From nobody Sat Jun 18 14:16:48 2022 X-Original-To: dev-commits-src-branches@mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79E2386AA94; Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:49 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4LQHz46lD4z3rN3; Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:48 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=freebsd.org; s=dkim; t=1655561809; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=vR586BuUk61QFovPBc4lb5k0OSOEyvDYkIG7YDoHUtg=; b=QFRH5NQo/K9JDzNtQIFZqnkNX8PCKljaOdE4JyaFENfHbDEUZF6R/eNH4BFSwSLFeNQQfi z1aD99qwlZvxnAuOi2ByfAiV4NTg3hxfnUbOeJq4ih2+FeCL1W8Wah5VlCpcmS9npwtxUM peTijNP87hICIFDo6IT2yn5tO8g/Xxt5rd0N+znnHLuXviA0wddaj+Eh+UODX2oAdK62r7 UmI+va/MKkUKv1XyWkp5/mpOK2/t01tal/ajMsChXKK/n7DSHqenH+8KXtV6aDgZfLKUse VwDNDURZ3owCHes4ye2BbwfhmLSuQ3zDxjoZiHMvEE1HIm3JySQlbawQLPgPLA== Received: from gitrepo.freebsd.org (gitrepo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:5]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8C661603D; Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:48 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) Received: from gitrepo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.44]) by gitrepo.freebsd.org (8.16.1/8.16.1) with ESMTP id 25IEGmYl034889; Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:48 GMT (envelope-from git@gitrepo.freebsd.org) Received: (from git@localhost) by gitrepo.freebsd.org (8.16.1/8.16.1/Submit) id 25IEGmUf034888; Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:48 GMT (envelope-from git) Date: Sat, 18 Jun 2022 14:16:48 GMT Message-Id: <202206181416.25IEGmUf034888@gitrepo.freebsd.org> To: src-committers@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-all@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-branches@FreeBSD.org From: Alan Somers Subject: git: 1f44d1861a01 - stable/13 - fusefs: handle evil servers that return illegal inode numbers List-Id: Commits to the stable branches of the FreeBSD src repository List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/dev-commits-src-branches List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Sender: owner-dev-commits-src-branches@freebsd.org X-BeenThere: dev-commits-src-branches@freebsd.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Git-Committer: asomers X-Git-Repository: src X-Git-Refname: refs/heads/stable/13 X-Git-Reftype: branch X-Git-Commit: 1f44d1861a0189130f8fb419ebcb1c5b1e627349 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=freebsd.org; s=dkim; t=1655561809; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=vR586BuUk61QFovPBc4lb5k0OSOEyvDYkIG7YDoHUtg=; b=PV/4CWGA0s0IT7Rd0rYFCmLtVcHcItz9XDR8T4EzYVqwUI1UyhFrqjoKX7HR+E1f2/THtO NtOVgfwdNoHCkn7j5AECVh8ZaM7KDyQJU+X38KNDt8EU+icpFACeNmQK4Ke/9VW6MlzVLd 8o5WwFVzeBigx7Z2AcK6FiSWfOLqSPknDgT1/m2G/AZHTq6zJfojM+0+bQ/yoZt+Sh/GM2 1kjh19lRocpGw7NOwfw4VD6B5tPKR9qzbEUzNX01odcnStOeUzVWchoSCYEOsNF/1cmg3e P6VOiQROFCru32qRB7XRmJunzIo0kPTJfQfLm1lng4oQTJLH5Nsh7lb/SJIH1A== ARC-Seal: i=1; s=dkim; d=freebsd.org; t=1655561809; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=hRHUWm8tZRt1iaLKhh3F5nLpqARe7p6bGxGyKAj+muCTBovHTAIuenJpnBocF4+kjfM8eq DU2PRUp/GF+xaiNCzVJP6oNGV2jESRDtU8mAa8Z2FsQN4YzTsHT5YmFo0cczZr7Nv4xNvV 5rt8aIXMro5t+fJyIWYPRlw61F4+NOChK2zFkIbPwYUmlGIVKcvt40z8SlkfRIaowHtCHb RAw1ZowMK3fS5MA8ABzf9J9frIpUn+UBTmbHyL6uYO/M/Y9Zk1HaYLf/lR5nWRInJ/+0cQ EVZUyLWuIw01FFRC+dZXXduxX3C15sABtMPf/SqwS0i2bpEUUu4qBV4UylJ7tQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx1.freebsd.org; none X-ThisMailContainsUnwantedMimeParts: N The branch stable/13 has been updated by asomers: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=1f44d1861a0189130f8fb419ebcb1c5b1e627349 commit 1f44d1861a0189130f8fb419ebcb1c5b1e627349 Author: Alan Somers AuthorDate: 2022-05-04 23:36:17 +0000 Commit: Alan Somers CommitDate: 2022-06-18 14:16:20 +0000 fusefs: handle evil servers that return illegal inode numbers * If during FUSE_CREATE, FUSE_MKDIR, etc the server returns the same inode number for the new file as for its parent directory, reject it. Previously this would triggers a recurse-on-non-recursive lock panic. * If during FUSE_LINK the server returns a different inode number for the new name as for the old one, reject it. Obviously, that can't be a hard link. * If during FUSE_LOOKUP the server returns the same inode number for the new file as for its parent directory, reject it. Nothing good can come of this. PR: 263662 Reported by: Robert Morris Reviewed by: pfg Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D35128 (cherry picked from commit 0bef4927ea858bb18b6f679bc0a36cff264dc842) --- sys/fs/fuse/fuse_ipc.h | 1 + sys/fs/fuse/fuse_node.c | 6 +++++ sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--- tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/sys/fs/fusefs/link.cc | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/sys/fs/fusefs/lookup.cc | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mkdir.cc | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mknod.cc | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/sys/fs/fusefs/symlink.cc | 22 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_ipc.h b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_ipc.h index fe616b3639a7..31e8b41b6ca3 100644 --- a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_ipc.h +++ b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_ipc.h @@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ struct fuse_data { #define FSESS_WARN_LSEXTATTR_LONG 0x100000 /* Returned too many extattrs */ #define FSESS_WARN_CACHE_INCOHERENT 0x200000 /* Read cache incoherent */ #define FSESS_WARN_WB_CACHE_INCOHERENT 0x400000 /* WB cache incoherent */ +#define FSESS_WARN_ILLEGAL_INODE 0x800000 /* Illegal inode for new file */ #define FSESS_MNTOPTS_MASK ( \ FSESS_DAEMON_CAN_SPY | FSESS_PUSH_SYMLINKS_IN | \ FSESS_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS | FSESS_INTR) diff --git a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_node.c b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_node.c index 258053dfb0b7..b72e7b1e4851 100644 --- a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_node.c +++ b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_node.c @@ -297,6 +297,12 @@ fuse_vnode_get(struct mount *mp, uint64_t generation = feo ? feo->generation : 0; int err = 0; + if (dvp != NULL && VTOFUD(dvp)->nid == nodeid) { + fuse_warn(fuse_get_mpdata(mp), FSESS_WARN_ILLEGAL_INODE, + "Assigned same inode to both parent and child."); + return EIO; + } + err = fuse_vnode_alloc(mp, td, nodeid, vtyp, vpp); if (err) { return err; diff --git a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c index d59d4e8de3aa..57d896cea079 100644 --- a/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c +++ b/sys/fs/fuse/fuse_vnops.c @@ -1328,6 +1328,16 @@ fuse_vnop_link(struct vop_link_args *ap) } feo = fdi.answ; + if (fli.oldnodeid != feo->nodeid) { + struct fuse_data *data = fuse_get_mpdata(vnode_mount(vp)); + fuse_warn(data, FSESS_WARN_ILLEGAL_INODE, + "Assigned wrong inode for a hard link."); + fuse_vnode_clear_attr_cache(vp); + fuse_vnode_clear_attr_cache(tdvp); + err = EIO; + goto out; + } + err = fuse_internal_checkentry(feo, vnode_vtype(vp)); if (!err) { /* @@ -1387,6 +1397,7 @@ fuse_vnop_lookup(struct vop_lookup_args *ap) struct mount *mp = vnode_mount(dvp); struct fuse_data *data = fuse_get_mpdata(mp); int default_permissions = data->dataflags & FSESS_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS; + bool is_dot; int err = 0; int lookup_err = 0; @@ -1414,6 +1425,7 @@ fuse_vnop_lookup(struct vop_lookup_args *ap) else if ((err = fuse_internal_access(dvp, VEXEC, td, cred))) return err; + is_dot = cnp->cn_namelen == 1 && *(cnp->cn_nameptr) == '.'; if ((flags & ISDOTDOT) && !(data->dataflags & FSESS_EXPORT_SUPPORT)) { if (!(VTOFUD(dvp)->flag & FN_PARENT_NID)) { @@ -1428,7 +1440,7 @@ fuse_vnop_lookup(struct vop_lookup_args *ap) return ENOENT; /* .. is obviously a directory */ vtyp = VDIR; - } else if (cnp->cn_namelen == 1 && *(cnp->cn_nameptr) == '.') { + } else if (is_dot) { nid = VTOI(dvp); /* . is obviously a directory */ vtyp = VDIR; @@ -1547,8 +1559,17 @@ fuse_vnop_lookup(struct vop_lookup_args *ap) &vp); *vpp = vp; } else if (nid == VTOI(dvp)) { - vref(dvp); - *vpp = dvp; + if (is_dot) { + vref(dvp); + *vpp = dvp; + } else { + fuse_warn(fuse_get_mpdata(mp), + FSESS_WARN_ILLEGAL_INODE, + "Assigned same inode to both parent and " + "child."); + err = EIO; + } + } else { struct fuse_vnode_data *fvdat; diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc index df3225ed1837..9f5820a00b3a 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/create.cc @@ -370,6 +370,47 @@ TEST_F(Create, ok) leak(fd); } +/* + * Nothing bad should happen if the server returns the parent's inode number + * for the newly created file. Regression test for bug 263662 + * https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=263662 + */ +TEST_F(Create, parent_inode) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_dir/some_file.txt"; + const char RELDIRPATH[] = "some_dir"; + const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt"; + mode_t mode = 0755; + uint64_t ino = 42; + int fd; + + expect_lookup(RELDIRPATH, ino, S_IFDIR | mode, 0, 1); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(ino, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT))); + expect_create(RELPATH, S_IFREG | mode, + ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, create); + out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = S_IFREG | mode; + /* Return the same inode as the parent dir */ + out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino; + out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX; + out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX; + })); + // FUSE_RELEASE happens asynchronously, so it may or may not arrive + // before the test completes. + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([=](auto in) { + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_RELEASE); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).Times(AtMost(1)) + .WillOnce(Invoke([=](auto in __unused, auto &out __unused) { })); + + fd = open(FULLPATH, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, mode); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, fd); + EXPECT_EQ(EIO, errno); +} + /* * A regression test for a bug that affected old FUSE implementations: * open(..., O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0444) should work despite the seeming diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/link.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/link.cc index 3d9a5a4e0e8f..789d3dcc3494 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/link.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/link.cc @@ -176,6 +176,53 @@ TEST_F(Link, emlink) EXPECT_EQ(EMLINK, errno); } +/* + * A hard link should always have the same inode as its source. If it doesn't, + * then it's not a hard link. + */ +TEST_F(Link, bad_inode) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/src"; + const char RELPATH[] = "src"; + const char FULLDST[] = "mountpoint/dst"; + const char RELDST[] = "dst"; + const uint64_t src_ino = 42; + const uint64_t dst_ino = 43; + mode_t mode = S_IFREG | 0644; + + EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT))); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, RELDST) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry); + out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode; + out.body.entry.nodeid = dst_ino; + out.body.entry.attr.nlink = 1; + out.body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX; + out.body.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX; + }))); + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([=](auto in) { + const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes + + sizeof(struct fuse_link_in); + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_LINK && + in.body.link.oldnodeid == dst_ino && + (0 == strcmp(name, RELPATH))); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry); + out.body.entry.nodeid = src_ino; + out.body.entry.attr.mode = mode; + out.body.entry.attr.nlink = 2; + out.body.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX; + out.body.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX; + }))); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(FULLDST, FULLPATH)); + ASSERT_EQ(EIO, errno); +} + TEST_F(Link, ok) { const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/src"; diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/lookup.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/lookup.cc index 0ec02913f66a..c654dd46bae5 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/lookup.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/lookup.cc @@ -430,6 +430,37 @@ TEST_F(Lookup, ok) ASSERT_EQ(0, access(FULLPATH, F_OK)) << strerror(errno); } +/* + * Lookup in a subdirectory of the fuse mount. The naughty server returns the + * same inode for the child as for the parent. + */ +TEST_F(Lookup, parent_inode) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_dir/some_file.txt"; + const char DIRPATH[] = "some_dir"; + const char RELPATH[] = "some_file.txt"; + uint64_t dir_ino = 2; + + EXPECT_LOOKUP(FUSE_ROOT_ID, DIRPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry); + out.body.entry.attr.mode = S_IFDIR | 0755; + out.body.entry.nodeid = dir_ino; + }))); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(dir_ino, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry); + out.body.entry.attr.mode = S_IFREG | 0644; + out.body.entry.nodeid = dir_ino; + }))); + /* + * access(2) is one of the few syscalls that will not (always) follow + * up a successful VOP_LOOKUP with another VOP. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, access(FULLPATH, F_OK)); + ASSERT_EQ(EIO, errno); +} + // Lookup in a subdirectory of the fuse mount TEST_F(Lookup, subdir) { diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mkdir.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mkdir.cc index 45efd08cfc80..f47189d9bf53 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mkdir.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mkdir.cc @@ -193,6 +193,59 @@ TEST_F(Mkdir, ok) ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(FULLPATH, mode)) << strerror(errno); } +/* + * Nothing bad should happen if the server returns the parent's inode number + * for the newly created directory. Regression test for bug 263662. + * https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=263662 + */ +TEST_F(Mkdir, parent_inode) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/parent/some_dir"; + const char PPATH[] = "parent"; + const char RELPATH[] = "some_dir"; + mode_t mode = 0755; + uint64_t ino = 42; + mode_t mask; + + mask = umask(0); + (void)umask(mask); + + expect_lookup(PPATH, ino, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, 1); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(ino, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT))); + + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([=](auto in) { + const char *name = (const char*)in.body.bytes + + sizeof(fuse_mkdir_in); + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_MKDIR && + in.body.mkdir.mode == (S_IFDIR | mode) && + in.body.mkdir.umask == mask && + (0 == strcmp(RELPATH, name))); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnImmediate([=](auto in __unused, auto& out) { + SET_OUT_HEADER_LEN(out, entry); + out.body.create.entry.attr.mode = S_IFDIR | mode; + out.body.create.entry.nodeid = ino; + out.body.create.entry.entry_valid = UINT64_MAX; + out.body.create.entry.attr_valid = UINT64_MAX; + }))); + // FUSE_FORGET happens asynchronously, so it may or may not arrive + // before the test completes. + EXPECT_CALL(*m_mock, process( + ResultOf([=](auto in) { + return (in.header.opcode == FUSE_FORGET); + }, Eq(true)), + _) + ).Times(AtMost(1)) + .WillOnce(Invoke([=](auto in __unused, auto &out __unused) { })); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mkdir(FULLPATH, mode)); + ASSERT_EQ(EIO, errno); + usleep(100000); +} + TEST_F(Mkdir_7_8, ok) { const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/some_dir"; diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mknod.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mknod.cc index 7bb8e116c3f8..75f7c2c46adc 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mknod.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/mknod.cc @@ -245,6 +245,38 @@ TEST_F(Mknod, socket) leak(fd); } +/* + * Nothing bad should happen if the server returns the parent's inode number + * for the newly created file. Regression test for bug 263662. + * https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=263662 + */ +TEST_F(Mknod, parent_inode) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/parent/some_node"; + const char PPATH[] = "parent"; + const char RELPATH[] = "some_node"; + mode_t mode = S_IFSOCK | 0755; + struct sockaddr_un sa; + int fd; + dev_t rdev = -1; /* Really it's a don't care */ + uint64_t ino = 42; + + expect_lookup(PPATH, ino, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, 1); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(ino, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT))); + expect_mknod(ino, RELPATH, ino, mode, rdev); + + fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, fd) << strerror(errno); + sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sa.sun_path, FULLPATH, sizeof(sa.sun_path)); + sa.sun_len = sizeof(FULLPATH); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, sizeof(sa))); + ASSERT_EQ(EIO, errno); + + leak(fd); +} + /* * fusefs(5) lacks VOP_WHITEOUT support. No bugzilla entry, because that's a * feature, not a bug diff --git a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/symlink.cc b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/symlink.cc index 1ee5f79f91fb..bef06c90c3db 100644 --- a/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/symlink.cc +++ b/tests/sys/fs/fusefs/symlink.cc @@ -165,6 +165,28 @@ TEST_F(Symlink, ok) EXPECT_EQ(0, symlink(dst, FULLPATH)) << strerror(errno); } +/* + * Nothing bad should happen if the server returns the parent's inode number + * for the newly created symlink. Regression test for bug 263662. + * https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=263662 + */ +TEST_F(Symlink, parent_ino) +{ + const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/parent/src"; + const char PPATH[] = "parent"; + const char RELPATH[] = "src"; + const char dst[] = "dst"; + const uint64_t ino = 42; + + expect_lookup(PPATH, ino, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, 1); + EXPECT_LOOKUP(ino, RELPATH) + .WillOnce(Invoke(ReturnErrno(ENOENT))); + expect_symlink(ino, dst, RELPATH); + + EXPECT_EQ(-1, symlink(dst, FULLPATH)); + EXPECT_EQ(EIO, errno); +} + TEST_F(Symlink_7_8, ok) { const char FULLPATH[] = "mountpoint/src";