TrustedBSD Extensions Project
stanislav shalunov
shalunov at att.com
Wed Apr 12 22:36:54 GMT 2000
> From: David Collier-Brown - Sun Canada <davecb at scot.canada.sun.com>
>
> | What if your disk controller goes bad and decides to write a block of
> | TOP SECRET information onto CLASSIFIED hard drive once in every ten
> | thousand requests?
>
> Actually the write never gets to the driver, having been
> caught up in the permissions module that all the open
> operations have to pass through.
No. You ask to transfer this data to SCSI ID 3, block 45467.
The controller decides to write to SCSI ID 1, block 45467.
> That's a denial-of-service attack on the TCB, not the
> whole OS.
If the whole OS is unusuable (doesn't respond to user input),
I guess that makes it.
> H-P sells their firewalls hosted on a B1 OS, and
Why would I buy anything from HP? My organization doesn't require
Orange Book-certified systems. If it did, I wouldn't be able to use
TrustedBSD if/when it was done.
> No, the colors merely serve to remind the user that they
> can't copy from SECRET to UNCLAS on Trusted Solaris...
I'm not talking about Solaris. I'm talking about just one possible
way to implement the (silly) requirement.
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