git: c55f457df678 - stable/14 - ip: Defer checks for an unspecified dstaddr until after pfil hooks
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Date: Fri, 31 Jan 2025 19:18:27 UTC
The branch stable/14 has been updated by markj:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=c55f457df6788fdaae244ab8ba87069bf5f2373f
commit c55f457df6788fdaae244ab8ba87069bf5f2373f
Author: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2025-01-16 15:46:37 +0000
Commit: Mark Johnston <markj@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2025-01-31 19:18:01 +0000
ip: Defer checks for an unspecified dstaddr until after pfil hooks
To comply with Common Criteria certification requirements, it may be
necessary to ensure that packets to 0.0.0.0/::0 are dropped and logged
by the system firewall. Currently, such packets are dropped by
ip_input() and ip6_input() before reaching pfil hooks; let's defer the
checks slightly to give firewalls a chance to drop the packets
themselves, as this gives better observability. Add some regression
tests for this with pf+pflog.
Note that prior to commit 713264f6b8b, v4 packets to the unspecified
address were not dropped by the IP stack at all.
Note that ip_forward() and ip6_forward() ensure that such packets are
not forwarded; they are passed back unmodified.
Add a regression test which ensures that such packets are visible to
pflog.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: OPNsense
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D48163
(cherry picked from commit 40faf87894ff67ffdf8126fce9bb438ddf61a26f)
---
sys/netinet/ip_input.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
sys/netinet6/ip6_fastfwd.c | 1 +
sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c | 17 ++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sys/netinet/ip_input.c b/sys/netinet/ip_input.c
index 1b080aa65e4e..6d8165003950 100644
--- a/sys/netinet/ip_input.c
+++ b/sys/netinet/ip_input.c
@@ -523,11 +523,6 @@ ip_input(struct mbuf *m)
goto bad;
}
}
- /* The unspecified address can appear only as a src address - RFC1122 */
- if (__predict_false(ntohl(ip->ip_dst.s_addr) == INADDR_ANY)) {
- IPSTAT_INC(ips_badaddr);
- goto bad;
- }
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_IP_CHECKED) {
sum = !(m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_IP_VALID);
@@ -645,6 +640,17 @@ tooshort:
}
}
passin:
+ /*
+ * The unspecified address can appear only as a src address - RFC1122.
+ *
+ * The check is deferred to here to give firewalls a chance to block
+ * (and log) such packets. ip_tryforward() will not process such
+ * packets.
+ */
+ if (__predict_false(ntohl(ip->ip_dst.s_addr) == INADDR_ANY)) {
+ IPSTAT_INC(ips_badaddr);
+ goto bad;
+ }
/*
* Process options and, if not destined for us,
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/ip6_fastfwd.c b/sys/netinet6/ip6_fastfwd.c
index 08531cee05bf..0ed313bd49a5 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/ip6_fastfwd.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/ip6_fastfwd.c
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ ip6_tryforward(struct mbuf *m)
IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
+ IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
in6_localip(&ip6->ip6_dst))
return (m);
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c b/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
index c5b9f9202cea..b3f10ddc5ea7 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
@@ -623,10 +623,10 @@ ip6_input(struct mbuf *m)
IP_PROBE(receive, NULL, NULL, ip6, rcvif, NULL, ip6);
/*
- * Check against address spoofing/corruption.
+ * Check against address spoofing/corruption. The unspecified address
+ * is checked further below.
*/
- if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
- IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
+ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src)) {
/*
* XXX: "badscope" is not very suitable for a multicast source.
*/
@@ -751,6 +751,17 @@ ip6_input(struct mbuf *m)
}
passin:
+ /*
+ * The check is deferred to here to give firewalls a chance to block
+ * (and log) such packets. ip6_tryforward() will not process such
+ * packets.
+ */
+ if (__predict_false(IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_dst))) {
+ IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
+ in6_ifstat_inc(rcvif, ifs6_in_addrerr);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
/*
* Disambiguate address scope zones (if there is ambiguity).
* We first make sure that the original source or destination address