From nobody Tue Feb 11 16:05:49 2025 X-Original-To: freebsd-current@mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mlmmj.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4YsmWl5MJ8z5nmjv for ; Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:05:55 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from dclarke@blastwave.org) Received: from mail.oetec.com (mail.oetec.com [108.160.241.186]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mail.oetec.com", Issuer "E5" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4YsmWk6d7cz3nW1 for ; Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:05:54 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from dclarke@blastwave.org) Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org; dkim=pass header.d=blastwave.org header.s=default header.b=b2aGwxyG; spf=pass (mx1.freebsd.org: domain of dclarke@blastwave.org designates 108.160.241.186 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=dclarke@blastwave.org; dmarc=pass (policy=quarantine) header.from=blastwave.org Received: from [172.16.35.3] (pool-99-253-118-250.cpe.net.cable.rogers.com [99.253.118.250]) (authenticated bits=0) by mail.oetec.com (8.17.1/8.17.1) with ESMTPSA id 51BG5naf059955 (version=TLSv1.3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 11 Feb 2025 11:05:50 -0500 (EST) (envelope-from dclarke@blastwave.org) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=blastwave.org; s=default; t=1739289950; bh=ge+OrxLsWvOkEPcGhhMu7hQtpC9v5XT974S31yXA8qw=; h=Date:Subject:References:To:From:In-Reply-To; b=b2aGwxyGIMQupZel2zQyS2jTpHzmGPJ2uNHiSQ6DUtVeMQOSMlsunzOLK5zy0wMOC vhSM0nHa/x/uIZyRedAFJgKRRwMA8D51Ah5pGE+FUVs+0RiGSzSW1cP9gCeqcU9yz+ CyEQJgN2gwHY6NBWgJ0tbJ18zV9eFLHJYscpNdM8ThDw49BQt8/Ze+AIY8bqzM02c9 jOVOnn1ePq+LC5mL4pIXinmpRMimQylMur8I+5x1D3AYV47j2QRRcq/x6S7ZBp8gWF KyFztBDQAyy3CNHYsHe2onsf4zCX4cYH5HbrnjDsCtBS1A6a5dnw9P8mLGyIY3I+er Do5DcWdCk39tQ== Message-ID: Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 11:05:49 -0500 List-Id: Discussions about the use of FreeBSD-current List-Archive: https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-current List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Sender: owner-freebsd-current@FreeBSD.org MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Fwd: OpenSSL Security Advisory References: <18fae49c1241f55eb41cf19017b8c0f6e8cf65af.camel@openssl.org> Content-Language: en-CA To: FreeBSD CURRENT From: Dennis Clarke Organization: GENUNIX In-Reply-To: <18fae49c1241f55eb41cf19017b8c0f6e8cf65af.camel@openssl.org> X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <18fae49c1241f55eb41cf19017b8c0f6e8cf65af.camel@openssl.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-oetec-MailScanner-Information: Please contact the ISP for more information X-oetec-MailScanner-ID: 51BG5naf059955 X-oetec-MailScanner: Found to be clean X-oetec-MailScanner-From: dclarke@blastwave.org X-Spam-Status: No X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-3.90 / 15.00]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-1.000]; RCVD_DKIM_ARC_DNSWL_MED(-0.50)[]; DMARC_POLICY_ALLOW(-0.50)[blastwave.org,quarantine]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.20)[-0.204]; R_DKIM_ALLOW(-0.20)[blastwave.org:s=default]; R_SPF_ALLOW(-0.20)[+mx]; RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED(-0.20)[108.160.241.186:from]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; RCPT_COUNT_ONE(0.00)[1]; ASN(0.00)[asn:812, ipnet:108.160.240.0/20, country:CA]; HAS_ORG_HEADER(0.00)[]; RCVD_COUNT_ONE(0.00)[1]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; RCVD_VIA_SMTP_AUTH(0.00)[]; RCVD_TLS_ALL(0.00)[]; MLMMJ_DEST(0.00)[freebsd-current@freebsd.org]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROM(0.00)[]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_ALL(0.00)[]; TO_DN_ALL(0.00)[]; PREVIOUSLY_DELIVERED(0.00)[freebsd-current@freebsd.org]; DKIM_TRACE(0.00)[blastwave.org:+] X-Spamd-Bar: --- X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 4YsmWk6d7cz3nW1 All : Just a heads up. I hope this lands in ports *really* fast. -- -- Dennis Clarke RISC-V/SPARC/PPC/ARM/CISC UNIX and Linux spoken PS: no FreeBSD on Raspberry Pi5 yet. Too many ugly blobs still. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: OpenSSL Security Advisory Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 16:54:29 +0100 From: Tomas Mraz To: openssl-project , openssl-users OpenSSL Security Advisory [11th February 2025] ============================================== RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as expected (CVE-2024-12797) ======================================================================================== Severity: High Issue summary: Clients using RFC7250 Raw Public Keys (RPKs) to authenticate a server may fail to notice that the server was not authenticated, because handshakes don't abort as expected when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER verification mode is set. Impact summary: TLS and DTLS connections using raw public keys may be vulnerable to man-in-middle attacks when server authentication failure is not detected by clients. RPKs are disabled by default in both TLS clients and TLS servers. The issue only arises when TLS clients explicitly enable RPK use by the server, and the server, likewise, enables sending of an RPK instead of an X.509 certificate chain. The affected clients are those that then rely on the handshake to fail when the server's RPK fails to match one of the expected public keys, by setting the verification mode to SSL_VERIFY_PEER. Clients that enable server-side raw public keys can still find out that raw public key verification failed by calling SSL_get_verify_result(), and those that do, and take appropriate action, are not affected. This issue was introduced in the initial implementation of RPK support in OpenSSL 3.2. The FIPS modules in 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.1, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are also not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3 and 3.2 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.4 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.4.1. OpenSSL 3.3 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.3.2. OpenSSL 3.2 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.2.4. This issue was reported on 18th December 2024 by Apple Inc. The fix was developed by Viktor Dukhovni. General Advisory Notes ====================== URL for this Security Advisory: https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20250211.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/