git: 800acf75eb80 - releng/14.4 - rack: Reload the TCP stack PCB after reacquiring the inpcb lock

The branch releng/14.4 has been updated by markj:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=800acf75eb80d299fd8ba1e151050da58d481232

commit 800acf75eb80d299fd8ba1e151050da58d481232
Author:     Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-06-23 21:46:17 +0000
Commit:     Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-06-29 19:17:30 +0000

    rack: Reload the TCP stack PCB after reacquiring the inpcb lock
    
    Malicious userspace might switch TCP stacks twice while the inpcb lock
    is dropped.  If it does so, the validation of tp->t_fb might succeed,
    but the saved pointer to the stack PCB might be invalid.  Reload it to
    avoid this problem, as BBR already does.
    
    Approved by:    so
    Security:       FreeBSD-SA-26:43.tcp
    Security:       CVE-2026-49422
    Reported by:    Maik Münch
    Reviewed by:    tuexen
    Sponsored by:   The FreeBSD Foundation
    Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D57791
---
 sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c b/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c
index 9b35fbb7797b..41a57eeedfde 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/tcp_stacks/rack.c
@@ -23936,6 +23936,7 @@ process_opt:
 		INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
 		return (ENOPROTOOPT);
 	}
+	rack = (struct tcp_rack *)tp->t_fb_ptr;
 	if (rack->defer_options && (rack->gp_ready == 0) &&
 	    (sopt->sopt_name != TCP_DEFER_OPTIONS) &&
 	    (sopt->sopt_name != TCP_HYBRID_PACING) &&