git: b025aa9f5abc - stable/14 - MAC/do: Check executable path from the current jail's root

The branch stable/14 has been updated by olce:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=b025aa9f5abc44a19a6437bea17fcc80a7747200

commit b025aa9f5abc44a19a6437bea17fcc80a7747200
Author:     Olivier Certner <olce@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2025-09-27 09:56:33 +0000
Commit:     Olivier Certner <olce@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2025-10-10 17:16:00 +0000

    MAC/do: Check executable path from the current jail's root
    
    Contrary to my initial belief, vn_fullpath() does return a vnode's path
    from the current chroot, and not from the global root (which would have
    been a bug also, but without security consequences).  This enables
    a "confused deputy"-like scenario where a chroot(2) can change which
    executable can be authorized by MAC/do, which is even more problematic
    for unprivileged chroot(2).
    
    This was found by re-examining the code following two close events:
    1. Shawn Webb sent a mail to freebsd-hackers@ on 08/05 saying that in
       HardenedBSD they had added a check on P2_NO_NEW_PRIVS (in
       mac_do_priv_grant()), which I responded to on 08/20 saying that
       P2_NO_NEW_PRIVS was not necessary for mac_do(4), with a correct
       reasoning but based on the wrong above-mentioned assumption about
       vn_fullpath().
    2. I reviewed some code by Kushagra Srivastava (GSoC 2025 student
       working on mac_do(4)/mdo(1)) adding the ability to specify which
       executables can spawn processes that mac_do(4) may decide to
       authorize (others are simply ignored), which currently is hardcoded
       to '/usr/bin/mdo'.
    
    MFC after:      3 days
    Event:          EuroBSDCon 2025
    Sponsored by:   The FreeBSD Foundation
    Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D52758
    
    (cherry picked from commit 9f269a0a771aff4f0a735211907a52c52fc0661b)
---
 sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
index 0c4b2d74cdcd..1006d4eae916 100644
--- a/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
+++ b/sys/security/mac_do/mac_do.c
@@ -1993,6 +1993,10 @@ check_proc(void)
 	/*
 	 * Only grant privileges if requested by the right executable.
 	 *
+	 * As MAC/do configuration is per-jail, in order to avoid confused
+	 * deputy situations in chroots (privileged or unprivileged), make sure
+	 * to check the path from the current jail's root.
+	 *
 	 * XXXOC: We may want to base this check on a tunable path and/or
 	 * a specific MAC label.  Going even further, e.g., envisioning to
 	 * completely replace the path check with the latter, we would need to
@@ -2004,7 +2008,7 @@ check_proc(void)
 	 * setting a MAC label per file (perhaps via additions to mtree(1)).  So
 	 * this probably isn't going to happen overnight, if ever.
 	 */
-	if (vn_fullpath(curproc->p_textvp, &path, &to_free) != 0)
+	if (vn_fullpath_jail(curproc->p_textvp, &path, &to_free) != 0)
 		return (EPERM);
 	error = strcmp(path, "/usr/bin/mdo") == 0 ? 0 : EPERM;
 	free(to_free, M_TEMP);