git: 0ffc20130b70 - releng/15.2 - lookup_cap_dotdot test: check symlink escape below a union mount root
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Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:09:41 UTC
The branch releng/15.2 has been updated by markj:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=0ffc20130b70f2ce9ab9c37b945dde42aa58574d
commit 0ffc20130b70f2ce9ab9c37b945dde42aa58574d
Author: Konstantin Belousov <kib@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-11-12 20:00:18 +0000
Commit: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-11-17 13:35:12 +0000
lookup_cap_dotdot test: check symlink escape below a union mount root
Let mount_tmpfs() add the union option, and leave creating the mount
point to the callers, so that the covered directory can be populated
before the mount.
Approved by: re (cperciva)
Approved by: so
Security: FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
---
tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
index 08c3f81b0d57..1fde0f13834c 100644
--- a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
+++ b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
@@ -263,15 +263,16 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__root, tc)
*/
static char mntpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+/* Mount tmpfs over the existing directory "mnt". */
static void
-mount_tmpfs(void)
+mount_tmpfs(bool unionmnt)
{
- struct iovec iov[4];
+ struct iovec iov[6];
char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+ u_int iovlen;
ATF_REQUIRE(getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) != NULL);
snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
- ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir(mntpath, 0777) == 0);
iov[0].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "fstype");
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof("fstype");
iov[1].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "tmpfs");
@@ -280,10 +281,29 @@ mount_tmpfs(void)
iov[2].iov_len = sizeof("fspath");
iov[3].iov_base = mntpath;
iov[3].iov_len = strlen(mntpath) + 1;
- ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(nmount(iov, nitems(iov), 0) == 0, "nmount: %s",
+ iovlen = 4;
+ if (unionmnt) {
+ iov[4].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "union");
+ iov[4].iov_len = sizeof("union");
+ iov[5].iov_base = NULL;
+ iov[5].iov_len = 0;
+ iovlen = 6;
+ }
+ ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(nmount(iov, iovlen, 0) == 0, "nmount: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
+static void
+unmount_tmpfs(void)
+{
+ char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
+ return;
+ snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
+ (void)unmount(mntpath, MNT_FORCE);
+}
+
ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
ATF_TC_HEAD(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
{
@@ -297,7 +317,8 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
int dfd;
check_capsicum();
- mount_tmpfs();
+ ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir("mnt", 0777) == 0);
+ mount_tmpfs(false);
ATF_REQUIRE((dfd = open(mntpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)) >= 0);
ATF_REQUIRE(mkdirat(dfd, "sub", 0777) == 0);
@@ -317,12 +338,54 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
ATF_TC_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
{
- char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+ unmount_tmpfs();
+}
- if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
- return;
- snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
- (void)unmount(mntpath, MNT_FORCE);
+/*
+ * A name missing from the root of a union mount is looked up in the
+ * covered directory. A relative symlink found there is resolved from
+ * the covered directory, and its ".." must not leave the starting
+ * directory either.
+ */
+ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__union);
+ATF_TC_HEAD(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+ atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "descr",
+ "Validate that symlinks below a union mount root stay beneath it");
+ atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
+}
+
+ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+ int dfd;
+
+ check_capsicum();
+ touchat(AT_FDCWD, "outside");
+ ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir("mnt", 0777) == 0);
+ touchat(AT_FDCWD, "mnt/lower");
+ ATF_REQUIRE(symlink("lower", "mnt/lnklower") == 0);
+ ATF_REQUIRE(symlink("../outside", "mnt/lnkout") == 0);
+ mount_tmpfs(true);
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE((dfd = open(mntpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)) >= 0);
+
+ /* Entries of the covered directory are still found. */
+ ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(openat(dfd, "lower", O_RDONLY |
+ O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) >= 0, "%s", strerror(errno));
+ ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(openat(dfd, "lnklower", O_RDONLY |
+ O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) >= 0, "%s", strerror(errno));
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "lnkout", O_RDONLY |
+ O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) < 0);
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE(cap_enter() >= 0);
+
+ ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "lnkout", O_RDONLY) < 0);
+}
+
+ATF_TC_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+ unmount_tmpfs();
}
ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
@@ -338,6 +401,7 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__negative);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__root);
ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
+ ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__union);
return (atf_no_error());
}