PERFORCE change 40036 for review

Robert Watson rwatson at FreeBSD.org
Mon Oct 20 23:29:09 GMT 2003


http://perforce.freebsd.org/chv.cgi?CH=40036

Change 40036 by rwatson at rwatson_tislabs on 2003/10/20 16:28:51

	Remove !posix_sem-related things.

Affected files ...

.. //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_posix_sem.c#2 edit

Differences ...

==== //depot/projects/trustedbsd/mac/sys/security/mac/mac_posix_sem.c#2 (text+ko) ====

@@ -1,12 +1,7 @@
 /*-
- * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
- * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  * All rights reserved.
  *
- * This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
- * TrustedBSD Project.
- *
  * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
  * Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
  * Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
@@ -34,805 +29,37 @@
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-/*
- * Framework for extensible kernel access control.  Kernel and userland
- * interface to the framework, policy registration and composition.
- */
-
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD: src/sys/kern/kern_mac.c,v 1.99 2003/09/29 18:35:17 rwatson Exp $");
 
 #include "opt_mac.h"
-#include "opt_devfs.h"
-#include "opt_posix.h"
 
 #include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/condvar.h>
-#include <sys/extattr.h>
-#include <sys/imgact.h>
 #include <sys/kernel.h>
-#include <sys/lock.h>
 #include <sys/malloc.h>
-#include <sys/mutex.h>
 #include <sys/mac.h>
-#include <sys/module.h>
-#include <sys/proc.h>
 #include <sys/sbuf.h>
 #include <sys/systm.h>
-#include <sys/sysproto.h>
-#include <sys/sysent.h>
 #include <sys/vnode.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/file.h>
-#include <sys/namei.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/pipe.h>
-#include <sys/socketvar.h>
 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
-#include <sys/msg.h>
-#include <sys/msg_msg.h>
-#include <sys/sem.h>
-#include <sys/shm.h>
 
 #include <posix4/ksem.h>
 
-#include <vm/vm.h>
-#include <vm/pmap.h>
-#include <vm/vm_map.h>
-#include <vm/vm_object.h>
-
 #include <sys/mac_policy.h>
 
-#include <fs/devfs/devfs.h>
-
-#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
-#include <net/if.h>
-#include <net/if_var.h>
-
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
-
 #include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
 
-#ifdef MAC
-
-/*
- * Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 1.  This permits
- * modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't present,
- * even if it's pre-boot.
- */
-MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, 1);
-
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
-    "TrustedBSD MAC policy controls");
-
-#if MAC_MAX_SLOTS > 32
-#error "MAC_MAX_SLOTS too large"
-#endif
-
-static unsigned int mac_max_slots = MAC_MAX_SLOTS;
-static unsigned int mac_slot_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_SLOTS) - 1;
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_slots, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &mac_max_slots, 0, "");
-
-/*
- * Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet?  All read/write
- * access to this variable is serialized during the boot process.  Following
- * the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking.
- */
-int	mac_late = 0;
-
-/*
- * Warn about EA transactions only the first time they happen.
- * Weak coherency, no locking.
- */
-static int	ea_warn_once = 0;
-
-/*
- * Flag to indicate whether or not we should allocate label storage for
- * new mbufs.  Since most dynamic policies we currently work with don't
- * rely on mbuf labeling, try to avoid paying the cost of mtag allocation
- * unless specifically notified of interest.  One result of this is
- * that if a dynamically loaded policy requests mbuf labels, it must
- * be able to deal with a NULL label being returned on any mbufs that
- * were already in flight when the policy was loaded.  Since the policy
- * already has to deal with uninitialized labels, this probably won't
- * be a problem.  Note: currently no locking.  Will this be a problem?
- */
-#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF
-static int	mac_labelmbufs = 0;
-#endif
-
-static int	mac_enforce_fs = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_kld = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_network = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_network", &mac_enforce_network);
-
 static int	mac_enforce_posix_sem = 1;
 SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_posix_sem, CTLFLAG_RW,
     &mac_enforce_posix_sem, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on global POSIX semaphores");
 TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_posix_sem", &mac_enforce_posix_sem);
 
-static int	mac_enforce_process = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_process, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_process, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on inter-process operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_process", &mac_enforce_process);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_socket = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_socket, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_socket, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on socket operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_socket", &mac_enforce_socket);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_system = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_system, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_system, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on system operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_system", &mac_enforce_system);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_sysv = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_sysv, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_sysv, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on System V IPC objects");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_sysv", &mac_enforce_sysv);
-
-static int	mac_enforce_vm = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_vm, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_enforce_vm, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on vm operations");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_vm", &mac_enforce_vm);
-
-static int	mac_mmap_revocation = 0;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_mmap_revocation, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files on subject "
-    "relabel");
-
-static int	mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow = 1;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, mmap_revocation_via_cow, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_mmap_revocation_via_cow, 0, "Revoke mmap access to files via "
-    "copy-on-write semantics, or by removing all write access");
-
 #ifdef MAC_DEBUG
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, debug, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
-    "TrustedBSD MAC debug info");
-
-static int	mac_debug_label_fallback = 0;
-SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, label_fallback, CTLFLAG_RW,
-    &mac_debug_label_fallback, 0, "Filesystems should fall back to fs label"
-    "when label is corrupted.");
-TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.debug_label_fallback",
-    &mac_debug_label_fallback);
-
-SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_debug, OID_AUTO, counters, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
-    "TrustedBSD MAC object counters");
-
-static unsigned int nmacmbufs, nmaccreds, nmacifnets, nmacbpfdescs,
-    nmacsockets, nmacmounts, nmactemp, nmacvnodes, nmacdevfsdirents,
-    nmacipqs, nmacprocs, nmacipcmsgs, nmacipcmsqs,
-    nmacipcsemas, nmacipcshms, nmacposixksems;
-
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mbufs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacmbufs, 0, "number of mbufs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, creds, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmaccreds, 0, "number of ucreds in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ifnets, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacifnets, 0, "number of ifnets in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacipqs, 0, "number of ipqs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, bpfdescs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacbpfdescs, 0, "number of bpfdescs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, sockets, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacsockets, 0, "number of sockets in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, procs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacprocs, 0, "number of procs in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, mounts, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacmounts, 0, "number of mounts in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, temp, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmactemp, 0, "number of temporary labels in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, vnodes, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacvnodes, 0, "number of vnodes in use");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, devfsdirents, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacdevfsdirents, 0, "number of devfs dirents inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msgs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacipcmsgs, 0, "number of sysv ipc messages inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_msqs, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacipcmsqs, 0, "number of sysv ipc message queue identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_semas, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacipcsemas, 0, "number of sysv ipc semaphore identifiers inuse");
-SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, ipc_shms, CTLFLAG_RD,
-    &nmacipcshms, 0, "number of sysv ipc shm identifiers inuse");
+static unsigned int nmacposixksems;
 SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac_debug_counters, OID_AUTO, posix_ksems, CTLFLAG_RD,
     &nmacposixksems, 0, "number of posix global semaphores inuse");
 #endif
 
-static int	mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
-static int	mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
-
-static void	mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade(struct ucred *cred,
-		    struct vnode *vp, int *prot);
-static void	mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse(struct thread *td,
-		    struct ucred *cred, struct vm_map *map);
-
-static void	mac_destroy_socket_label(struct label *label);
-
-static int	mac_setlabel_vnode_extattr(struct ucred *cred,
-		    struct vnode *vp, struct label *intlabel);
-
-MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage");
-
-/*
- * mac_static_policy_list holds a list of policy modules that are not
- * loaded while the system is "live", and cannot be unloaded.  These
- * policies can be invoked without holding the busy count.
- *
- * mac_policy_list stores the list of dynamic policies.  A busy count is
- * maintained for the list, stored in mac_policy_busy.  The busy count
- * is protected by mac_policy_mtx; the list may be modified only
- * while the busy count is 0, requiring that the lock be held to
- * prevent new references to the list from being acquired.  For almost
- * all operations, incrementing the busy count is sufficient to
- * guarantee consistency, as the list cannot be modified while the
- * busy count is elevated.  For a few special operations involving a
- * change to the list of active policies, the mtx itself must be held.
- * A condition variable, mac_policy_cv, is used to signal potential
- * exclusive consumers that they should try to acquire the lock if a
- * first attempt at exclusive access fails.
- */
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-static struct mtx mac_policy_mtx;
-static struct cv mac_policy_cv;
-static int mac_policy_count;
-#endif
-struct mac_policy_list_head mac_policy_list;
-struct mac_policy_list_head mac_static_policy_list;
-
-/*
- * We manually invoke WITNESS_WARN() to allow Witness to generate
- * warnings even if we don't end up ever triggering the wait at
- * run-time.  The consumer of the exclusive interface must not hold
- * any locks (other than potentially Giant) since we may sleep for
- * long (potentially indefinite) periods of time waiting for the
- * framework to become quiescent so that a policy list change may
- * be made.
- */
-void
-mac_policy_grab_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
- 	    "mac_policy_grab_exclusive() at %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
-	mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	while (mac_policy_count != 0)
-		cv_wait(&mac_policy_cv, &mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_assert_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	mtx_assert(&mac_policy_mtx, MA_OWNED);
-	KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0,
-	    ("mac_policy_assert_exclusive(): not exclusive"));
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_release_exclusive(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	KASSERT(mac_policy_count == 0,
-	    ("mac_policy_release_exclusive(): not exclusive"));
-	mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_list_busy(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	mac_policy_count++;
-	mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-int
-mac_policy_list_conditional_busy(void)
-{
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	int ret;
-
-	mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	if (!LIST_EMPTY(&mac_policy_list)) {
-		mac_policy_count++;
-		ret = 1;
-	} else
-		ret = 0;
-	mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	return (ret);
-#else
-	return (0);
-#endif
-}
-
-void
-mac_policy_list_unbusy(void)
-{
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	mtx_lock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-	mac_policy_count--;
-	KASSERT(mac_policy_count >= 0, ("MAC_POLICY_LIST_LOCK"));
-	if (mac_policy_count == 0)
-		cv_signal(&mac_policy_cv);
-	mtx_unlock(&mac_policy_mtx);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
- */
-static void
-mac_init(void)
-{
-
-	LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list);
-	LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list);
-
-#ifndef MAC_STATIC
-	mtx_init(&mac_policy_mtx, "mac_policy_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
-	cv_init(&mac_policy_cv, "mac_policy_cv");
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded
- * "early", set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either
- * linked into the kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
- */
-static void
-mac_late_init(void)
-{
-
-	mac_late = 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * After the policy list has changed, walk the list to update any global
- * flags.  Currently, we support only one flag, and it's conditionally
- * defined; as a result, the entire function is conditional.  Eventually,
- * the #else case might also iterate across the policies.
- */
-static void
-mac_policy_updateflags(void)
-{
-#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF
-	struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
-	int labelmbufs;
-
-	mac_policy_assert_exclusive();
-
-	labelmbufs = 0;
-	LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
-		if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS)
-			labelmbufs++;
-	}
-	LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
-		if (tmpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_LABELMBUFS)
-			labelmbufs++;
-	}
-	mac_labelmbufs = (labelmbufs != 0);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc.
- */
-int
-mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data)
-{
-	struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
-	int error;
-
-	error = 0;
-	mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data;
-
-#ifdef MAC_STATIC
-	if (mac_late) {
-		printf("mac_policy_modevent: MAC_STATIC and late\n");
-		return (EBUSY);
-	}
-#endif
-
-	switch (type) {
-	case MOD_LOAD:
-		if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE &&
-		    mac_late) {
-			printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy "
-			    "after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name);
-			error = EBUSY;
-			break;
-		}
-		error = mac_policy_register(mpc);
-		break;
-	case MOD_UNLOAD:
-		/* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */
-		if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED)
-		    != 0)
-			error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc);
-		else
-			error = 0;
-		break;
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
-{
-	struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
-	int error, slot, static_entry;
-
-	error = 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * We don't technically need exclusive access while !mac_late,
-	 * but hold it for assertion consistency.
-	 */
-	mac_policy_grab_exclusive();
-
-	/*
-	 * If the module can potentially be unloaded, or we're loading
-	 * late, we have to stick it in the non-static list and pay
-	 * an extra performance overhead.  Otherwise, we can pay a
-	 * light locking cost and stick it in the static list.
-	 */
-	static_entry = (!mac_late &&
-	    !(mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK));
-
-	if (static_entry) {
-		LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
-			if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
-				error = EEXIST;
-				goto out;
-			}
-		}
-	} else {
-		LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
-			if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
-				error = EEXIST;
-				goto out;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
-		slot = ffs(mac_slot_offsets_free);
-		if (slot == 0) {
-			error = ENOMEM;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		slot--;
-		mac_slot_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot);
-		*mpc->mpc_field_off = slot;
-	}
-	mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
-
-	/*
-	 * If we're loading a MAC module after the framework has
-	 * initialized, it has to go into the dynamic list.  If
-	 * we're loading it before we've finished initializing,
-	 * it can go into the static list with weaker locker
-	 * requirements.
-	 */
-	if (static_entry)
-		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_static_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
-	else
-		LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
-
-	/* Per-policy initialization. */
-	if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL)
-		(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc);
-	mac_policy_updateflags();
-
-	printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
-	    mpc->mpc_name);
-
-out:
-	mac_policy_release_exclusive();
-	return (error);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
-{
-
-	/*
-	 * If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload.  Check
-	 * to see if we did the run-time registration, and if not,
-	 * silently succeed.
-	 */
-	mac_policy_grab_exclusive();
-	if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) {
-		mac_policy_release_exclusive();
-		return (0);
-	}
-#if 0
-	/*
-	 * Don't allow unloading modules with private data.
-	 */
-	if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
-		MAC_POLICY_LIST_UNLOCK();
-		return (EBUSY);
-	}
-#endif
-	/*
-	 * Only allow the unload to proceed if the module is unloadable
-	 * by its own definition.
-	 */
-	if ((mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK) == 0) {
-		mac_policy_release_exclusive();
-		return (EBUSY);
-	}
-	if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy != NULL)
-		(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy))(mpc);
-
-	LIST_REMOVE(mpc, mpc_list);
-	mpc->mpc_runtime_flags &= ~MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
-	mac_policy_updateflags();
-
-	mac_policy_release_exclusive();
-
-	printf("Security policy unload: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
-	    mpc->mpc_name);
-
-	return (0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Define an error value precedence, and given two arguments, selects the
- * value with the higher precedence.
- */
-int
-mac_error_select(int error1, int error2)
-{
-
-	/* Certain decision-making errors take top priority. */
-	if (error1 == EDEADLK || error2 == EDEADLK)
-		return (EDEADLK);
-
-	/* Invalid arguments should be reported where possible. */
-	if (error1 == EINVAL || error2 == EINVAL)
-		return (EINVAL);
-
-	/* Precedence goes to "visibility", with both process and file. */
-	if (error1 == ESRCH || error2 == ESRCH)
-		return (ESRCH);
-
-	if (error1 == ENOENT || error2 == ENOENT)
-		return (ENOENT);
-
-	/* Precedence goes to DAC/MAC protections. */
-	if (error1 == EACCES || error2 == EACCES)
-		return (EACCES);
-
-	/* Precedence goes to privilege. */
-	if (error1 == EPERM || error2 == EPERM)
-		return (EPERM);
-
-	/* Precedence goes to error over success; otherwise, arbitrary. */
-	if (error1 != 0)
-		return (error1);
-	return (error2);
-}
-
-static struct label *
-mbuf_to_label(struct mbuf *mbuf)
-{
-	struct m_tag *tag;
-	struct label *label;
-
-	tag = m_tag_find(mbuf, PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, NULL);
-	label = (struct label *)(tag+1);
-
-	return (label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	bzero(label, sizeof(*label));
-	label->l_flags = MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	KASSERT(label->l_flags & MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED,
-	    ("destroying uninitialized label"));
-
-	bzero(label, sizeof(*label));
-	/* implicit: label->l_flags &= ~MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED; */
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&bpf_d->bd_label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacbpfdescs);
-}
-
-static void
-mac_init_cred_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_cred_label, label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmaccreds);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_cred(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	mac_init_cred_label(&cred->cr_label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&de->de_label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacdevfsdirents);
-}
-
-static void
-mac_init_ifnet_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_ifnet_label, label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacifnets);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp)
-{
-
-	mac_init_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_msgmsg(struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&msgptr->label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_msgmsg_label, &msgptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcmsgs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_msgqueue(struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&msqkptr->label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_msgqueue_label, &msqkptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcmsqs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_sema(struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&semakptr->label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_sema_label, &semakptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcsemas);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_ipc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&shmsegptr->label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_ipc_shm_label, &shmsegptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipcshms);
-}
-
-int
-mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, int flag)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	mac_init_label(&ipq->ipq_label);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(init_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label, flag);
-	if (error) {
-		MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipq_label, &ipq->ipq_label);
-		mac_destroy_label(&ipq->ipq_label);
-	} else {
-		MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacipqs);
-	}
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_init_mbuf_tag(struct m_tag *tag, int flag)
-{
-	struct label *label;
-	int error;
-
-	label = (struct label *) (tag + 1);
-	mac_init_label(label);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(init_mbuf_label, label, flag);
-	if (error) {
-		MAC_PERFORM(destroy_mbuf_label, label);
-		mac_destroy_label(label);
-	} else {
-		MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacmbufs);
-	}
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, int flag)
-{
-	struct m_tag *tag;
-	int error;
-
-	M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
-
-#ifndef MAC_ALWAYS_LABEL_MBUF
-	/*
-	 * If conditionally allocating mbuf labels, don't allocate unless
-	 * they are required.
-	 */
-	if (!mac_labelmbufs)
-		return (0);
-#endif
-	tag = m_tag_get(PACKET_TAG_MACLABEL, sizeof(struct label),
-	    flag);
-	if (tag == NULL)
-		return (ENOMEM);
-	error = mac_init_mbuf_tag(tag, flag);
-	if (error) {
-		m_tag_free(tag);
-		return (error);
-	}
-	m_tag_prepend(m, tag);
-	return (0);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_mount(struct mount *mp)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_mntlabel);
-	mac_init_label(&mp->mnt_fslabel);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_label, &mp->mnt_mntlabel);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_mount_fs_label, &mp->mnt_fslabel);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacmounts);
-}
-
 void 
 mac_init_posix_ksem(struct ksem *ksemptr)
 {
@@ -843,199 +70,6 @@
 }
 
 void
-mac_init_proc(struct proc *p)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(&p->p_label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_proc_label, &p->p_label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacprocs);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_init_socket_label(struct label *label, int flag)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	mac_init_label(label);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(init_socket_label, label, flag);
-	if (error) {
-		MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label);
-		mac_destroy_label(label);
-	} else {
-		MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacsockets);
-	}
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-static int
-mac_init_socket_peer_label(struct label *label, int flag)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	mac_init_label(label);
-
-	MAC_CHECK(init_socket_peer_label, label, flag);
-	if (error) {
-		MAC_PERFORM(destroy_socket_label, label);
-		mac_destroy_label(label);
-	}
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-int
-mac_init_socket(struct socket *socket, int flag)
-{
-	int error;
-
-	error = mac_init_socket_label(&socket->so_label, flag);
-	if (error)
-		return (error);
-
-	error = mac_init_socket_peer_label(&socket->so_peerlabel, flag);
-	if (error)
-		mac_destroy_socket_label(&socket->so_label);
-
-	return (error);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_vnode_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	mac_init_label(label);
-	MAC_PERFORM(init_vnode_label, label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_INC(&nmacvnodes);
-}
-
-void
-mac_init_vnode(struct vnode *vp)
-{
-
-	mac_init_vnode_label(&vp->v_label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_bpfdesc_label, &bpf_d->bd_label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&bpf_d->bd_label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacbpfdescs);
-}
-
-static void
-mac_destroy_cred_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_cred_label, label);
-	mac_destroy_label(label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmaccreds);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *cred)
-{
-
-	mac_destroy_cred_label(&cred->cr_label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_devfsdirent_label, &de->de_label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&de->de_label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacdevfsdirents);
-}
-
-static void
-mac_destroy_ifnet_label(struct label *label)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ifnet_label, label);
-	mac_destroy_label(label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacifnets);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp)
-{
-
-	mac_destroy_ifnet_label(&ifp->if_label);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_msgmsg(struct msg *msgptr)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_msgmsg_label, &msgptr->label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&msgptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcmsgs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_msgqueue(struct msqid_kernel *msqkptr)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_msgqueue_label, &msqkptr->label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&msqkptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcmsqs);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_sema(struct semid_kernel *semakptr)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_sema_label, &semakptr->label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&semakptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcsemas);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shmsegptr)
-{
-
-	MAC_PERFORM(destroy_ipc_shm_label, &shmsegptr->label);
-	mac_destroy_label(&shmsegptr->label);
-	MAC_DEBUG_COUNTER_DEC(&nmacipcshms);
-}
-
-void
-mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *ipq)
-{

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