git: 460b4b550dc9 - stable/13 - Implement unprivileged chroot

The branch stable/13 has been updated by trasz:

URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=460b4b550dc9619f33a0d1af3870eaef60b04797

commit 460b4b550dc9619f33a0d1af3870eaef60b04797
Author:     Edward Tomasz Napierala <trasz@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2021-07-20 08:56:04 +0000
Commit:     Edward Tomasz Napierala <trasz@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2022-02-14 18:42:21 +0000

    Implement unprivileged chroot
    
    This builds on recently introduced NO_NEW_PRIVS flag to implement
    unprivileged chroot, enabled by `security.bsd.unprivileged_chroot`.
    It allows non-root processes to chroot(2), provided they have the
    NO_NEW_PRIVS flag set.
    
    The chroot(8) utility gets a new flag, -n, which sets NO_NEW_PRIVS
    before chrooting.
    
    Reviewed By:    kib
    Sponsored By:   EPSRC
    Relnotes:       yes
    Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D30130
    
    (cherry picked from commit a40cf4175c90142442d0c6515f6c83956336699b)
---
 sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c  | 17 +++++++++++++++--
 usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.8 | 13 ++++++++++++-
 usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c b/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
index 3d1e7d9c73fa..19a32a175895 100644
--- a/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
+++ b/sys/kern/vfs_syscalls.c
@@ -956,6 +956,10 @@ kern_chdir(struct thread *td, const char *path, enum uio_seg pathseg)
 	return (0);
 }
 
+static int unprivileged_chroot = 0;
+SYSCTL_INT(_security_bsd, OID_AUTO, unprivileged_chroot, CTLFLAG_RW,
+    &unprivileged_chroot, 0,
+    "Unprivileged processes can use chroot(2)");
 /*
  * Change notion of root (``/'') directory.
  */
@@ -968,11 +972,20 @@ int
 sys_chroot(struct thread *td, struct chroot_args *uap)
 {
 	struct nameidata nd;
+	struct proc *p;
 	int error;
 
 	error = priv_check(td, PRIV_VFS_CHROOT);
-	if (error != 0)
-		return (error);
+	if (error != 0) {
+		p = td->td_proc;
+		PROC_LOCK(p);
+		if (unprivileged_chroot == 0 ||
+		    (p->p_flag2 & P2_NO_NEW_PRIVS) == 0) {
+			PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+			return (error);
+		}
+		PROC_UNLOCK(p);
+	}
 	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | AUDITVNODE1,
 	    UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
 	error = namei(&nd);
diff --git a/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.8 b/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.8
index 977961abb6ec..9f5b2f380376 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.8
+++ b/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.8
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 .\"     @(#)chroot.8	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/9/93
 .\" $FreeBSD$
 .\"
-.Dd June 27, 2020
+.Dd July 20, 2021
 .Dt CHROOT 8
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 .Op Fl G Ar group Ns Op Cm \&, Ns Ar group  ...
 .Op Fl g Ar group
 .Op Fl u Ar user
+.Op Fl n
 .Ar newroot
 .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
 .Sh DESCRIPTION
@@ -61,6 +62,16 @@ Run the command with the permissions of the specified
 .It Fl u Ar user
 Run the command as the
 .Ar user .
+.It Fl n
+Use the
+.Dv PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_CTL
+.Xr procctl 2
+command before chrooting, effectively disabling SUID/SGID bits
+for the calling process and its descendants.
+If
+.Dv security.bsd.unprivileged_chroot
+sysctl is set to 1, it will make it possible to chroot without
+superuser privileges.
 .El
 .Sh ENVIRONMENT
 The following environment variable is referenced by
diff --git a/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.c b/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.c
index 60ef631ca875..bb87ae6f0503 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.c
+++ b/usr.sbin/chroot/chroot.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#)chroot.c	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/9/93";
 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/procctl.h>
 
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <err.h>
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <paths.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -67,13 +69,15 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	const char	*shell;
 	gid_t		gid, *gidlist;
 	uid_t		uid;
-	int		ch, gids;
+	int		arg, ch, error, gids;
 	long		ngroups_max;
+	bool		nonpriviledged;
 
 	gid = 0;
 	uid = 0;
 	user = group = grouplist = NULL;
-	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "G:g:u:")) != -1) {
+	nonpriviledged = false;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "G:g:u:n")) != -1) {
 		switch(ch) {
 		case 'u':
 			user = optarg;
@@ -90,6 +94,9 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			if (*grouplist == '\0')
 				usage();
 			break;
+		case 'n':
+			nonpriviledged = true;
+			break;
 		case '?':
 		default:
 			usage();
@@ -153,6 +160,13 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (nonpriviledged) {
+		arg = PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_ENABLE;
+		error = procctl(P_PID, getpid(), PROC_NO_NEW_PRIVS_CTL, &arg);
+		if (error != 0)
+			err(1, "procctl");
+	}
+
 	if (chdir(argv[0]) == -1 || chroot(".") == -1)
 		err(1, "%s", argv[0]);
 
@@ -179,6 +193,6 @@ static void
 usage(void)
 {
 	(void)fprintf(stderr, "usage: chroot [-g group] [-G group,group,...] "
-	    "[-u user] newroot [command]\n");
+	    "[-u user] [-n ] newroot [command]\n");
 	exit(1);
 }