git: c39254c8f233 - stable/14 - ssh: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters

The branch stable/14 has been updated by emaste:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=c39254c8f23379709b8e2a68dc64477d2885f1d4

commit c39254c8f23379709b8e2a68dc64477d2885f1d4
Author:     Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2024-01-05 18:12:09 +0000
Commit:     Ed Maste <emaste@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2024-01-05 23:42:30 +0000

    ssh: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
    
    Cherry-picked from OpenSSH commit 7ef3787c84b6:
    
    This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
    commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
    
    Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
    metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
    interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
    that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
    
    It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
    but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
    most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
    and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
    what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
    user's specified ProxyCommand.
    
    To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
    continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
    from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
    directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
    
    feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
    
    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
---
 crypto/openssh/ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
index ec5c36091d29..ea459ffc007e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.594 2023/09/03 23:59:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.599 2023/12/18 14:47:44 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -624,6 +624,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 	free(cinfo);
 }
 
+static int
+valid_hostname(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+valid_ruser(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Main program for the ssh client.
  */
@@ -1116,6 +1151,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (!host)
 		usage();
 
+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
 	options.host_arg = xstrdup(host);
 
 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */