git: b9cac4b1786d - releng/14.5 - openssl: Fix multiple vulnerabilities
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Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 16:00:40 UTC
The branch releng/14.5 has been updated by markj:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=b9cac4b1786ded74ccc2a2ca07e7a37c45e69c94
commit b9cac4b1786ded74ccc2a2ca07e7a37c45e69c94
Author: Gordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-08-23 15:56:38 +0000
Commit: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-08-24 19:04:13 +0000
openssl: Fix multiple vulnerabilities
This is a rollup commit from upstream to fix:
Avoid full read buffer allocation when buffering DTLS records
ssl/record: lower the DTLS unprocessed_rcds queue limit
Fix heap buffer overflow (8-byte OOB write) in AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap
Add a test for restricting growth in cmp cert cache
Fix unbounded cert cache growth in cmp
Fix Remote NULL deref in ossl_cmp_calc_protection() via crafted protectionAlg
Approved by: re (cperciva)
Approved by: so
Obtained from: OpenSSL
Security: FreeBSD-SA-26:61.openssl
Security: CVE-2026-54874
Security: CVE-2026-63072
Security: CVE-2026-63074
Security: CVE-2026-63076
---
crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c | 2 +-
crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c | 15 +-
crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c | 9 +-
crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 120 ++++++---
crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record.h | 1 -
crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record_local.h | 11 +-
crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 12 +-
crypto/openssl/test/build.info | 6 +-
crypto/openssl/test/cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c | 348 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/openssl/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t | 7 +-
10 files changed, 488 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
index 9b1c95e974dd..a4bcf0f2b89b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET);
return NULL;
}
- if (ppval == NULL) {
+ if (pptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || ppval == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
index b63f32f50167..9eaff73ce0e0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
@@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
{
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
+ int num_extra_before, num_extra_after, num_added;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
return 0;
@@ -700,17 +701,27 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
+ num_extra_before = sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted);
if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
/* this allows self-signed certs */
X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
| X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
return 0;
-
+ num_extra_after = sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted);
+ num_added = num_extra_after - num_extra_before;
/* validate message protection */
if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
+ /*
+ * remove extraCerts again if not caching
+ * or if we failed validation above, lest a remote user
+ * starts sending us lots of certificate in invalid messages
+ * leading to a DOS from unbounded certificate stack growth
+ */
+ while (num_added-- > 0)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->untrusted));
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
@@ -719,6 +730,8 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
} else {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
+ while (num_added-- > 0)
+ X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->untrusted));
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
index 79697cd3372c..74d58412335f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_kari.c
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *out = NULL;
int outlen;
+ size_t outsize;
keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(kari->ctx);
if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
@@ -230,7 +231,13 @@ static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
/* obtain output length of ciphered key */
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
goto err;
- out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ /*
+ * On its integrity-failure paths that primitive writes and cleanses up to
+ * inlen bytes of the output buffer. Size the buffer for that worst case so
+ * a failed unwrap cannot write past the allocation.
+ */
+ outsize = (size_t)outlen < inlen ? inlen : (size_t)outlen;
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outsize);
if (out == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
index 414aa9b9c23e..fb7736648a98 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->rbuf.buf, rdata->rbuf.len);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->packet, rdata->packet_length);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->rbuf.buf, rdata->rbuf.len);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(rdata->packet, rdata->packet_length);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
}
@@ -130,26 +130,60 @@ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
- SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
+ /*
+ * The record was read into a read buffer at least this size, so it must fit
+ * - see the length checks in ssl3_read_n(). Verify it rather than risk
+ * overrunning the buffer if that ever ceases to hold.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(rdata->packet_length <= s->rlayer.rbuf.len)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
+ /*
+ * rdata->packet is a standalone copy of this record's on-wire bytes (see
+ * dtls1_buffer_record()). Copy it into the live read buffer so that
+ * s->rlayer.packet continues to point inside s->rlayer.rbuf.buf, as it
+ * does for every other record, then free our standalone copy.
+ */
+ memcpy(s->rlayer.rbuf.buf, rdata->packet, rdata->packet_length);
+ s->rlayer.rbuf.offset = 0;
+ s->rlayer.rbuf.left = 0;
+ s->rlayer.packet = s->rlayer.rbuf.buf;
s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
- memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+ /*
+ * dtls1_buffer_record() rebased rrec.data/input onto rdata->packet if they
+ * pointed into this record's own bytes, so translate them again onto the
+ * record's new location in the read buffer. Anything still pointing
+ * outside rdata->packet is either a separate allocation (rr->comp) or a
+ * leftover from a previously processed record that will be overwritten
+ * before use, so leave it alone.
+ */
+ if (rdata->rrec.data >= rdata->packet
+ && rdata->rrec.data < rdata->packet + rdata->packet_length)
+ s->rlayer.rrec[0].data = s->rlayer.packet + (rdata->rrec.data - rdata->packet);
+ if (rdata->rrec.input >= rdata->packet
+ && rdata->rrec.input < rdata->packet + rdata->packet_length)
+ s->rlayer.rrec[0].input = s->rlayer.packet + (rdata->rrec.input - rdata->packet);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
+
/* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
- memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
+ memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(s->rlayer.packet[5]), 6);
return 1;
}
-int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority,
+ size_t limit)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
- if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= limit)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
@@ -161,11 +195,37 @@ int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
return -1;
}
- rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
+ /*
+ * Take a copy of just this record's own on-wire bytes - the header plus the
+ * record body, which for an already-processed record holds the plaintext
+ * decrypted in place - rather than the whole (much larger) read buffer. The
+ * live s->rlayer.rbuf is left untouched and continues to be used for
+ * subsequent reads.
+ */
rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
- memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ rdata->packet = OPENSSL_memdup(s->rlayer.packet, s->rlayer.packet_length);
+ if (rdata->packet == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+ /*
+ * The copied rrec.data/input still point into the live read buffer. Rebase
+ * any that point within this record's own bytes onto our standalone copy,
+ * so that dtls1_copy_record() can translate them again on retrieval.
+ * Pointers elsewhere (e.g. into rr->comp, or left over from a previously
+ * processed record) are not ours to move and are left alone.
+ */
+ if (rdata->rrec.data >= s->rlayer.packet
+ && rdata->rrec.data < s->rlayer.packet + s->rlayer.packet_length)
+ rdata->rrec.data = rdata->packet + (rdata->rrec.data - s->rlayer.packet);
+ if (rdata->rrec.input >= s->rlayer.packet
+ && rdata->rrec.input < s->rlayer.packet + s->rlayer.packet_length)
+ rdata->rrec.input = rdata->packet + (rdata->rrec.input - s->rlayer.packet);
+
item->data = rdata;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -176,22 +236,9 @@ int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
}
#endif
- s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
- s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
- memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
- memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
- OPENSSL_free(rdata);
- pitem_free(item);
- return -1;
- }
-
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
/* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
- OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->packet);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
}
@@ -202,15 +249,16 @@ int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
{
pitem *item;
+ int ret;
item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
if (item) {
- dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+ ret = dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
- return 1;
+ return ret;
}
return 0;
@@ -255,7 +303,13 @@ int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
- dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+ if (!dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s)) {
+ /*
+ * Should not happen. The record has been dropped, so move on
+ * to the next one.
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
/*
@@ -292,7 +346,8 @@ int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
}
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec))
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec),
+ DTLS1_MAX_BUFFERED_RECORDS)
< 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
@@ -398,6 +453,7 @@ start:
}
#endif
+ /* On failure the record is simply dropped */
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
@@ -451,7 +507,7 @@ start:
* data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
*/
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr))
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr), DTLS1_MAX_BUFFERED_RECORDS)
< 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record.h
index fcdbbe012578..67527e54402a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record.h
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ typedef struct record_pqueue_st {
typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st {
unsigned char *packet;
size_t packet_length;
- SSL3_BUFFER rbuf;
SSL3_RECORD rrec;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo recordinfo;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record_local.h b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record_local.h
index 93fb0fd51cb8..a8d5387636c2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record_local.h
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/record_local.h
@@ -41,9 +41,18 @@ __owur int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
+/*
+ * Limits on the number of records dtls1_buffer_record() will hold, to prevent
+ * DOS attacks. Records arriving early for the next epoch get a tighter limit:
+ * a legitimate peer only ever has a small burst of those in flight.
+ */
+#define DTLS1_MAX_UNPROCESSED_RECORDS 16
+#define DTLS1_MAX_BUFFERED_RECORDS 100
+
int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s);
int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue);
-int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority);
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, unsigned char *priority,
+ size_t limit);
void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq);
/* Functions provided by the DTLS1_BITMAP component */
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index 6fd2328a12de..2c45dae27f71 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -1683,8 +1683,11 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
* after use :-).
*/
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+ /*
+ * Leave s->rlayer.packet_length alone: ssl3_read_n() starts each new record
+ * by resetting it, and it must still describe this record's on-wire bytes
+ * for dtls1_buffer_record() should this record end up being buffered.
+ */
/* Mark receipt of record. */
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
@@ -1887,7 +1890,7 @@ again:
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s,
&(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
- rr->seq_num)
+ rr->seq_num, DTLS1_MAX_UNPROCESSED_RECORDS)
< 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
@@ -1930,7 +1933,8 @@ int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off
rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
- SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec))
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec),
+ DTLS1_MAX_BUFFERED_RECORDS)
<= 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/test/build.info b/crypto/openssl/test/build.info
index 83acdd1b4289..3f4c0121bdeb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/test/build.info
+++ b/crypto/openssl/test/build.info
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
IF[{- !$disabled{cmp} -}]
PROGRAMS{noinst}=cmp_asn_test cmp_ctx_test cmp_status_test cmp_hdr_test \
cmp_protect_test cmp_msg_test cmp_vfy_test \
- cmp_server_test cmp_client_test
+ cmp_server_test cmp_client_test cmp_extracerts_dos_test
ENDIF
SOURCE[cmp_asn_test]=cmp_asn_test.c helpers/cmp_testlib.c
@@ -591,6 +591,10 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
INCLUDE[cmp_msg_test]=.. ../include ../apps/include
DEPEND[cmp_msg_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
+ SOURCE[cmp_extracerts_dos_test]=cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c helpers/cmp_testlib.c
+ INCLUDE[cmp_extracerts_dos_test]=.. ../include ../apps/include
+ DEPEND[cmp_extracerts_dos_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
+
SOURCE[cmp_vfy_test]=cmp_vfy_test.c helpers/cmp_testlib.c
INCLUDE[cmp_vfy_test]=.. ../include ../apps/include
DEPEND[cmp_vfy_test]=../libcrypto.a libtestutil.a
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/test/cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c b/crypto/openssl/test/cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..670020a680d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/test/cmp_extracerts_dos_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Regression test for: CMP server unauthenticated memory/CPU DoS via
+ * cached extraCerts on failed protection checks.
+ *
+ * Root cause (crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(), current
+ * master as of this writing):
+ *
+ * res = ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, ...);
+ * ...
+ * res = OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg) || (cb...); // may be 0 (rejected)
+ *
+ * if (ctx->noCacheExtraCerts) // <-- rollback is
+ * while (num_added-- > 0) // gated on this
+ * X509_free(sk_X509_shift(ctx->untrusted)); // flag only, NOT
+ * // on the
+ * // validation
+ * // result (res)
+ *
+ * if (!res) { ...; return 0; } // certs from a REJECTED msg are kept
+ *
+ * This test exercises ossl_cmp_msg_check_update() directly -- no sockets,
+ * no HTTP server, no apps/cmp.c -- and asserts on the resulting size of
+ * ctx->untrusted. It builds a genuinely PBM-protected OSSL_CMP_MSG using
+ * the project's own internal message-creation function
+ * (ossl_cmp_genm_new(), same one exercised in test/cmp_msg_test.c) so the
+ * message is not hand-crafted to "look" rejectable -- it is rejected for a
+ * real reason (the receiving ctx has no matching secret configured), the
+ * same way OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() would reject any unauthenticated CMP
+ * request in the field.
+ *
+ * Expected results:
+ * - BEFORE the fix: untrusted_count_after == untrusted_count_before + N
+ * (every rejected message's extraCerts persist)
+ * - AFTER the fix: untrusted_count_after == untrusted_count_before
+ * (rejected messages leave no residue)
+ */
+
+#include "helpers/cmp_testlib.h"
+
+#define NUM_REJECTED_REQUESTS 25 /* "attacker" sends this many distinct certs */
+
+typedef struct test_fixture {
+ const char *test_case_name;
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *server_ctx; /* long-lived ctx under test, mirrors srv_ctx->ctx */
+} CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE;
+
+static OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+
+static CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE *set_up(const char *const test_case_name)
+{
+ CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE *fixture;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(fixture = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*fixture))))
+ return NULL;
+ fixture->test_case_name = test_case_name;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(fixture->server_ctx = OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(libctx, NULL))) {
+ OPENSSL_free(fixture);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Deliberately do NOT call OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue() on the
+ * server ctx. Per OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() (crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c):
+ * case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
+ * if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
+ * ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "no secret available for verifying..");
+ * ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
+ * return 0;
+ * }
+ * so every PBM-protected message this ctx receives is unconditionally
+ * rejected -- a deterministic, content-independent rejection path that
+ * models "missing or invalid protection" from the report's repro
+ * steps, without needing to forge a bad MAC by hand.
+ * ctx->noCacheExtraCerts is left at its default (0), exactly as in the
+ * vulnerable deployment ("not setting -no_cache_extracerts").
+ */
+ return fixture;
+}
+
+static void tear_down(CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE *fixture)
+{
+ if (fixture == NULL)
+ return;
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(fixture->server_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(fixture);
+}
+
+/* Generates a throwaway EC P-256 keypair; cheap, and key strength is
+ * irrelevant to this test. */
+static EVP_PKEY *generate_throwaway_keypair(void)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(libctx, "EC", NULL)))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(pctx, "P-256"), 0)
+ || !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_generate(pctx, &pkey), 0))
+ pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return pkey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Builds a minimal, self-signed, syntactically valid X509 with a unique
+ * subject/issuer per index, so X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP cannot collapse it
+ * with any other generated cert (matching the report's exploitation
+ * requirement of "unique certificates across requests").
+ */
+static X509 *generate_unique_self_signed_cert(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int index)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial = NULL;
+ char cn[64];
+
+ BIO_snprintf(cn, sizeof(cn), "attacker-cert-%d", index);
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(cert = X509_new())
+ || !TEST_true(X509_set_version(cert, X509_VERSION_3)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(serial = ASN1_INTEGER_new())
+ || !TEST_true(ASN1_INTEGER_set(serial, 1000L + index))
+ || !TEST_true(X509_set_serialNumber(cert, serial)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert), 0))
+ || !TEST_ptr(X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert),
+ 60L * 60L * 24L * 365L)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(X509_set_pubkey(cert, pkey)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(name = X509_NAME_new())
+ || !TEST_true(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "O", MBSTRING_ASC,
+ (unsigned char *)"cmp-dos-test",
+ -1, -1, 0))
+ || !TEST_true(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
+ (unsigned char *)cn,
+ -1, -1, 0))
+ || !TEST_true(X509_set_subject_name(cert, name))
+ || !TEST_true(X509_set_issuer_name(cert, name)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_gt(X509_sign(cert, pkey, EVP_sha256()), 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+ return cert;
+
+err:
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(serial);
+ X509_free(cert);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Builds a real, internally consistent, PBM-protected CMP GenMsg carrying
+ * exactly one never-before-seen self-signed cert as its sole extraCert.
+ * Uses a throwaway *client*-side OSSL_CMP_CTX purely to drive message
+ * creation/protection (ossl_cmp_genm_new() both builds the body and calls
+ * ossl_cmp_msg_protect() internally, same as in test/cmp_msg_test.c). The
+ * client ctx's secret is intentionally never shared with the server ctx
+ * under test, so the message is protected (syntactically well-formed,
+ * non-empty protection field) but NOT verifiable by the receiver -- this
+ * is what "missing or invalid protection" means for a real attacker who
+ * has no credentials, not an empty/garbage protection field.
+ */
+static OSSL_CMP_MSG *build_rejectable_msg_with_unique_cert(int index)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *client_ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ X509 *fresh_cert = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra = NULL;
+ unsigned char ref[16], secret[16];
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(client_ctx = OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(libctx, NULL)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(pkey = generate_throwaway_keypair())
+ || !TEST_ptr(fresh_cert = generate_unique_self_signed_cert(pkey, index)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(extra = sk_X509_new_null())
+ || !TEST_true(sk_X509_push(extra, fresh_cert)))
+ goto err;
+ fresh_cert = NULL; /* ownership now with the stack */
+
+ if (!TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_extraCertsOut(client_ctx, extra)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* PBM protection with a secret the server ctx will never be given */
+ memset(ref, (unsigned char)(0xA0 + (index & 0x0F)), sizeof(ref));
+ memset(secret, (unsigned char)(0x50 + (index & 0x0F)), sizeof(secret));
+ if (!TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(client_ctx,
+ OSSL_CMP_OPT_UNPROTECTED_SEND, 0))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(client_ctx, ref,
+ sizeof(ref)))
+ || !TEST_true(OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(client_ctx, secret,
+ sizeof(secret))))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* GenMsg is the lightest standard body type for this purpose */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(msg = ossl_cmp_genm_new(client_ctx)))
+ goto err;
+
+ sk_X509_pop_free(extra, X509_free);
+ X509_free(fresh_cert);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(client_ctx);
+ return msg;
+
+err:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(extra, X509_free);
+ X509_free(fresh_cert);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(client_ctx);
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Core assertion: N distinct rejected requests must not grow
+ * server_ctx->untrusted at all.
+ *
+ * Before the fix this fails with e.g.:
+ * ERROR: untrusted count after (25) != count before (0)
+ */
+static int execute_no_unbounded_growth_test(CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE *fixture)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *server_ctx = fixture->server_ctx;
+ int count_before, count_after, i;
+
+#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
+ TEST_skip("The unbounded growth test is invalid when FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION is defined\n");
+ return 1;
+#endif
+
+ count_before = sk_X509_num(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted(server_ctx));
+ if (count_before < 0)
+ count_before = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_REJECTED_REQUESTS; i++) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = build_rejectable_msg_with_unique_cert(i);
+ int check_result;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(msg))
+ return 0;
+
+ check_result = ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(server_ctx, msg, NULL, 0);
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(check_result, 0)) {
+ TEST_note("expected request #%d to be rejected (server ctx has"
+ " no matching PBM secret) but it was accepted -- test"
+ " setup is wrong, not exercising the rejection path",
+ i);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ count_after = sk_X509_num(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted(server_ctx));
+ if (count_after < 0)
+ count_after = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(count_after, count_before)) {
+ TEST_note("server_ctx->untrusted grew from %d to %d after %d"
+ " rejected requests -- failed-request extraCerts caching"
+ " bug is present (see ossl_cmp_msg_check_update() in"
+ " crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c)",
+ count_before, count_after,
+ NUM_REJECTED_REQUESTS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Single-request variant of the same check, useful in isolation since it
+ * pins down that even ONE rejected request leaves no residue -- ruling out
+ * X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP coincidentally masking the bug in the N-request test.
+ */
+static int execute_single_rejected_request_test(CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE *fixture)
+{
+ OSSL_CMP_CTX *server_ctx = fixture->server_ctx;
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = build_rejectable_msg_with_unique_cert(999);
+ int count_before, count_after;
+
+#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
+ TEST_skip("The cmp reject test is invalid when FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION is defined\n");
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+ return 1;
+#endif
+ if (!TEST_ptr(msg))
+ return 0;
+
+ count_before = sk_X509_num(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted(server_ctx));
+ if (count_before < 0)
+ count_before = 0;
+
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(server_ctx, msg, NULL, 0), 0)) {
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+
+ count_after = sk_X509_num(OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted(server_ctx));
+ if (count_after < 0)
+ count_after = 0;
+
+ return TEST_int_eq(count_after, count_before);
+}
+
+static int test_single_rejected_request_leaves_no_residue(void)
+{
+ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up);
+ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_single_rejected_request_test, tear_down);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int test_no_unbounded_growth_on_rejected_requests(void)
+{
+ SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(CMP_DOS_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up);
+ EXECUTE_TEST(execute_no_unbounded_growth_test, tear_down);
+ return result;
+}
+
+int setup_tests(void)
+{
+ ADD_TEST(test_single_rejected_request_leaves_no_residue);
+ ADD_TEST(test_no_unbounded_growth_on_rejected_requests);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t b/crypto/openssl/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t
index d104576a9d60..19c17efca4ea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssl/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t
+++ b/crypto/openssl/test/recipes/65-test_cmp_msg.t
@@ -20,17 +20,22 @@ use lib srctop_dir('Configurations');
use lib bldtop_dir('.');
my $no_fips = disabled('fips') || ($ENV{NO_FIPS} // 0);
+my $no_ec = disabled('ec');
plan skip_all => "This test is not supported in a no-cmp build"
if disabled("cmp");
-plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1); #fips test
+plan tests => 2 + ($no_fips ? 0 : 1) + ($no_ec ? 0 : 1); #fips test and ec test
my @basic_cmd = ("cmp_msg_test",
data_file("new.key"),
data_file("server.crt"),
data_file("pkcs10.der"));
+unless ($no_ec) {
+ ok(run(test(["cmp_extracerts_dos_test"])));
+}
+
ok(run(test([@basic_cmd, "none"])));
ok(run(test([@basic_cmd, "default", srctop_file("test", "default.cnf")])));