git: ae3d4a75ab05 - main - security/openssl30: Resurrect OpenSSL 3.0 port
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 11:11:53 UTC
The branch main has been updated by brnrd:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/ports/commit/?id=ae3d4a75ab0550f4e4496f728ae451a996d79ec2
commit ae3d4a75ab0550f4e4496f728ae451a996d79ec2
Author: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2026-09-30 11:10:54 +0000
Commit: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2026-09-30 11:10:54 +0000
security/openssl30: Resurrect OpenSSL 3.0 port
For FreeBSD 14, expires 2028-11-30
Has known vulnerabilities, users are encouraged to move
to OpenSSL 3.5 from security/openssl
---
security/Makefile | 1 +
security/openssl30/Makefile | 179 +++++++
security/openssl30/distinfo | 3 +
security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-ktls | 540 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../openssl30/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits | 20 +
.../files/patch-Configurations_10-main.conf | 35 ++
security/openssl30/files/patch-Configure | 11 +
.../files/patch-crypto_async_arch_async__posix.h | 32 ++
security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_ppccap.c | 34 ++
.../files/patch-crypto_threads__pthread.c | 13 +
.../files/patch-util_perl_OpenSSL_config.pm | 14 +
security/openssl30/pkg-descr | 13 +
security/openssl30/pkg-message | 22 +
security/openssl30/pkg-plist | 275 +++++++++++
security/openssl30/version.mk | 1 +
15 files changed, 1193 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 34614c8df275..13d52b6b8152 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -461,6 +461,7 @@
SUBDIR += openssl-oqsprovider
SUBDIR += openssl-pkcs11provider
SUBDIR += openssl-unsafe
+ SUBDIR += openssl30
SUBDIR += openssl34
SUBDIR += openssl35
SUBDIR += openssl36
diff --git a/security/openssl30/Makefile b/security/openssl30/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..66ed527e3b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+PORTNAME= openssl
+PORTVERSION= 3.0.22
+CATEGORIES= security devel
+MASTER_SITES= https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/${DISTNAME}/
+
+MAINTAINER= brnrd@FreeBSD.org
+COMMENT= TLSv1.3 capable SSL and crypto library
+WWW= https://www.openssl.org/
+
+LICENSE= APACHE20
+LICENSE_FILE= ${WRKSRC}/LICENSE.txt
+
+# Expire together with FreeBSD 14
+EXPIRATION_DATE= 2028-11-30
+
+CONFLICTS_INSTALL= boringssl libressl libressl-devel openssl[134]*
+
+USES= cpe perl5
+USE_PERL5= build
+TEST_TARGET= test
+
+HAS_CONFIGURE= yes
+CONFIGURE_SCRIPT= config
+CONFIGURE_ENV= PERL="${PERL}"
+CONFIGURE_ARGS= --openssldir=${OPENSSLDIR} \
+ --prefix=${PREFIX}
+
+LDFLAGS_i386= -Wl,-znotext
+
+MAKE_ARGS+= WHOLE_ARCHIVE_FLAG=--whole-archive CNF_LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS}"
+MAKE_ENV+= LIBRPATH="${PREFIX}/lib" GREP_OPTIONS=
+
+OPTIONS_GROUP= CIPHERS HASHES MODULES OPTIMIZE PROTOCOLS
+OPTIONS_GROUP_CIPHERS= ARIA DES GOST IDEA SM4 RC2 RC4 RC5 WEAK-SSL-CIPHERS
+OPTIONS_GROUP_HASHES= MD2 MD4 MDC2 RMD160 SM2 SM3
+OPTIONS_GROUP_OPTIMIZE= ASM SSE2 THREADS
+OPTIONS_GROUP_MODULES= FIPS LEGACY
+OPTIONS_DEFINE_i386= I386
+OPTIONS_GROUP_PROTOCOLS=NEXTPROTONEG SCTP SSL3 TLS1 TLS1_1 TLS1_2
+
+OPTIONS_DEFINE= ASYNC CT KTLS MAN3 RFC3779 SHARED ZLIB
+
+OPTIONS_DEFAULT=ASM ASYNC CT DES EC FIPS GOST KTLS MAN3 MD4 NEXTPROTONEG \
+ RFC3779 RC2 RC4 RMD160 SCTP SHARED SSE2 THREADS TLS1 TLS1_1 TLS1_2
+
+.if ${MACHINE_ARCH} == "amd64"
+OPTIONS_GROUP_OPTIMIZE+= EC
+.endif
+
+OPTIONS_SUB= yes
+
+ARIA_DESC= ARIA (South Korean standard)
+ASM_DESC= Assembler code
+ASYNC_DESC= Asynchronous mode
+CIPHERS_DESC= Block Cipher Support
+CT_DESC= Certificate Transparency Support
+DES_DESC= (Triple) Data Encryption Standard
+EC_DESC= Optimize NIST elliptic curves
+FIPS_DESC= Build FIPS provider
+GOST_DESC= GOST (Russian standard)
+HASHES_DESC= Hash Function Support
+I386_DESC= i386 (instead of i486+)
+IDEA_DESC= International Data Encryption Algorithm
+KTLS_DESC= Use in-kernel TLS (FreeBSD >13)
+LEGACY_DESC= Older algorithms
+MAN3_DESC= Install API manpages (section 3, 7)
+MD2_DESC= MD2 (obsolete) (requires LEGACY)
+MD4_DESC= MD4 (unsafe)
+MDC2_DESC= MDC-2 (patented, requires DES)
+MODULES_DESC= Provider modules
+NEXTPROTONEG_DESC= Next Protocol Negotiation (SPDY)
+OPTIMIZE_DESC= Optimizations
+PROTOCOLS_DESC= Protocol Support
+RC2_DESC= RC2 (unsafe)
+RC4_DESC= RC4 (unsafe)
+RC5_DESC= RC5 (patented)
+RMD160_DESC= RIPEMD-160
+RFC3779_DESC= RFC3779 support (BGP)
+SCTP_DESC= SCTP (Stream Control Transmission)
+SHARED_DESC= Build shared libraries
+SM2_DESC= SM2 Elliptic Curve DH (Chinese standard)
+SM3_DESC= SM3 256bit (Chinese standard)
+SM4_DESC= SM4 128bit (Chinese standard)
+SSE2_DESC= Runtime SSE2 detection
+SSL3_DESC= SSLv3 (unsafe)
+TLS1_DESC= TLSv1.0 (requires TLS1_1, TLS1_2)
+TLS1_1_DESC= TLSv1.1 (requires TLS1_2)
+TLS1_2_DESC= TLSv1.2
+WEAK-SSL-CIPHERS_DESC= Weak cipher support (unsafe)
+
+# Upstream default disabled options
+.for _option in fips md2 ktls rc5 sctp ssl3 weak-ssl-ciphers zlib
+${_option:tu}_CONFIGURE_ON= enable-${_option}
+.endfor
+
+# Upstream default enabled options
+.for _option in aria asm async ct des gost idea md4 mdc2 legacy \
+ nextprotoneg rc2 rc4 rfc3779 rmd160 shared sm2 sm3 sm4 sse2 \
+ threads tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2
+${_option:tu}_CONFIGURE_OFF= no-${_option}
+.endfor
+
+MD2_IMPLIES= LEGACY
+MDC2_IMPLIES= DES
+TLS1_IMPLIES= TLS1_1
+TLS1_1_IMPLIES= TLS1_2
+
+EC_CONFIGURE_ON= enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
+FIPS_VARS= shlibs+=lib/ossl-modules/fips.so
+I386_CONFIGURE_ON= 386
+KTLS_EXTRA_PATCHES= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-ktls
+LEGACY_VARS= shlibs+=lib/ossl-modules/legacy.so
+MAN3_EXTRA_PATCHES_OFF= ${FILESDIR}/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits
+SHARED_MAKE_ENV= SHLIBVER=${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}
+SHARED_PLIST_SUB= SHLIBVER=${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}
+SHARED_USE= ldconfig=yes
+SHARED_VARS= shlibs+="lib/libcrypto.so.${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER} \
+ lib/libssl.so.${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER} \
+ lib/engines-${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}/capi.so \
+ lib/engines-${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}/devcrypto.so \
+ lib/engines-${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}/padlock.so"
+SSL3_CONFIGURE_ON+= enable-ssl3-method
+ZLIB_CONFIGURE_ON= zlib-dynamic
+
+SHLIBS= lib/engines-${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}/loader_attic.so
+
+PORTSCOUT= limit:^${PORTVERSION:R:S/./\./g}\.
+
+.include <bsd.port.options.mk>
+
+.if ${ARCH} == powerpc64
+CONFIGURE_ARGS+= BSD-ppc64
+.elif ${ARCH} == powerpc64le
+CONFIGURE_ARGS+= BSD-ppc64le
+.elif ${ARCH} == riscv64
+CONFIGURE_ARGS+= BSD-riscv64
+.endif
+
+.include <bsd.port.pre.mk>
+.if ${PREFIX} == /usr
+IGNORE= the OpenSSL port can not be installed over the base version
+.endif
+
+OPENSSLDIR?= ${PREFIX}/openssl
+PLIST_SUB+= OPENSSLDIR=${OPENSSLDIR:S=^${PREFIX}/==}
+
+.include "version.mk"
+
+post-patch:
+ ${REINPLACE_CMD} -Ee 's|^(build\|install)_docs: .*|\1_docs: \1_man_docs|' \
+ ${WRKSRC}/Configurations/unix-Makefile.tmpl
+ ${REINPLACE_CMD} 's|SHLIB_VERSION=3|SHLIB_VERSION=${OPENSSL_SHLIBVER}|' \
+ ${WRKSRC}/VERSION.dat
+
+post-configure:
+ ( cd ${WRKSRC} ; ${PERL} configdata.pm --dump )
+
+post-configure-MAN3-off:
+ ${REINPLACE_CMD} \
+ -e 's|^build_man_docs:.*|build_man_docs: $$(MANDOCS1) $$(MANDOCS5)|' \
+ -e 's|dummy $$(MANDOCS[37]); do |dummy; do |' \
+ ${WRKSRC}/Makefile
+
+post-install-SHARED-on:
+.for i in ${SHLIBS}
+ -@${STRIP_CMD} ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/$i
+.endfor
+
+post-install-SHARED-off:
+ ${RMDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/lib/engines-12
+
+post-install:
+ ${STRIP_CMD} ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/bin/openssl
+
+post-install-MAN3-on:
+ ( cd ${STAGEDIR}/${PREFIX} ; ${FIND} share/man/man3 -not -type d ; \
+ ${FIND} share/man/man7 -not -type d ) | ${SED} 's/$$/.gz/' >> ${TMPPLIST}
+
+.include <bsd.port.post.mk>
diff --git a/security/openssl30/distinfo b/security/openssl30/distinfo
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4050bedd4c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/distinfo
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+TIMESTAMP = 1787680996
+SHA256 (openssl-3.0.22.tar.gz) = 67ebca7e50d17383028045486653492195b83db95f8558709701bb47b5c1ef81
+SIZE (openssl-3.0.22.tar.gz) = 15330396
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-ktls b/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-ktls
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..48a5dd43a972
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-ktls
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+diff --git include/internal/ktls.h include/internal/ktls.h
+index 95492fd065..3c82cae26b 100644
+--- include/internal/ktls.h
++++ include/internal/ktls.h
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #define OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
+ #define OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
+ #define OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13
++#ifdef TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN
++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
++# define OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
++# endif
++#endif
+
+ typedef struct tls_enable ktls_crypto_info_t;
+
+diff --git ssl/ktls.c ssl/ktls.c
+index 79d980959e..e343d382cc 100644
+--- ssl/ktls.c
++++ ssl/ktls.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,67 @@
+ #include "ssl_local.h"
+ #include "internal/ktls.h"
+
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
++ /*
++ * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
++ *
++ * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
++ * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
++ * function will fail.
++ */
++static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
++{
++ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
++ PACKET pkt, subpkt;
++ int count = 0;
++
++ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
++ return -1;
++
++ while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
++ /* Skip record type and version */
++ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
++ return -1;
++
++ /* Read until next record */
++ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
++ return -1;
++
++ count += 1;
++ }
++
++ return count;
++}
++
++/*
++ * The kernel cannot offload receive if a partial TLS record has been read.
++ * Check the read buffer for unprocessed records. If the buffer contains a
++ * partial record, fail and return 0. Otherwise, update the sequence
++ * number at *rec_seq for the count of unprocessed records and return 1.
++ */
++static int check_rx_read_ahead(SSL *s, unsigned char *rec_seq)
++{
++ int bit, count_unprocessed;
++
++ count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
++ if (count_unprocessed < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
++ while (count_unprocessed) {
++ for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
++ ++rec_seq[bit];
++ if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
++ break;
++ }
++ count_unprocessed--;
++
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(__FreeBSD__)
+ # include "crypto/cryptodev.h"
+
+@@ -37,6 +98,10 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ return 1;
++# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
++ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
++ return 1;
++# endif
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+@@ -55,9 +120,9 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ }
+
+ /* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
+-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
++int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+ void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
+- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
++ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
+ size_t mac_secret_size)
+ {
+@@ -71,6 +136,12 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+ else
+ crypto_info->iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+ break;
++# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
++ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
++ crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
++ crypto_info->iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(dd);
++ break;
++# endif
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+@@ -101,11 +172,11 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+ crypto_info->tls_vminor = (s->version & 0x000000ff);
+ #ifdef TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE
+ memcpy(crypto_info->rec_seq, rl_sequence, sizeof(crypto_info->rec_seq));
+- if (rec_seq != NULL)
+- *rec_seq = crypto_info->rec_seq;
++ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->rec_seq))
++ return 0;
+ #else
+- if (rec_seq != NULL)
+- *rec_seq = NULL;
++ if (!is_tx)
++ return 0;
+ #endif
+ return 1;
+ };
+@@ -154,15 +227,20 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EV
+ }
+
+ /* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
+-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
++int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+ void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
+- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
++ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
+ size_t mac_secret_size)
+ {
+ unsigned char geniv[12];
+ unsigned char *iiv = iv;
+
++# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
++ if (!is_tx)
++ return 0;
++# endif
++
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv(dd, geniv,
+ EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN
+@@ -186,8 +262,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPH
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+- if (rec_seq != NULL)
+- *rec_seq = crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq;
++ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq))
++ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
+@@ -201,8 +277,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPH
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+- if (rec_seq != NULL)
+- *rec_seq = crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq;
++ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq))
++ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
+@@ -216,8 +292,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPH
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+- if (rec_seq != NULL)
+- *rec_seq = crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq;
++ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq))
++ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+@@ -231,7 +309,11 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPH
+ TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+ if (rec_seq != NULL)
+ *rec_seq = crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq;
+- return 1;
++ if (!is_tx
++ && !check_rx_read_ahead(s,
++ crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq))
++ return 0;
++ return 1;
+ #endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+diff --git ssl/record/ssl3_record.c ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+index d8ef018741..63caac080f 100644
+--- ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
++++ ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+@@ -186,18 +186,23 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ int imac_size;
+ size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
+ PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
+- int is_ktls_left;
++ int using_ktls;
+ SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+- is_ktls_left = (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) > 0);
+ max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
+ if (max_recs == 0)
+ max_recs = 1;
+ sess = s->session;
+
++ /*
++ * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
++ * then it is from before enabling ktls.
++ */
++ using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0;
++
+ do {
+ thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
+
+@@ -357,7 +362,9 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
++ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
++ && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
++ && !using_ktls) {
+ if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+@@ -386,7 +393,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+- if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
++ size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++
++ /* KTLS strips the inner record type. */
++ if (using_ktls)
++ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++
++ if (thisrr->length > len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
+ SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+@@ -404,7 +417,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ #endif
+
+ /* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
+- if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
++ if (using_ktls)
+ len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
+
+ if (thisrr->length > len) {
+@@ -512,11 +525,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- /*
+- * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
+- * then it is from before enabling ktls
+- */
+- if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
++ if (using_ktls)
+ goto skip_decryption;
+
+ if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
+@@ -684,21 +693,29 @@ skip_decryption:
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+- size_t end;
++ /*
++ * The following logic are irrelevant in KTLS: the kernel provides
++ * unprotected record and thus record type represent the actual
++ * content type, and padding is already removed and thisrr->type and
++ * thisrr->length should have the correct values.
++ */
++ if (!using_ktls) {
++ size_t end;
++ if (thisrr->length == 0
++ || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
++ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
++ goto end;
++ }
+
+- if (thisrr->length == 0
+- || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+- goto end;
++ /* Strip trailing padding */
++ for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
++ end--)
++ continue;
++
++ thisrr->length = end;
++ thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
+ }
+
+- /* Strip trailing padding */
+- for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
+- end--)
+- continue;
+-
+- thisrr->length = end;
+- thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
+ if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+@@ -707,7 +724,7 @@ skip_decryption:
+ }
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
+- &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
++ &thisrr->type, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -730,9 +747,8 @@ skip_decryption:
+ * Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
+ * limit in the kernel.
+ */
+- if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+- && (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || is_ktls_left)) {
+- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
++ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !using_ktls) {
++ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+diff --git ssl/ssl_local.h ssl/ssl_local.h
+index 5471e900b8..79ced2f468 100644
+--- ssl/ssl_local.h
++++ ssl/ssl_local.h
+@@ -2774,9 +2774,9 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EV
+ /* ktls.c */
+ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd);
+-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
++int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+ void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
+- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
++ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
+ unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
+ size_t mac_secret_size);
+ #endif
+diff --git ssl/t1_enc.c ssl/t1_enc.c
+index 237a19cd93..900ba14fbd 100644
+--- ssl/t1_enc.c
++++ ssl/t1_enc.c
+@@ -98,41 +98,6 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned ch
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+-/*
+- * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
+- *
+- * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
+- * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
+- * function will fail.
+- */
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+-static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
+-{
+- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+- PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+- int count = 0;
+-
+- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
+- return -1;
+-
+- while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+- /* Skip record type and version */
+- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
+- return -1;
+-
+- /* Read until next record */
+- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
+- return -1;
+-
+- count += 1;
+- }
+-
+- return count;
+-}
+-#endif
+-#endif
+-
+ int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
+ const EVP_MD *md)
+@@ -199,12 +164,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ int reuse_dd = 0;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
+- unsigned char *rec_seq;
+ void *rl_sequence;
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+- int count_unprocessed;
+- int bit;
+-#endif
+ BIO *bio;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -478,29 +438,10 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ else
+ rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info, &rec_seq,
+- iv, key, ms, *mac_secret_size))
+- goto skip_ktls;
+-
+- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+- count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
+- if (count_unprocessed < 0)
+- goto skip_ktls;
+-
+- /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
+- while (count_unprocessed) {
+- for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
+- ++rec_seq[bit];
+- if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
+- break;
+- }
+- count_unprocessed--;
+- }
+-#else
+- goto skip_ktls;
+-#endif
+- }
++ if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
++ which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv, key, ms,
++ *mac_secret_size))
++ goto skip_ktls;
+
+ /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
+ if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
+diff --git ssl/tls13_enc.c ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index 12388922e3..eaab0e2a74 100644
+--- ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
+ ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
++ void *rl_sequence;
+ BIO *bio;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -690,8 +691,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
+- if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+- || !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
++ if (!(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
+ || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
+ goto skip_ktls;
+
+@@ -705,7 +705,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
+ goto skip_ktls;
+
+- bio = s->wbio;
++ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
++ bio = s->wbio;
++ else
++ bio = s->rbio;
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+@@ -715,18 +718,26 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ }
+
+ /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
+- if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
+- goto skip_ktls;
++ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
++ if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
++ goto skip_ktls;
++ }
+
+ /* configure kernel crypto structure */
+- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx,
+- RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
+- &crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0))
++ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
++ rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
++ else
++ rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
++
++ if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
++ which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv, key, NULL, 0))
+ goto skip_ktls;
+
+ /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
+- if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
+- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
++ if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
++ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
++ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
++ }
+ skip_ktls:
+ #endif
+ #endif
+diff --git test/sslapitest.c test/sslapitest.c
+index 2911d6e94b..faf2eec2bc 100644
+--- test/sslapitest.c
++++ test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX)
+ rx_supported = 0;
+ #else
+- rx_supported = (tls_version != TLS1_3_VERSION);
++ rx_supported = 1;
+ #endif
+ if (!cis_ktls || !rx_supported) {
+ if (!TEST_false(BIO_get_ktls_recv(clientssl->rbio)))
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits b/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e4fc20a06252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/extra-patch-util_find-doc-nits
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--- util/find-doc-nits.orig 2023-08-01 13:47:24 UTC
++++ util/find-doc-nits
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ my $temp = '/tmp/docnits.txt';
+ my $OUT;
+ my $status = 0;
+
+-$opt_m = "man1,man3,man5,man7" unless $opt_m;
++$opt_m = "man1,man5" unless $opt_m;
+ die "Argument of -m option may contain only man1, man3, man5, and/or man7"
+ unless $opt_m =~ /^(man[1357][, ]?)*$/;
+ my @sections = ( split /[, ]/, $opt_m );
+@@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ sub check {
+ next if $target eq ''; # Skip if links within page, or
+ next if $target =~ /::/; # links to a Perl module, or
+ next if $target =~ /^https?:/; # is a URL link, or
+- next if $target =~ /\([1357]\)$/; # it has a section
++ next if $target =~ /\([15]\)$/; # it has a section
+ err($id, "Missing man section number (likely, $mansect) in L<$target>")
+ }
+ # Check for proper links to commands.
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configurations_10-main.conf b/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configurations_10-main.conf
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82503c0ff90c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configurations_10-main.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+--- Configurations/10-main.conf.orig 2022-04-12 16:29:42 UTC
++++ Configurations/10-main.conf
+@@ -1069,6 +1069,32 @@ my %targets = (
+ perlasm_scheme => "linux64",
+ },
+
++ "BSD-ppc" => {
++ inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic32" ],
++ asm_arch => 'ppc32',
++ perlasm_scheme => "linux32",
++ lib_cppflags => add("-DB_ENDIAN"),
++ },
++
++ "BSD-ppc64" => {
++ inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic64" ],
++ cflags => add("-m64"),
++ cxxflags => add("-m64"),
++ lib_cppflags => add("-DB_ENDIAN"),
++ asm_arch => 'ppc64',
++ perlasm_scheme => "linux64",
++ },
++
++ "BSD-ppc64le" => {
++ inherit_from => [ "BSD-generic64" ],
++ cflags => add("-m64"),
++ cxxflags => add("-m64"),
++ lib_cppflags => add("-DL_ENDIAN"),
++ asm_arch => 'ppc64',
++ perlasm_scheme => "linux64le",
++ },
++
++
+ "bsdi-elf-gcc" => {
+ inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ],
+ CC => "gcc",
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configure b/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configure
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c26823c674f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-Configure
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- Configure.orig 2022-04-12 16:30:34 UTC
++++ Configure
+@@ -1549,7 +1549,7 @@ my %predefined_CXX = $config{CXX}
+
+ unless ($disabled{asm}) {
+ # big endian systems can use ELFv2 ABI
+- if ($target eq "linux-ppc64") {
++ if ($target eq "linux-ppc64" || $target eq "BSD-ppc64") {
+ $target{perlasm_scheme} = "linux64v2" if ($predefined_C{_CALL_ELF} == 2);
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_async_arch_async__posix.h b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_async_arch_async__posix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8690f951fa42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_async_arch_async__posix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+commit e883812f463c1623249e038698ccaddf2baa34d8
+Author: Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 18 19:48:22 2024 -0600
+
+ posix_async: FreeBSD also defines {make|swap|get|set}context
+
+ FreeBSD also defines {make|swap|get|set}context for backward
+ compatibility, despite also exposing POSIX_VERSION 200809L
+ in FreeBSD 15-current.
+
+ Note: There's no fallback for POSIX_VERSION 200809 without these
+ routines, so maybe that should be a #error? ... But that's a questionf
+ or upstream.
+
+ FreeBSD has defined these interfaces since FreeBSD 4.7, released over 20
+ years ago, so no further nuance in FreeBSD version number is necessary.
+
+ Pull Request: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23885
+
+diff --git a/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h b/crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h
+index a17c6b8e68af..2d97ec3acc9b 100644
+--- crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h
++++ crypto/async/arch/async_posix.h
+@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+ #if _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L \
+- && (_POSIX_VERSION < 200809L || defined(__GLIBC__))
++ && (_POSIX_VERSION < 200809L || defined(__GLIBC__) || defined(__FreeBSD__))
+
+ #include <pthread.h>
+
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_ppccap.c b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_ppccap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6783e0b13c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_ppccap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+--- crypto/ppccap.c.orig 2022-04-12 16:31:27 UTC
++++ crypto/ppccap.c
+@@ -117,14 +117,18 @@ static unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long key)
+ #endif
+
+ /* I wish <sys/auxv.h> was universally available */
+-#define HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */
++#ifndef AT_HWCAP
++# define AT_HWCAP 16 /* AT_HWCAP */
++#endif
+ #define HWCAP_PPC64 (1U << 30)
+ #define HWCAP_ALTIVEC (1U << 28)
+ #define HWCAP_FPU (1U << 27)
+ #define HWCAP_POWER6_EXT (1U << 9)
+ #define HWCAP_VSX (1U << 7)
+
+-#define HWCAP2 26 /* AT_HWCAP2 */
++#ifndef AT_HWCAP2
++#define AT_HWCAP2 26 /* AT_HWCAP2 */
++#endif
+ #define HWCAP_VEC_CRYPTO (1U << 25)
+ #define HWCAP_ARCH_3_00 (1U << 23)
+
+@@ -215,8 +219,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
+
+ #ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL
+ {
+- unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP);
+- unsigned long hwcap2 = getauxval(HWCAP2);
++ unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(AT_HWCAP);
++ unsigned long hwcap2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2);
+
+ if (hwcap & HWCAP_FPU) {
+ OPENSSL_ppccap_P |= PPC_FPU;
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_threads__pthread.c b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_threads__pthread.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3347170e0bd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-crypto_threads__pthread.c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+--- crypto/threads_pthread.c.orig 2022-11-01 14:14:36 UTC
++++ crypto/threads_pthread.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #define BROKEN_CLANG_ATOMICS
+ #endif
+
++#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(__i386__)
++#define BROKEN_CLANG_ATOMICS
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(CRYPTO_TDEBUG) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+
+ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
diff --git a/security/openssl30/files/patch-util_perl_OpenSSL_config.pm b/security/openssl30/files/patch-util_perl_OpenSSL_config.pm
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9c669372a4f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl30/files/patch-util_perl_OpenSSL_config.pm
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+--- util/perl/OpenSSL/config.pm.orig 2022-04-12 16:34:06 UTC
++++ util/perl/OpenSSL/config.pm
+@@ -747,8 +747,9 @@ EOF
+ disable => [ 'sse2' ] } ],
+ [ 'alpha.*-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-generic64",
+ defines => [ 'L_ENDIAN' ] } ],
+- [ 'powerpc64-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-generic64",
+- defines => [ 'B_ENDIAN' ] } ],
++ [ 'powerpc-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-ppc" } ],
++ [ 'powerpc64-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-ppc64" } ],
++ [ 'powerpc64le-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-ppc64le" } ],
+ [ 'riscv64-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-riscv64" } ],
+ [ 'sparc64-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-sparc64" } ],
+ [ 'ia64-.*-.*bsd.*', { target => "BSD-ia64" } ],
diff --git a/security/openssl30/pkg-descr b/security/openssl30/pkg-descr
*** 334 LINES SKIPPED ***