svn commit: r198434 - in stable/8/sys: . amd64/include/xen cddl/contrib/opensolaris contrib/dev/acpica contrib/pf dev/xen/xenpci kern sys

[Ruslan Ermilov]

Author: ru
Date: Sat Oct 24 04:55:14 2009
New Revision: 198434
URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/198434

Log:
  MFC r198295:
  
  Random number generator initialization cleanup:
  
  - Introduce new SI_SUB_RANDOM point in boot sequence to make it
  clear from where one may start using random(9).  It should be as
  early as possible, so place it just after SI_SUB_CPU where we
  have some randomness on most platforms via get_cyclecount().
  
  - Move stack protector initialization to be after SI_SUB_RANDOM
  as before this point we have no randomness at all.  This fixes
  stack protector to actually protect stack with some random guard
  value instead of a well-known one.
  
  Note that this patch doesn't try to address arc4random(9) issues.
  With current code, it will be implicitly seeded by stack protector
  and hence will get the same entropy as random(9).  It will be
  securely reseeded once /dev/random is feeded by some entropy from
  userland.
  
  Submitted by:	Maxim Dounin <mdounin at mdounin.ru>
  Approved by:	re (kib)

Modified:
  stable/8/sys/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/amd64/include/xen/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/cddl/contrib/opensolaris/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/contrib/dev/acpica/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/contrib/pf/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/dev/xen/xenpci/   (props changed)
  stable/8/sys/kern/init_main.c
  stable/8/sys/kern/stack_protector.c
  stable/8/sys/sys/kernel.h

Modified: stable/8/sys/kern/init_main.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/8/sys/kern/init_main.c	Sat Oct 24 04:11:40 2009	(r198433)
+++ stable/8/sys/kern/init_main.c	Sat Oct 24 04:55:14 2009	(r198434)
@@ -557,6 +557,19 @@ proc0_post(void *dummy __unused)
 }
 SYSINIT(p0post, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC_POST, SI_ORDER_FIRST, proc0_post, NULL);
 
+static void
+random_init(void *dummy __unused)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * After CPU has been started we have some randomness on most
+	 * platforms via get_cyclecount().  For platforms that don't
+	 * we will reseed random(9) in proc0_post() as well.
+	 */
+	srandom(get_cyclecount());
+}
+SYSINIT(random, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_FIRST, random_init, NULL);
+
 /*
  ***************************************************************************
  ****

Modified: stable/8/sys/kern/stack_protector.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/8/sys/kern/stack_protector.c	Sat Oct 24 04:11:40 2009	(r198433)
+++ stable/8/sys/kern/stack_protector.c	Sat Oct 24 04:55:14 2009	(r198434)
@@ -28,5 +28,4 @@ __stack_chk_init(void *dummy __unused)
 	for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(guard); i++)
 		__stack_chk_guard[i] = guard[i];
 }
-/* SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER is right after SI_SUB_LOCK used by arc4rand() init. */
-SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL);
+SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL);

Modified: stable/8/sys/sys/kernel.h
==============================================================================
--- stable/8/sys/sys/kernel.h	Sat Oct 24 04:11:40 2009	(r198433)
+++ stable/8/sys/sys/kernel.h	Sat Oct 24 04:55:14 2009	(r198434)
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ enum sysinit_sub_id {
 	SI_SUB_VNET_PRELINK	= 0x1E00000,	/* vnet init before modules */
 	SI_SUB_KLD		= 0x2000000,	/* KLD and module setup */
 	SI_SUB_CPU		= 0x2100000,	/* CPU resource(s)*/
+	SI_SUB_RANDOM		= 0x2120000,	/* random number generator */
 	SI_SUB_KDTRACE		= 0x2140000,	/* Kernel dtrace hooks */
 	SI_SUB_MAC		= 0x2180000,	/* TrustedBSD MAC subsystem */
 	SI_SUB_MAC_POLICY	= 0x21C0000,	/* TrustedBSD MAC policies */