git: ea4ab7e36ed9 - main - bnxt_en: Add per-VF trust, spoof-check and promiscuous controls
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Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 06:45:01 UTC
The branch main has been updated by ssaxena:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=ea4ab7e36ed9cf153c374782be446254a7d11822
commit ea4ab7e36ed9cf153c374782be446254a7d11822
Author: Chandrakanth Patil <chandrakanth.patil@broadcom.com>
AuthorDate: 2026-03-31 16:59:01 +0000
Commit: Sumit Saxena <ssaxena@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-04-28 06:32:12 +0000
bnxt_en: Add per-VF trust, spoof-check and promiscuous controls
Expose per-VF policy knobs via the FreeBSD sysctl tree and enforce
them at the data-path level.
Trust (dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.trusted):
bnxt_set_vf_trust() sets/clears BNXT_VF_TRUST and sends
HWRM_FUNC_CFG with FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE/DISABLE.
bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls() / bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls()
manage the sysctl lifetime with VF creation/teardown.
Spoof-check (dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.spoofchk):
bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk() issues HWRM_FUNC_CFG with
SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_ENABLE/DISABLE.
Promiscuous gating:
bnxt_is_trusted_vf() queries firmware via HWRM_FUNC_QCFG.
bnxt_promisc_ok() returns false for untrusted VFs, preventing them
from entering promiscuous mode. bnxt_promisc_set() is updated to
gate the PROMISCUOUS and ANYVLAN_NONVLAN mask bits on bnxt_promisc_ok().
bnxt_iov_vf_add() applies the initial trust/spoof-check policy from the
nvlist schema. bnxt_iov_init() creates the sysctl trees after
bnxt_cfg_hw_sriov() succeeds. bnxt_iov_uninit() tears them down.
MFC after: 1 month
Reviewed by: ssaxena
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56200
---
sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c | 6 +-
2 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
index 9bec955f9890..2d9b43728c2d 100644
--- a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
+++ b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/bnxt_sriov.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include "bnxt_hwrm.h"
#include "bnxt_sriov.h"
-
static int
bnxt_set_vf_admin_mac(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf,
const uint8_t *mac)
@@ -89,6 +88,9 @@ bnxt_iov_vf_add(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t vfnum, const nvlist_t *params)
vfnum, rc);
}
+ (void)bnxt_set_vf_trust(softc, vfnum, vf->trusted);
+ (void)bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(softc, vfnum, vf->spoofchk);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ void bnxt_iov_uninit(if_ctx_t ctx)
if (rc)
device_printf(softc->dev, "VF resource free HWRM failed: %d\n", rc);
+ bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls(softc);
bnxt_free_vf_resources(softc);
BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK_DESTROY(softc);
}
@@ -349,6 +352,75 @@ bnxt_is_trusted_vf(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
return !!(vf->func_qcfg_flags & HWRM_FUNC_QCFG_OUTPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF);
}
+bool bnxt_promisc_ok(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
+{
+ if (BNXT_VF(softc) && !bnxt_is_trusted_vf(softc, &softc->vf))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
+{
+ struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!(softc->fw_cap & BNXT_FW_CAP_TRUSTED_VF))
+ return (EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+ bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(softc, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG);
+
+ req.fid = htole16(vf->fw_fid);
+
+ if (vf->flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST)
+ req.flags = cpu_to_le32(HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_ENABLE);
+ else
+ req.flags = cpu_to_le32(HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_TRUSTED_VF_DISABLE);
+
+ BNXT_HWRM_LOCK(softc);
+ rc = _hwrm_send_message(softc, &req, sizeof(req));
+ BNXT_HWRM_UNLOCK(softc);
+ if (rc)
+ device_printf(softc->dev, "bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf failed. rc:%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+bnxt_set_vf_trust(struct bnxt_softc *softc, int vf_id, bool trusted)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct bnxt_vf_info *vf = NULL;
+
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+ if (softc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+ return (ENOENT);
+ }
+ vf = &softc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+
+ if (trusted)
+ vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+ else
+ vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+
+ rc = bnxt_hwrm_set_trusted_vf(softc, vf);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+ if (softc->pf.num_vfs != 0 && vf_id < softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ vf = &softc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+ if (trusted)
+ vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+ else
+ vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_TRUST;
+ }
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int
bnxt_vf_configure_mac(struct bnxt_softc *softc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf)
{
@@ -452,6 +524,186 @@ void bnxt_hwrm_exec_fwd_req(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
}
}
+/* destroy VF sysctls when VFs are removed / PF detaches. */
+void
+bnxt_destroy_trusted_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc)
+{
+ sysctl_ctx_free(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx);
+}
+
+/* Handler for: dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf<N>.trusted (0/1) */
+static int
+bnxt_sysctl_vf_trusted(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
+{
+ struct bnxt_softc *softc = (struct bnxt_softc *)arg1;
+ int vf_id = (int)arg2;
+ int val, rc;
+
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
+ if (softc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id < 0 || vf_id >= softc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+ return (ENOENT);
+ }
+ val = (softc->pf.vf[vf_id].flags & BNXT_VF_TRUST) ? 1 : 0;
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(softc);
+
+ rc = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* If no new value supplied, it was a READ */
+ if (req->newptr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* WRITE path: 'val' now holds the user's 0/1 */
+ rc = bnxt_set_vf_trust(softc, vf_id, (val != 0));
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create per-VF sysctls:
+ * dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf0.trusted
+ * dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf1.trusted
+ * ..
+ */
+int
+bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc, uint16_t num_vfs)
+{
+ struct sysctl_oid_list *root_list;
+ struct sysctl_oid *vf_node;
+ char node_name[16];
+
+ /* use the device's sysctl tree as root: dev.bnxt.<unit>. */
+ sysctl_ctx_init(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx);
+ root_list = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(device_get_sysctl_tree(softc->dev));
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
+ snprintf(node_name, sizeof(node_name), "vf%d", i);
+
+ /* dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN */
+ vf_node = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+ root_list, OID_AUTO,
+ node_name, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "VF node");
+
+ /* dev.bnxt.<unit>.vfN.trusted */
+ SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+ SYSCTL_CHILDREN(vf_node),
+ OID_AUTO, "trusted",
+ CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
+ softc, i, bnxt_sysctl_vf_trusted, "I",
+ "0=untrusted (default), 1=trusted");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk(struct bnxt_softc *sc, struct bnxt_vf_info *vf,
+ bool enable)
+{
+ struct hwrm_func_cfg_input req = {0};
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ bnxt_hwrm_cmd_hdr_init(sc, &req, HWRM_FUNC_CFG);
+
+ req.fid = htole16(vf->fw_fid);
+ req.flags = htole32(enable ?
+ HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_ENABLE :
+ HWRM_FUNC_CFG_INPUT_FLAGS_SRC_MAC_ADDR_CHECK_DISABLE);
+
+ BNXT_HWRM_LOCK(sc);
+ rc = _hwrm_send_message(sc, &req, sizeof(req));
+ BNXT_HWRM_UNLOCK(sc);
+ if (rc)
+ device_printf(sc->dev, "bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk failed. rc:%d\n", rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(struct bnxt_softc *sc, int vf_id, bool enable)
+{
+ struct bnxt_vf_info *vf;
+ int rc;
+
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+ if (sc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+ return (ENOENT);
+ }
+ vf = &sc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+
+ rc = bnxt_hwrm_set_vf_spoofchk(sc, vf, enable);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+ if (sc->pf.num_vfs != 0 && vf_id < sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ vf = &sc->pf.vf[vf_id];
+ if (enable)
+ vf->flags |= BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK;
+ else
+ vf->flags &= ~BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK;
+ }
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+bnxt_sysctl_vf_spoofchk(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
+{
+ struct bnxt_softc *sc = (struct bnxt_softc *)arg1;
+ int vf_id = (int)arg2;
+ int val, rc;
+
+ BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(sc);
+ if (sc->pf.num_vfs == 0 || vf_id >= sc->pf.num_vfs) {
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+ return (ENOENT);
+ }
+ val = (sc->pf.vf[vf_id].flags & BNXT_VF_SPOOFCHK) ? 1 : 0;
+ BNXT_SRIOV_UNLOCK(sc);
+
+ rc = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &val, 0, req);
+ if (rc || req->newptr == NULL)
+ return rc;
+
+ return bnxt_set_vf_spoofchk(sc, vf_id, val != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create per-VF spoofchk:
+ * dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf0.spoofchk
+ * dev.bnxt.<unit>.vf1.spoofchk
+ * ..
+ */
+int
+bnxt_create_spoofchk_vf_sysctls(struct bnxt_softc *softc, uint16_t num_vfs)
+{
+ struct sysctl_oid_list *root_list;
+ struct sysctl_oid *vf_node;
+ char node_name[16];
+
+ /* Reuse the same ctx & root tree as trusted vf */
+ root_list = SYSCTL_CHILDREN(device_get_sysctl_tree(softc->dev));
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < num_vfs; i++) {
+ snprintf(node_name, sizeof(node_name), "vf%d", i);
+
+ vf_node = SYSCTL_ADD_NODE(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+ root_list, OID_AUTO,
+ node_name, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "VF node");
+
+ SYSCTL_ADD_PROC(&softc->pf.sysctl_ctx,
+ SYSCTL_CHILDREN(vf_node),
+ OID_AUTO, "spoofchk",
+ CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE,
+ softc, i, bnxt_sysctl_vf_spoofchk, "I",
+ "0=spoofchk off, 1=spoofchk on");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int
bnxt_hwrm_func_vf_resc_cfg(struct bnxt_softc *softc, int num_vfs, bool reset)
{
@@ -673,6 +925,17 @@ bnxt_iov_init(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t num_vfs, const nvlist_t *params)
if (rc)
goto fail_free_vf_resc;
+ rc = bnxt_create_trusted_vf_sysctls(softc, num_vfs);
+ if (rc) {
+ device_printf(softc->dev, "trusted VF sysctl creation failed (error=%d)\n", rc);
+ goto fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc;
+ }
+
+ rc = bnxt_create_spoofchk_vf_sysctls(softc, num_vfs);
+ if (rc) {
+ device_printf(softc->dev, "spoof check VF sysctl creation failed (error=%d)\n", rc);
+ goto fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc;
+ }
BNXT_SRIOV_LOCK(softc);
softc->pf.num_vfs = num_vfs;
@@ -680,6 +943,8 @@ bnxt_iov_init(if_ctx_t ctx, uint16_t num_vfs, const nvlist_t *params)
return 0;
+fail_free_hwrm_vf_resc:
+ bnxt_hwrm_func_vf_resource_free(softc, num_vfs);
fail_free_vf_resc:
bnxt_free_vf_resources(softc);
fail_lock:
diff --git a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
index 83cace50291f..8023ee1524c5 100644
--- a/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
+++ b/sys/dev/bnxt/bnxt_en/if_bnxt.c
@@ -3730,13 +3730,15 @@ bnxt_promisc_set(if_ctx_t ctx, int flags)
softc->vnic_info.rx_mask &=
~HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ALL_MCAST;
- if (if_getflags(ifp) & IFF_PROMISC)
+ if ((if_getflags(ifp) & IFF_PROMISC) &&
+ bnxt_promisc_ok(softc))
softc->vnic_info.rx_mask |=
HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS |
HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ANYVLAN_NONVLAN;
else
softc->vnic_info.rx_mask &=
- ~(HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS);
+ ~(HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_PROMISCUOUS |
+ HWRM_CFA_L2_SET_RX_MASK_INPUT_MASK_ANYVLAN_NONVLAN);
rc = bnxt_hwrm_cfa_l2_set_rx_mask(softc, &softc->vnic_info);