git: 7878a69e0415 - stable/12 - random(4): Make entropy source deregistration safe
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Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 07:29:00 UTC
The branch stable/12 has been updated by obrien: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=7878a69e0415251e4c7a0d3447f998207258ad41 commit 7878a69e0415251e4c7a0d3447f998207258ad41 Author: Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2019-12-30 01:38:19 +0000 Commit: David E. O'Brien <obrien@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2022-02-22 06:20:50 +0000 random(4): Make entropy source deregistration safe Allow loadable modules that provide random entropy source(s) to safely unload. Prior to this change, no driver could ensure that their random_source structure was not being used by random_harvestq.c for any period of time after invoking random_source_deregister(). This change converts the source_list LIST to a ConcurrencyKit CK_LIST and uses an epoch(9) to protect typical read accesses of the list. The existing HARVEST_LOCK spin mutex is used to safely add and remove list entries. random_source_deregister() uses epoch_wait() to ensure no concurrent source_list readers are accessing a random_source before freeing the list item and returning to the caller. Callers can safely unload immediately after random_source_deregister() returns. (cherry picked from commit 374c99911ee45c5d2ddd42bc6bcf711a8a66b07e) --- sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c b/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c index 3f29a5bad979..c01cd0851a89 100644 --- a/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c +++ b/sys/dev/random/random_harvestq.c @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/ck.h> #include <sys/conf.h> +#include <sys/epoch.h> #include <sys/eventhandler.h> #include <sys/hash.h> #include <sys/kernel.h> @@ -71,6 +73,14 @@ static void random_sources_feed(void); static u_int read_rate; +/* + * Random must initialize much earlier than epoch, but we can initialize the + * epoch code before SMP starts. Prior to SMP, we can safely bypass + * concurrency primitives. + */ +static __read_mostly bool epoch_inited; +static __read_mostly epoch_t rs_epoch; + /* * How many events to queue up. We create this many items in * an 'empty' queue, then transfer them to the 'harvest' queue with @@ -90,12 +100,12 @@ volatile int random_kthread_control; __read_frequently u_int hc_source_mask; struct random_sources { - LIST_ENTRY(random_sources) rrs_entries; + CK_LIST_ENTRY(random_sources) rrs_entries; struct random_source *rrs_source; }; -static LIST_HEAD(sources_head, random_sources) source_list = - LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(source_list); +static CK_LIST_HEAD(sources_head, random_sources) source_list = + CK_LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(source_list); SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_random, OID_AUTO, harvest, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Entropy Device Parameters"); @@ -199,6 +209,14 @@ random_kthread(void) SYSINIT(random_device_h_proc, SI_SUB_KICK_SCHEDULER, SI_ORDER_ANY, kproc_start, &random_proc_kp); +static void +rs_epoch_init(void *dummy __unused) +{ + rs_epoch = epoch_alloc(EPOCH_PREEMPT); + epoch_inited = true; +} +SYSINIT(rs_epoch_init, SI_SUB_EPOCH, SI_ORDER_ANY, rs_epoch_init, NULL); + /* * Run through all fast sources reading entropy for the given * number of rounds, which should be a multiple of the number @@ -208,8 +226,12 @@ static void random_sources_feed(void) { uint32_t entropy[HARVESTSIZE]; + struct epoch_tracker et; struct random_sources *rrs; u_int i, n, local_read_rate, npools; + bool rse_warm; + + rse_warm = epoch_inited; /* * Step over all of live entropy sources, and feed their output @@ -233,7 +255,9 @@ random_sources_feed(void) npools = howmany(p_random_alg_context->ra_poolcount * local_read_rate, RANDOM_KTHREAD_HZ); - LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) { + if (rse_warm) + epoch_enter_preempt(rs_epoch, &et); + CK_LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) { for (i = 0; i < npools; i++) { n = rrs->rrs_source->rs_read(entropy, sizeof(entropy)); KASSERT((n <= sizeof(entropy)), ("%s: rs_read returned too much data (%u > %zu)", __func__, n, sizeof(entropy))); @@ -253,6 +277,8 @@ random_sources_feed(void) random_harvest_direct(entropy, n, rrs->rrs_source->rs_source); } } + if (rse_warm) + epoch_exit_preempt(rs_epoch, &et); explicit_bzero(entropy, sizeof(entropy)); } @@ -575,7 +601,10 @@ random_source_register(struct random_source *rsource) random_harvest_register_source(rsource->rs_source); printf("random: registering fast source %s\n", rsource->rs_ident); - LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&source_list, rrs, rrs_entries); + + RANDOM_HARVEST_LOCK(); + CK_LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&source_list, rrs, rrs_entries); + RANDOM_HARVEST_UNLOCK(); } void @@ -587,29 +616,40 @@ random_source_deregister(struct random_source *rsource) random_harvest_deregister_source(rsource->rs_source); - LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) + RANDOM_HARVEST_LOCK(); + CK_LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) if (rrs->rrs_source == rsource) { - LIST_REMOVE(rrs, rrs_entries); + CK_LIST_REMOVE(rrs, rrs_entries); break; } - if (rrs != NULL) - free(rrs, M_ENTROPY); + RANDOM_HARVEST_UNLOCK(); + + if (rrs != NULL && epoch_inited) + epoch_wait_preempt(rs_epoch); + free(rrs, M_ENTROPY); } static int random_source_handler(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS) { + struct epoch_tracker et; struct random_sources *rrs; struct sbuf sbuf; int error, count; + error = sysctl_wire_old_buffer(req, 0); + if (error != 0) + return (error); + sbuf_new_for_sysctl(&sbuf, NULL, 64, req); count = 0; - LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) { + epoch_enter_preempt(rs_epoch, &et); + CK_LIST_FOREACH(rrs, &source_list, rrs_entries) { sbuf_cat(&sbuf, (count++ ? ",'" : "'")); sbuf_cat(&sbuf, rrs->rrs_source->rs_ident); sbuf_cat(&sbuf, "'"); } + epoch_exit_preempt(rs_epoch, &et); error = sbuf_finish(&sbuf); sbuf_delete(&sbuf); return (error);