000
mac_do: add a new MAC/do policy and mdo(1) utility
This policy enables a user to become another user without having to be
root (hence no setuid binary). it is configured via rules using sysctl
security.mac.do.rules
For example:
security.mac.do.rules=uid=1001:80,gid=0:any
The above rule means the user identifier by the uid 1001 is able to
become user 80
Any user of the group 0 are allowed to become any user on the system.
The mdo(1) utility expects the MAC/do policy to be installed and its
rules defined.
Reviewed by: des
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D45145
---
share/man/man4/Makefile | 1 +
share/man/man4/mac_do.4 | 78 +++++++
sys/modules/Makefile | 2 +
sys/modules/mac_do/Makefile | 6 +
sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c | 545 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
usr.bin/Makefile | 1 +
usr.bin/mdo/Makefile | 4 +
usr.bin/mdo/mdo.1 | 44 ++++
usr.bin/mdo/mdo.c | 76 ++++++
9 files changed, 757 insertions(+)
diff --git a/share/man/man4/Makefile b/share/man/man4/Makefile
index 164efe3ddf66..69424a4be271 100644
--- a/share/man/man4/Makefile
+++ b/share/man/man4/Makefile
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ MAN= aac.4 \
mac_biba.4 \
mac_bsdextended.4 \
mac_ddb.4 \
+ mac_do.4 \
mac_ifoff.4 \
mac_ipacl.4 \
mac_lomac.4 \
diff --git a/share/man/man4/mac_do.4 b/share/man/man4/mac_do.4
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a9ebe1ca989
--- /dev/null
+++ b/share/man/man4/mac_do.4
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+.\"-
+.\" Copyright (c) 2024 Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
+.\"
+.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
+.\"
+.Dd May 22, 2024
+.Dt MAC_DO 4
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm mac_do
+.Nd "policy allowing user to execute program as another user"
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+To compile the
+.Nm
+policy into your kernel, place the following lines
+in your kernel configruation file:
+.Bd -ragged -offset indent
+.Cd "options MAC"
+.Cd "options MAC_DO"
+.Ed
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Nm
+policy grants users the ability to run processs as other users
+according to predefined rules.
+.Pp
+The exact set of kernel privileges granted are:
+.Bl -inset -compact -offset indent
+.It Dv PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS
+.It Dv PRIV_CRET_SETUID
+.El
+.Pp
+The following
+.Xr sysctl 8
+MIBs are available:
+.Bl -tag -width indent
+.It Va security.mac.do.enabled
+Enable the
+.Nm
+policy.
+(Default: 1).
+.It Va security.mac.do.rules
+The set of rules.
+.El
+.Pp
+The rules consist of a list of elements separated by
+.So , Sc .
+Each element is of the form
+.Sm off
+.Do
+.Op Cm uid | Cm gid
+.Li =
+.Ar fid
+.Li :
+.Ar tid
+.Dc
+.Sm on .
+Where
+.Ar fid
+is the uid or gid of the user or group the rule applies to, and
+.Ar tid
+is the uid of the targetted user.
+Two special forms are accepted for
+.Ar tid :
+.Va any
+or
+.Va * ,
+which allow to target any user.
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+The following rule:
+.Pp
+.Dl security.mac.do.rules=uid=1001:80,gid=0:any
+.Pp
+means the user with the uid 1001 can execute processes as user with uid 80,
+all the users which belongs to the group gid 0 can execute processes as any user.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr mac 4 ,
+.Xr mdo 1
diff --git a/sys/modules/Makefile b/sys/modules/Makefile
index 2bd8914ab0d5..ad274e7f7b47 100644
--- a/sys/modules/Makefile
+++ b/sys/modules/Makefile
@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ SUBDIR= \
${_mac_biba} \
${_mac_bsdextended} \
${_mac_ddb} \
+ ${_mac_do} \
${_mac_ifoff} \
${_mac_ipacl} \
${_mac_lomac} \
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ _mac_bsdextended= mac_bsdextended
.if ${KERN_OPTS:MDDB} || defined(ALL_MODULES)
_mac_ddb= mac_ddb
.endif
+_mac_do= mac_do
_mac_ifoff= mac_ifoff
_mac_ipacl= mac_ipacl
_mac_lomac= mac_lomac
diff --git a/sys/modules/mac_do/Makefile b/sys/modules/mac_do/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..532a5b9faa71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/modules/mac_do/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+.PATH: ${SRCTOP}/sys/security/mac_do
+
+KMOD= mac_do
+SRCS= mac_do.c vnode_if.h
+
+.include <bsd.kmod.mk>
diff --git a/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8685954b7db6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
@@ -0,0 +1,545 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright(c) 2024 Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/malloc.h>
+#include <sys/jail.h>
+#include <sys/kernel.h>
+#include <sys/lock.h>
+#include <sys/module.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/mutex.h>
+#include <sys/priv.h>
+#include <sys/proc.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/sx.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/ucred.h>
+#include <sys/vnode.h>
+
+#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
+
+SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
+
+static SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, do,
+ CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0, "mac_do policy controls");
+
+static int do_enabled = 1;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
+ &do_enabled, 0, "Enforce do policy");
+
+static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_DO, "do_rule", "Rules for mac_do");
+
+#define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024
+
+static unsigned mac_do_osd_jail_slot;
+
+#define RULE_UID 1
+#define RULE_GID 2
+#define RULE_ANY 3
+
+struct rule {
+ int from_type;
+ union {
+ uid_t f_uid;
+ gid_t f_gid;
+ };
+ int to_type;
+ uid_t t_uid;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(rule) r_entries;
+};
+
+struct mac_do_rule {
+ char string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
+ TAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule) head;
+};
+
+static struct mac_do_rule rules0;
+
+static void
+toast_rules(struct rulehead *head)
+{
+ struct rule *r;
+
+ while ((r = TAILQ_FIRST(head)) != NULL) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(head, r, r_entries);
+ free(r, M_DO);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+parse_rule_element(char *element, struct rule **rule)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+ char *type, *id, *p;
+ struct rule *new;
+
+ new = malloc(sizeof(*new), M_DO, M_ZERO|M_WAITOK);
+
+ type = strsep(&element, "=");
+ if (type == NULL) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(type, "uid") == 0) {
+ new->from_type = RULE_UID;
+ } else if (strcmp(type, "gid") == 0) {
+ new->from_type = RULE_GID;
+ } else {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ id = strsep(&element, ":");
+ if (id == NULL) {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (new->from_type == RULE_UID)
+ new->f_uid = strtol(id, &p, 10);
+ if (new->from_type == RULE_GID)
+ new->f_gid = strtol(id, &p, 10);
+ if (*p != '\0') {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (*element == '\0') {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(element, "any") == 0 || strcmp(element, "*") == 0) {
+ new->to_type = RULE_ANY;
+ } else {
+ new->to_type = RULE_UID;
+ new->t_uid = strtol(element, &p, 10);
+ if (*p != '\0') {
+ error = EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ if (error != 0) {
+ free(new, M_DO);
+ *rule = NULL;
+ } else
+ *rule = new;
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_rules(char *string, struct rulehead *head)
+{
+ struct rule *new;
+ char *element;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ while ((element = strsep(&string, ",")) != NULL) {
+ if (strlen(element) == 0)
+ continue;
+ error = parse_rule_element(element, &new);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, new, r_entries);
+ }
+out:
+ if (error != 0)
+ toast_rules(head);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static struct mac_do_rule *
+mac_do_rule_find(struct prison *spr, struct prison **prp)
+{
+ struct prison *pr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rules;
+
+ for (pr = spr;; pr = pr->pr_parent) {
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ if (pr == &prison0) {
+ rules = &rules0;
+ break;
+ }
+ rules = osd_jail_get(pr, mac_do_osd_jail_slot);
+ if (rules != NULL)
+ break;
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ }
+ *prp = pr;
+
+ return (rules);
+}
+
+static int
+sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
+{
+ char *copy_string, *new_string;
+ struct rulehead head, saved_head;
+ struct prison *pr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rules;
+ int error;
+
+ rules = mac_do_rule_find(req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison, &pr);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ if (req->newptr == NULL)
+ return (sysctl_handle_string(oidp, rules->string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req));
+
+ new_string = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_DO,
+ M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ strlcpy(new_string, rules->string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+
+ error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, new_string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ copy_string = strdup(new_string, M_DO);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&head);
+ error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
+ free(copy_string, M_DO);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+ TAILQ_INIT(&saved_head);
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&saved_head, &rules->head, r_entries);
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&rules->head, &head, r_entries);
+ strlcpy(rules->string, new_string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ toast_rules(&saved_head);
+
+out:
+ free(new_string, M_DO);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, rules,
+ CTLTYPE_STRING|CTLFLAG_RW|CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
+ 0, 0, sysctl_rules, "A",
+ "Rules");
+
+static void
+destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
+{
+ osd_jail_deregister(mac_do_osd_jail_slot);
+ toast_rules(&rules0.head);
+}
+
+static void
+mac_do_alloc_prison(struct prison *pr, struct mac_do_rule **lrp)
+{
+ struct prison *ppr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rules, *new_rules;
+ void **rsv;
+
+ rules = mac_do_rule_find(pr, &ppr);
+ if (ppr == pr)
+ goto done;
+
+ mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
+ new_rules = malloc(sizeof(*new_rules), M_PRISON, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
+ rsv = osd_reserve(mac_do_osd_jail_slot);
+ rules = mac_do_rule_find(pr, &ppr);
+ if (ppr == pr) {
+ free(new_rules, M_PRISON);
+ osd_free_reserved(rsv);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ osd_jail_set_reserved(pr, mac_do_osd_jail_slot, rsv, new_rules);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&new_rules->head);
+done:
+ if (lrp != NULL)
+ *lrp = rules;
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
+}
+
+static void
+mac_do_dealloc_prison(void *data)
+{
+ struct mac_do_rule *r = data;
+
+ toast_rules(&r->head);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_do_prison_set(void *obj, void *data)
+{
+ struct prison *pr = obj;
+ struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
+ struct rulehead head, saved_head;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rules;
+ char *rules_string, *copy_string;
+ int error, jsys, len;
+
+ error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "mdo", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
+ if (error == ENOENT)
+ jsys = -1;
+ error = vfs_getopt(opts, "mdo.rules", (void **)&rules_string, &len);
+ if (error == ENOENT)
+ rules = NULL;
+ else
+ jsys = JAIL_SYS_NEW;
+ switch (jsys) {
+ case JAIL_SYS_INHERIT:
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ osd_jail_del(pr, mac_do_osd_jail_slot);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ break;
+ case JAIL_SYS_NEW:
+ mac_do_alloc_prison(pr, &rules);
+ if (rules_string == NULL)
+ break;
+ copy_string = strdup(rules_string, M_DO);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&head);
+ error = parse_rules(copy_string, &head);
+ free(copy_string, M_DO);
+ if (error)
+ return (1);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&saved_head);
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&saved_head, &rules->head, r_entries);
+ TAILQ_CONCAT(&rules->head, &head, r_entries);
+ strlcpy(rules->string, rules_string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ toast_rules(&saved_head);
+ break;
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_NODE(mdo, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail MAC/do parameters");
+SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mdo, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN,
+ "Jail MAC/do rules");
+
+static int
+mac_do_prison_get(void *obj, void *data)
+{
+ struct prison *ppr, *pr = obj;
+ struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rules;
+ int jsys, error;
+
+ rules = mac_do_rule_find(pr, &ppr);
+ error = vfs_setopt(opts, "mdo", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
+ if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
+ goto done;
+ error = vfs_setopts(opts, "mdo.rules", rules->string);
+ if (error != 0 && error != ENOENT)
+ goto done;
+ mtx_unlock(&ppr->pr_mtx);
+ error = 0;
+done:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_do_prison_create(void *obj, void *data __unused)
+{
+ struct prison *pr = obj;
+
+ mac_do_alloc_prison(pr, NULL);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_do_prison_remove(void *obj, void *data __unused)
+{
+ struct prison *pr = obj;
+ struct mac_do_rule *r;
+
+ mtx_lock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ r = osd_jail_get(pr, mac_do_osd_jail_slot);
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ toast_rules(&r->head);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+mac_do_prison_check(void *obj, void *data)
+{
+ struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
+ char *rules_string;
+ int error, jsys, len;
+
+ error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "mdo", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
+ if (error != ENOENT) {
+ if (error != 0)
+ return (error);
+ if (jsys != JAIL_SYS_NEW && jsys != JAIL_SYS_INHERIT)
+ return (EINVAL);
+ }
+ error = vfs_getopt(opts, "mdo.rules", (void **)&rules_string, &len);
+ if (error != ENOENT) {
+ if (error != 0)
+ return (error);
+ if (len > MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN) {
+ vfs_opterror(opts, "mdo.rules too long");
+ return (ENAMETOOLONG);
+ }
+ }
+ if (error == ENOENT)
+ error = 0;
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static void
+init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
+{
+ static osd_method_t methods[PR_MAXMETHOD] = {
+ [PR_METHOD_CREATE] = mac_do_prison_create,
+ [PR_METHOD_GET] = mac_do_prison_get,
+ [PR_METHOD_SET] = mac_do_prison_set,
+ [PR_METHOD_CHECK] = mac_do_prison_check,
+ [PR_METHOD_REMOVE] = mac_do_prison_remove,
+ };
+ struct prison *pr;
+
+ mac_do_osd_jail_slot = osd_jail_register(mac_do_dealloc_prison, methods);
+ TAILQ_INIT(&rules0.head);
+ sx_slock(&allprison_lock);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(pr, &allprison, pr_list)
+ mac_do_alloc_prison(pr, NULL);
+ sx_sunlock(&allprison_lock);
+}
+
+static bool
+rule_is_valid(struct ucred *cred, struct rule *r)
+{
+ if (r->from_type == RULE_UID && r->f_uid == cred->cr_uid)
+ return (true);
+ if (r->from_type == RULE_GID && r->f_gid == cred->cr_gid)
+ return (true);
+ return (false);
+}
+
+static int
+priv_grant(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
+{
+ struct rule *r;
+ struct prison *pr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rule;
+
+ if (do_enabled == 0)
+ return (EPERM);
+
+ rule = mac_do_rule_find(cred->cr_prison, &pr);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rule->head, r_entries) {
+ if (rule_is_valid(cred, r)) {
+ switch (priv) {
+ case PRIV_CRED_SETGROUPS:
+ case PRIV_CRED_SETUID:
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ return (0);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ return (EPERM);
+}
+
+static int
+check_setgroups(struct ucred *cred, int ngrp, gid_t *groups)
+{
+ struct rule *r;
+ char *fullpath = NULL;
+ char *freebuf = NULL;
+ struct prison *pr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rule;
+
+ if (do_enabled == 0)
+ return (0);
+ if (cred->cr_uid == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (vn_fullpath(curproc->p_textvp, &fullpath, &freebuf) != 0)
+ return (EPERM);
+ if (strcmp(fullpath, "/usr/bin/mdo") != 0) {
+ free(freebuf, M_TEMP);
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ free(freebuf, M_TEMP);
+
+ rule = mac_do_rule_find(cred->cr_prison, &pr);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rule->head, r_entries) {
+ if (rule_is_valid(cred, r)) {
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+
+ return (EPERM);
+}
+
+static int
+check_setuid(struct ucred *cred, uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct rule *r;
+ int error;
+ char *fullpath = NULL;
+ char *freebuf = NULL;
+ struct prison *pr;
+ struct mac_do_rule *rule;
+
+ if (do_enabled == 0)
+ return (0);
+ if (cred->cr_uid == uid || cred->cr_uid == 0)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (vn_fullpath(curproc->p_textvp, &fullpath, &freebuf) != 0)
+ return (EPERM);
+ if (strcmp(fullpath, "/usr/bin/mdo") != 0) {
+ free(freebuf, M_TEMP);
+ return (EPERM);
+ }
+ free(freebuf, M_TEMP);
+
+ error = EPERM;
+ rule = mac_do_rule_find(cred->cr_prison, &pr);
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(r, &rule->head, r_entries) {
+ if (r->from_type == RULE_UID) {
+ if (cred->cr_uid != r->f_uid)
+ continue;
+ if (r->to_type == RULE_ANY) {
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r->to_type == RULE_UID && uid == r->t_uid) {
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r->from_type == RULE_GID) {
+ if (cred->cr_gid != r->f_gid)
+ continue;
+ if (r->to_type == RULE_ANY) {
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (r->to_type == RULE_UID && uid == r->t_uid) {
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ mtx_unlock(&pr->pr_mtx);
+ return (error);
+}
+
+static struct mac_policy_ops do_ops = {
+ .mpo_destroy = destroy,
+ .mpo_init = init,
+ .mpo_cred_check_setuid = check_setuid,
+ .mpo_cred_check_setgroups = check_setgroups,
+ .mpo_priv_grant = priv_grant,
+};
+
+MAC_POLICY_SET(&do_ops, mac_do, "MAC/do",
+ MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);
+MODULE_VERSION(mac_do, 1);
diff --git a/usr.bin/Makefile b/usr.bin/Makefile
index 0a584a18d14a..a9d5c1563797 100644
--- a/usr.bin/Makefile
+++ b/usr.bin/Makefile
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ SUBDIR= alias \
lzmainfo \
m4 \
mandoc \
+ mdo \
mesg \
ministat \
mkdep \
diff --git a/usr.bin/mdo/Makefile b/usr.bin/mdo/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e20f2719fc82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/mdo/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+PROG= mdo
+SRCS= mdo.c
+
+.include <bsd.prog.mk>
diff --git a/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.1 b/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..115ce44f4531
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.1
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+.\"-
+.\" Copyright(c) 2024 Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
+.\"
+.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
+.\"
+.Dd May 22, 2024
+.Dt MDO 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm mdo
+.Nd execute commands as another user
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl u Ar username
+.Op Fl i
+.Op command Op args
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Nm
+utility executes the specified
+.Ar command
+as user
+.Ar username .
+.Pp
+If no
+.Ar username
+is provided it defaults to the
+.Va root
+user.
+If no
+.Ar command
+is specified, it will execute the shell specified as
+.Va SHELL
+environnement variable, falling back on
+.Pa /bin/sh .
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl i
+option can be used to only call
+.Fn setuid
+and keep the group from the calling user.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr su 1
+.Xr mac_do 4
diff --git a/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.c b/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..22e2838daa08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/usr.bin/mdo/mdo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright(c) 2024 Baptiste Daroussin <bapt@FreeBSD.org>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <sys/limits.h>
+
+#include <err.h>
+#include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: mdo [-u username] [-i] [--] [command [args]]\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ const char *username = "root";
+ bool uidonly = false;
+ int ch;
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "u:i")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'u':
+ username = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ uidonly = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ usage();
+ }
+ }
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+
+ if ((pw = getpwnam(username)) == NULL) {
+ if (strspn(username, "0123456789") == strlen(username)) {
+ const char *errp = NULL;
+ uid_t uid = strtonum(username, 0, UID_MAX, &errp);
+ if (errp != NULL)
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s", errp);
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ }
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "invalid username '%s'", username);
+ }
+ if (!uidonly) {
+ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "failed to call initgroups");
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "failed to call setgid");
+ }
+ if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "failed to call setuid");
+ if (*argv == NULL) {
+ const char *sh = getenv("SHELL");
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ sh = _PATH_BSHELL;
+ execlp(sh, sh, "-i", NULL);
+ } else {
+ execvp(argv[0], argv);
+ }
+ err(EXIT_FAILURE, "exec failed");
+}