git: 9b7c7bcebd4d - stable/15 - lookup_cap_dotdot test: check symlink escape below a union mount root

From: Mark Johnston <markj_at_FreeBSD.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:06:00 UTC
The branch stable/15 has been updated by markj:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=9b7c7bcebd4d8b85212fed84daeae54a0522c00c

commit 9b7c7bcebd4d8b85212fed84daeae54a0522c00c
Author:     Konstantin Belousov <kib@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-11-12 20:00:18 +0000
Commit:     Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-11-17 16:57:22 +0000

    lookup_cap_dotdot test: check symlink escape below a union mount root
    
    Let mount_tmpfs() add the union option, and leave creating the mount
    point to the callers, so that the covered directory can be populated
    before the mount.
    
    Approved by:    so
    Security:       FreeBSD-SA-26:81.vfs
    Sponsored by:   The FreeBSD Foundation
---
 tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
index 08c3f81b0d57..1fde0f13834c 100644
--- a/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
+++ b/tests/sys/vfs/lookup_cap_dotdot.c
@@ -263,15 +263,16 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__root, tc)
  */
 static char mntpath[MAXPATHLEN];
 
+/* Mount tmpfs over the existing directory "mnt". */
 static void
-mount_tmpfs(void)
+mount_tmpfs(bool unionmnt)
 {
-	struct iovec iov[4];
+	struct iovec iov[6];
 	char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+	u_int iovlen;
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE(getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) != NULL);
 	snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
-	ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir(mntpath, 0777) == 0);
 	iov[0].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "fstype");
 	iov[0].iov_len = sizeof("fstype");
 	iov[1].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "tmpfs");
@@ -280,10 +281,29 @@ mount_tmpfs(void)
 	iov[2].iov_len = sizeof("fspath");
 	iov[3].iov_base = mntpath;
 	iov[3].iov_len = strlen(mntpath) + 1;
-	ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(nmount(iov, nitems(iov), 0) == 0, "nmount: %s",
+	iovlen = 4;
+	if (unionmnt) {
+		iov[4].iov_base = __DECONST(char *, "union");
+		iov[4].iov_len = sizeof("union");
+		iov[5].iov_base = NULL;
+		iov[5].iov_len = 0;
+		iovlen = 6;
+	}
+	ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(nmount(iov, iovlen, 0) == 0, "nmount: %s",
 	    strerror(errno));
 }
 
+static void
+unmount_tmpfs(void)
+{
+	char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+	if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
+		return;
+	snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
+	(void)unmount(mntpath, MNT_FORCE);
+}
+
 ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
 ATF_TC_HEAD(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
 {
@@ -297,7 +317,8 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
 	int dfd;
 
 	check_capsicum();
-	mount_tmpfs();
+	ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir("mnt", 0777) == 0);
+	mount_tmpfs(false);
 
 	ATF_REQUIRE((dfd = open(mntpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)) >= 0);
 	ATF_REQUIRE(mkdirat(dfd, "sub", 0777) == 0);
@@ -317,12 +338,54 @@ ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
 
 ATF_TC_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot, tc)
 {
-	char cwd[MAXPATHLEN];
+	unmount_tmpfs();
+}
 
-	if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
-		return;
-	snprintf(mntpath, sizeof(mntpath), "%s/mnt", cwd);
-	(void)unmount(mntpath, MNT_FORCE);
+/*
+ * A name missing from the root of a union mount is looked up in the
+ * covered directory.  A relative symlink found there is resolved from
+ * the covered directory, and its ".." must not leave the starting
+ * directory either.
+ */
+ATF_TC_WITH_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__union);
+ATF_TC_HEAD(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+	atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "descr",
+	    "Validate that symlinks below a union mount root stay beneath it");
+	atf_tc_set_md_var(tc, "require.user", "root");
+}
+
+ATF_TC_BODY(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+	int dfd;
+
+	check_capsicum();
+	touchat(AT_FDCWD, "outside");
+	ATF_REQUIRE(mkdir("mnt", 0777) == 0);
+	touchat(AT_FDCWD, "mnt/lower");
+	ATF_REQUIRE(symlink("lower", "mnt/lnklower") == 0);
+	ATF_REQUIRE(symlink("../outside", "mnt/lnkout") == 0);
+	mount_tmpfs(true);
+
+	ATF_REQUIRE((dfd = open(mntpath, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)) >= 0);
+
+	/* Entries of the covered directory are still found. */
+	ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(openat(dfd, "lower", O_RDONLY |
+	    O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) >= 0, "%s", strerror(errno));
+	ATF_REQUIRE_MSG(openat(dfd, "lnklower", O_RDONLY |
+	    O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) >= 0, "%s", strerror(errno));
+
+	ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "lnkout", O_RDONLY |
+	    O_RESOLVE_BENEATH) < 0);
+
+	ATF_REQUIRE(cap_enter() >= 0);
+
+	ATF_REQUIRE_ERRNO(ENOTCAPABLE, openat(dfd, "lnkout", O_RDONLY) < 0);
+}
+
+ATF_TC_CLEANUP(lookup_cap_dotdot__union, tc)
+{
+	unmount_tmpfs();
 }
 
 ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
@@ -338,6 +401,7 @@ ATF_TP_ADD_TCS(tp)
 	ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__negative);
 	ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__root);
 	ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__mountroot);
+	ATF_TP_ADD_TC(tp, lookup_cap_dotdot__union);
 
 	return (atf_no_error());
 }