git: a74ba1d781de - main - security/openssl: Update to 3.0.16
- Go to: [ bottom of page ] [ top of archives ] [ this month ]
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:50:31 UTC
The branch main has been updated by brnrd:
URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/ports/commit/?id=a74ba1d781de756a96aed73dc613ed73d1d68e93
commit a74ba1d781de756a96aed73dc613ed73d1d68e93
Author: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
AuthorDate: 2025-02-11 16:50:29 +0000
Commit: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org>
CommitDate: 2025-02-11 16:50:29 +0000
security/openssl: Update to 3.0.16
---
security/openssl/Makefile | 3 +-
security/openssl/distinfo | 6 +-
security/openssl/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 | 198 -----------------------------
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index c9e7409e08f6..47d4f6b699c6 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
PORTNAME= openssl
-PORTVERSION= 3.0.15
-PORTREVISION= 1
+PORTVERSION= 3.0.16
PORTEPOCH= 1
CATEGORIES= security devel
diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo
index 5b6aeaead9d3..0de6e3f8ccb9 100644
--- a/security/openssl/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssl/distinfo
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1725385248
-SHA256 (openssl-openssl-3.0.15-openssl-3.0.15_GH0.tar.gz) = 9f823ef7168cd78315fe61f2147b6d65bb344a32755f4fe76b3002af91a1bb0b
-SIZE (openssl-openssl-3.0.15-openssl-3.0.15_GH0.tar.gz) = 15467483
+TIMESTAMP = 1739291402
+SHA256 (openssl-openssl-3.0.16-openssl-3.0.16_GH0.tar.gz) = 9642aa3d97ac37da45dadabb3b576f399016acdb1df5d0e2751733e1cdf9f328
+SIZE (openssl-openssl-3.0.16-openssl-3.0.16_GH0.tar.gz) = 15486066
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143 b/security/openssl/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143
deleted file mode 100644
index a2e0babfda33..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-CVE-2024-9143
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,198 +0,0 @@
-From 72ae83ad214d2eef262461365a1975707f862712 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 01:02:40 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.
-
-The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
-(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
-to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.
-
-These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
-reduction. A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
-polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
-its final element).
-
-Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
-precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
-could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().
-
-The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
-standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
-See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:
-
- https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html
-
-The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
-basis X9.62 forms.
-
-This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
-the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).
-
-Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
-enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
-The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
-final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
-large. Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
-just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
-for non-sentinel values.
-
-Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
-degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
-CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.
-
-The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates. These
-generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
-disallows explicit EC parameters. The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
-constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
-parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
-problem values as noted above.
-
-Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.
-
-A closely related issue was earlier reported in
-<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.
-
-Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8e008cb8b23ec7dc75c45a66eeed09c815b11cd2)
----
- crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------
- test/ec_internal_test.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
-index c811ae82d6b15..bcc66613cc14d 100644
---- crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c.orig
-+++ crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
-@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
- #include "bn_local.h"
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+# include <openssl/ec.h>
-
- /*
- * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
-@@ -1140,16 +1141,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
- /*
- * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
- * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
-- * coefficient. Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
-- * will be filled. Return value is total number of array elements that would
-- * be filled if array was large enough.
-+ * coefficient. The array is intended to be suitable for use with
-+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
-+ * zero. This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
-+ *
-+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements
-+ * of the array will be filled.
-+ *
-+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
-+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`. It is `0` when `a`
-+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
-+ *
-+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
-+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
- */
- int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
- {
- int i, j, k = 0;
- BN_ULONG mask;
-
-- if (BN_is_zero(a))
-+ if (!BN_is_odd(a))
- return 0;
-
- for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-@@ -1167,12 +1178,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
- }
- }
-
-- if (k < max) {
-+ if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (k < max)
- p[k] = -1;
-- k++;
-- }
-
-- return k;
-+ return k + 1;
- }
-
- /*
-diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
-index 8c2cd05631696..02cfd4e9d8858 100644
---- test/ec_internal_test.c.orig
-+++ test/ec_internal_test.c
-@@ -155,6 +155,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
- }
-
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
-+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
-+{
-+ int ret = 0;
-+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-+ BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
-+ EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
-+
-+ TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
-+
-+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+ p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+ if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
-+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
-+ || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
-+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
-+ goto out;
-+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+ TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
-+
-+ /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
-+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
-+ goto out;
-+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+ TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
-+
-+ /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
-+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
-+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
-+ goto out;
-+ if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
-+ TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
-+ OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
-+
-+ ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
-+
-+ out:
-+ EC_GROUP_free(group1);
-+ EC_GROUP_free(group2);
-+ EC_GROUP_free(group3);
-+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-+
-+ return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
- static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
- {
-@@ -443,6 +493,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
- ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
- ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
- #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
-+ ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
- ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
- #endif
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);