git: 3bafcb9744c9 - stable/13 - Implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd.
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Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 17:10:15 UTC
The branch stable/13 has been updated by gordon: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=3bafcb9744c966ff7750357b24fc7942f2d928d4 commit 3bafcb9744c966ff7750357b24fc7942f2d928d4 Author: Gordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org> AuthorDate: 2023-12-18 16:22:22 +0000 Commit: Gordon Tetlow <gordon@FreeBSD.org> CommitDate: 2023-12-18 17:09:18 +0000 Implement "strict key exchange" in ssh and sshd. This adds a protocol extension to improve the integrity of the SSH transport protocol, particular in and around the initial key exchange (KEX) phase. Full details of the extension are in the PROTOCOL file. OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a66ac962f0a630d7945fee54004ed9e9c439f14 Approved by: so (implicit) Obtained from: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 Security: CVE-2023-48795 (cherry picked from commit 92f58c69a14c0afe910145f177c0e8aeaf9c7da4) --- crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL | 26 +++++++++++ crypto/openssh/kex.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ crypto/openssh/kex.h | 1 + crypto/openssh/packet.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ crypto/openssh/packet.h | 1 - crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c | 10 +---- 6 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL index 27804d0cadbd..ad611a01a200 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL +++ b/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL @@ -104,6 +104,32 @@ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.o This is identical to curve25519-sha256 as later published in RFC8731. +1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension + +OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under +a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the +RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the +initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append +"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server +may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms +are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored +if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets. + +When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm +name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to +the the protocol: + +a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or + out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the + connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. + Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages + that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as + SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. +b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the + packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the + duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first + SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS). + 2. Connection protocol changes 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c index b4e2ab75f541..251cff7af530 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" /* prototype */ -static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); +static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { @@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) return 1; } +/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ +static int +has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) +{ + char *cp; + + if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) + return 0; + free(cp); + return 1; +} + /* * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. * Caller must free returned string. @@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) char * kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) { - char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; + char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p; size_t len; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') @@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) } strlcpy(ret, a, len); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { - if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { - free(m); + if (has_any_alg(ret, p)) continue; /* Algorithm already present */ - } if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { free(tmp); @@ -334,15 +344,23 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], const char *defpropclient[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; const char **defprop = ssh->kex->server ? defpropserver : defpropclient; u_int i; + char *cp; if (prop == NULL) fatal_f("proposal missing"); + /* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */ + if (kexalgos == NULL) + kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ? + "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" : + "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) + fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { switch(i) { case PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS: - prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, - kexalgos ? kexalgos : defprop[i]); + prop[i] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp); break; case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS: case PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC: @@ -363,6 +381,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *ssh, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX], prop[i] = xstrdup(defprop[i]); } } + free(cp); } void @@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { int r; - error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */ + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: " + "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq); + } + error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) @@ -544,7 +568,7 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) if (ninfo >= 1024) { error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected " "<=1024, received %u", ninfo); - return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh); } for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) @@ -660,7 +684,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) error_f("no kex"); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error); ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; @@ -696,7 +720,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; - if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) @@ -960,20 +984,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) return (1); } -/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ static int -has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) +kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext) { - char *cp; - - if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) - return 0; - free(cp); - return 1; + return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext); } static int -kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) +kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; @@ -998,13 +1016,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) sprop=peer; } - /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ - if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { - char *ext; - - ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); - kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); - free(ext); + /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */ + if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + if (kex->server) { + kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c"); + kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, + "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"); + } else { + kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, + "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); + } + if (kex->kex_strict) { + debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering"); + if (seq != 0) + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, + "strict KEX violation: " + "KEXINIT was not the first packet"); + } } /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */ diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.h b/crypto/openssh/kex.h index 8b54e3f4b912..a7ae59bf7869 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/kex.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct kex { u_int kex_type; char *server_sig_algs; int ext_info_c; + int kex_strict; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; struct sshbuf *client_version; diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c index 3f885c3d01d1..cc492476f675 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c @@ -1206,8 +1206,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ - if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) + if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) { + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number " + "wrapped during initial key exchange"); + } logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); + } if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; @@ -1215,6 +1220,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr); + state->p_send.seqnr = 0; + } + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) @@ -1343,8 +1353,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ - r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); - if (r != 0) + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) @@ -1415,29 +1424,6 @@ ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) return type; } -/* - * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches - * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. - */ - -int -ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) -{ - int r; - u_char type; - - if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - if (type != expected_type) { - if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, - "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", - expected_type, type)) != 0) - return r; - return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; - } - return 0; -} - static int ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { @@ -1628,10 +1614,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } + if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; - if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) + if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) { + if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number " + "wrapped during initial key exchange"); + } logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); + } if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; @@ -1697,6 +1689,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; + if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { + debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr); + state->p_read.seqnr = 0; + } if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) return r; @@ -1717,10 +1713,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; - if (*typep) { - state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; - DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + if (*typep == 0) { + /* no message ready */ + return 0; } + state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + + /* Always process disconnect messages */ + if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ + do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && + reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" + "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); + free(msg); + return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + } + + /* + * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial + * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed + * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate + * protocol errors. + */ + if (ssh->kex != NULL && + (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) + return 0; + /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */ switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); @@ -1735,19 +1760,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; - case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) - return r; - /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ - do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && - reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? - SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, - "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" - "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); - free(msg); - return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; @@ -2213,6 +2225,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || @@ -2375,6 +2388,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || @@ -2703,6 +2717,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); + debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.h b/crypto/openssh/packet.h index 176488b1e5d2..9fc035b5e04f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/packet.h +++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.h @@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); -int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c index bc05f02142fd..d30b7364313f 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c @@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod { }; static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); -static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(ssh); @@ -523,12 +522,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) return r; } -static int -input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) -{ - return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); -} - void userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) { @@ -607,6 +600,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error); return 0; }