svn commit: r256257 - stable/9/lib/libfetch
Gleb Smirnoff
glebius at FreeBSD.org
Thu Oct 10 09:42:42 UTC 2013
Author: glebius
Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:41 2013
New Revision: 256257
URL: http://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/256257
Log:
Merge from head r253514,r253680,r253805,r254650:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
r253514 | des | 2013-07-21 10:59:56 +0400 (вс, 21 июл 2013) | 5 lines
Use the correct request syntax for proxied (tunneled) HTTPS requests.
PR: bin/180666
MFC after: 3 days
---------------------------------------------------------------------
r253680 | des | 2013-07-26 19:53:43 +0400 (пт, 26 июл 2013) | 7 lines
Implement certificate verification, and many other SSL-related
imrovements; complete details in the PR.
PR: kern/175514
Submitted by: Michael Gmelin <freebsd at grem.de>
MFC after: 1 week
---------------------------------------------------------------------
r253805 | des | 2013-07-30 17:07:55 +0400 (вт, 30 июл 2013) | 5 lines
Include an Accept header in requests.
PR: kern/180917
MFC after: 1 week
---------------------------------------------------------------------
r254650 | des | 2013-08-22 11:43:36 +0400 (чт, 22 авг 2013) | 8 lines
Even though it doesn't really make sense in the context of a CONNECT
request, RFC 2616 14.23 mandates the presence of the Host: header in
all HTTP 1.1 requests.
PR: kern/181445
Submitted by: Kimo <kimor79 at yahoo.com>
MFC after: 3 days
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Reviewed by: des
Modified:
stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.c
stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.h
stable/9/lib/libfetch/fetch.3
stable/9/lib/libfetch/http.c
Directory Properties:
stable/9/lib/libfetch/ (props changed)
Modified: stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.c Thu Oct 10 09:32:27 2013 (r256256)
+++ stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.c Thu Oct 10 09:42:41 2013 (r256257)
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1998-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Michael Gmelin <freebsd at grem.de>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -47,6 +48,10 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#endif
+
#include "fetch.h"
#include "common.h"
@@ -317,15 +322,488 @@ fetch_connect(const char *host, int port
return (conn);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+/*
+ * Convert characters A-Z to lowercase (intentionally avoid any locale
+ * specific conversions).
+ */
+static char
+fetch_ssl_tolower(char in)
+{
+ if (in >= 'A' && in <= 'Z')
+ return (in + 32);
+ else
+ return (in);
+}
+
+/*
+ * isalpha implementation that intentionally avoids any locale specific
+ * conversions.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_isalpha(char in)
+{
+ return ((in >= 'A' && in <= 'Z') || (in >= 'a' && in <= 'z'));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if passed hostnames a and b are equal.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_hname_equal(const char *a, size_t alen, const char *b,
+ size_t blen)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (alen != blen)
+ return (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < alen; ++i) {
+ if (fetch_ssl_tolower(a[i]) != fetch_ssl_tolower(b[i]))
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if domain label is traditional, meaning that only A-Z, a-z, 0-9
+ * and '-' (hyphen) are allowed. Hyphens have to be surrounded by alpha-
+ * numeric characters. Double hyphens (like they're found in IDN a-labels
+ * 'xn--') are not allowed. Empty labels are invalid.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_is_trad_domain_label(const char *l, size_t len, int wcok)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (!len || l[0] == '-' || l[len-1] == '-')
+ return (0);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ if (!isdigit(l[i]) &&
+ !fetch_ssl_isalpha(l[i]) &&
+ !(l[i] == '*' && wcok) &&
+ !(l[i] == '-' && l[i - 1] != '-'))
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if host name consists only of numbers. This might indicate an IP
+ * address, which is not a good idea for CN wildcard comparison.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_hname_is_only_numbers(const char *hostname, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ if (!((hostname[i] >= '0' && hostname[i] <= '9') ||
+ hostname[i] == '.'))
+ return (0);
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the host name h passed matches the pattern passed in m which
+ * is usually part of subjectAltName or CN of a certificate presented to
+ * the client. This includes wildcard matching. The algorithm is based on
+ * RFC6125, sections 6.4.3 and 7.2, which clarifies RFC2818 and RFC3280.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_hname_match(const char *h, size_t hlen, const char *m,
+ size_t mlen)
+{
+ int delta, hdotidx, mdot1idx, wcidx;
+ const char *hdot, *mdot1, *mdot2;
+ const char *wc; /* wildcard */
+
+ if (!(h && *h && m && *m))
+ return (0);
+ if ((wc = strnstr(m, "*", mlen)) == NULL)
+ return (fetch_ssl_hname_equal(h, hlen, m, mlen));
+ wcidx = wc - m;
+ /* hostname should not be just dots and numbers */
+ if (fetch_ssl_hname_is_only_numbers(h, hlen))
+ return (0);
+ /* only one wildcard allowed in pattern */
+ if (strnstr(wc + 1, "*", mlen - wcidx - 1) != NULL)
+ return (0);
+ /*
+ * there must be at least two more domain labels and
+ * wildcard has to be in the leftmost label (RFC6125)
+ */
+ mdot1 = strnstr(m, ".", mlen);
+ if (mdot1 == NULL || mdot1 < wc || (mlen - (mdot1 - m)) < 4)
+ return (0);
+ mdot1idx = mdot1 - m;
+ mdot2 = strnstr(mdot1 + 1, ".", mlen - mdot1idx - 1);
+ if (mdot2 == NULL || (mlen - (mdot2 - m)) < 2)
+ return (0);
+ /* hostname must contain a dot and not be the 1st char */
+ hdot = strnstr(h, ".", hlen);
+ if (hdot == NULL || hdot == h)
+ return (0);
+ hdotidx = hdot - h;
+ /*
+ * host part of hostname must be at least as long as
+ * pattern it's supposed to match
+ */
+ if (hdotidx < mdot1idx)
+ return (0);
+ /*
+ * don't allow wildcards in non-traditional domain names
+ * (IDN, A-label, U-label...)
+ */
+ if (!fetch_ssl_is_trad_domain_label(h, hdotidx, 0) ||
+ !fetch_ssl_is_trad_domain_label(m, mdot1idx, 1))
+ return (0);
+ /* match domain part (part after first dot) */
+ if (!fetch_ssl_hname_equal(hdot, hlen - hdotidx, mdot1,
+ mlen - mdot1idx))
+ return (0);
+ /* match part left of wildcard */
+ if (!fetch_ssl_hname_equal(h, wcidx, m, wcidx))
+ return (0);
+ /* match part right of wildcard */
+ delta = mdot1idx - wcidx - 1;
+ if (!fetch_ssl_hname_equal(hdot - delta, delta,
+ mdot1 - delta, delta))
+ return (0);
+ /* all tests succeded, it's a match */
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get numeric host address info - returns NULL if host was not an IP
+ * address. The caller is responsible for deallocation using
+ * freeaddrinfo(3).
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+fetch_ssl_get_numeric_addrinfo(const char *hostname, size_t len)
+{
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+ char *host;
+
+ host = (char *)malloc(len + 1);
+ memcpy(host, hostname, len);
+ host[len] = '\0';
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = 0;
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ /* port is not relevant for this purpose */
+ getaddrinfo(host, "443", &hints, &res);
+ free(host);
+ return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare ip address in addrinfo with address passes.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match_bin(const struct addrinfo *lhost, const char *rhost,
+ size_t rhostlen)
+{
+ const void *left;
+
+ if (lhost->ai_family == AF_INET && rhostlen == 4) {
+ left = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in*)(void *)
+ lhost->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#ifdef INET6
+ } else if (lhost->ai_family == AF_INET6 && rhostlen == 16) {
+ left = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)
+ lhost->ai_addr)->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+ } else
+ return (0);
+ return (!memcmp(left, (const void *)rhost, rhostlen) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare ip address in addrinfo with host passed. If host is not an IP
+ * address, comparison will fail.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match(const struct addrinfo *laddr, const char *r,
+ size_t rlen)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *raddr;
+ int ret;
+ char *rip;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ if ((raddr = fetch_ssl_get_numeric_addrinfo(r, rlen)) == NULL)
+ return 0; /* not a numeric host */
+
+ if (laddr->ai_family == raddr->ai_family) {
+ if (laddr->ai_family == AF_INET) {
+ rip = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)(void *)
+ raddr->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ ret = fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match_bin(laddr, rip, 4);
+#ifdef INET6
+ } else if (laddr->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+ rip = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *)
+ raddr->ai_addr)->sin6_addr;
+ ret = fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match_bin(laddr, rip, 16);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(raddr);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify server certificate by subjectAltName.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_verify_altname(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames,
+ const char *host, struct addrinfo *ip)
+{
+ const GENERAL_NAME *name;
+ size_t nslen;
+ int i;
+ const char *ns;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); ++i) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
+ /*
+ * This is a workaround, since the following line causes
+ * alignment issues in clang:
+ * name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+ * OpenSSL explicitly warns not to use those macros
+ * directly, but there isn't much choice (and there
+ * shouldn't be any ill side effects)
+ */
+ name = (GENERAL_NAME *)SKM_sk_value(void, altnames, i);
+#else
+ name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+#endif
+ ns = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.ia5);
+ nslen = (size_t)ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.ia5);
+
+ if (name->type == GEN_DNS && ip == NULL &&
+ fetch_ssl_hname_match(host, strlen(host), ns, nslen))
+ return (1);
+ else if (name->type == GEN_IPADD && ip != NULL &&
+ fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match_bin(ip, ns, nslen))
+ return (1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify server certificate by CN.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_verify_cn(X509_NAME *subject, const char *host,
+ struct addrinfo *ip)
+{
+ ASN1_STRING *namedata;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *nameentry;
+ int cnlen, lastpos, loc, ret;
+ unsigned char *cn;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ lastpos = -1;
+ loc = -1;
+ cn = NULL;
+ /* get most specific CN (last entry in list) and compare */
+ while ((lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subject,
+ NID_commonName, lastpos)) != -1)
+ loc = lastpos;
+
+ if (loc > -1) {
+ nameentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(subject, loc);
+ namedata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(nameentry);
+ cnlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&cn, namedata);
+ if (ip == NULL &&
+ fetch_ssl_hname_match(host, strlen(host), cn, cnlen))
+ ret = 1;
+ else if (ip != NULL && fetch_ssl_ipaddr_match(ip, cn, cnlen))
+ ret = 1;
+ OPENSSL_free(cn);
+ }
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that server certificate subjectAltName/CN matches
+ * hostname. First check, if there are alternative subject names. If yes,
+ * those have to match. Only if those don't exist it falls back to
+ * checking the subject's CN.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_verify_hname(X509 *cert, const char *host)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *ip;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
+ X509_NAME *subject;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ ip = fetch_ssl_get_numeric_addrinfo(host, strlen(host));
+ altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
+ NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (altnames != NULL) {
+ ret = fetch_ssl_verify_altname(altnames, host, ip);
+ } else {
+ subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+ if (subject != NULL)
+ ret = fetch_ssl_verify_cn(subject, host, ip);
+ }
+
+ if (ip != NULL)
+ freeaddrinfo(ip);
+ if (altnames != NULL)
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure transport security layer based on environment.
+ */
+static void
+fetch_ssl_setup_transport_layer(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose)
+{
+ long ssl_ctx_options;
+
+ ssl_ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+ if (getenv("SSL_ALLOW_SSL2") == NULL)
+ ssl_ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ if (getenv("SSL_NO_SSL3") != NULL)
+ ssl_ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ if (getenv("SSL_NO_TLS1") != NULL)
+ ssl_ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ if (verbose)
+ fetch_info("SSL options: %x", ssl_ctx_options);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ssl_ctx_options);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Configure peer verification based on environment.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_setup_peer_verification(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose)
+{
+ X509_LOOKUP *crl_lookup;
+ X509_STORE *crl_store;
+ const char *ca_cert_file, *ca_cert_path, *crl_file;
+
+ if (getenv("SSL_NO_VERIFY_PEER") == NULL) {
+ ca_cert_file = getenv("SSL_CA_CERT_FILE") != NULL ?
+ getenv("SSL_CA_CERT_FILE") : "/etc/ssl/cert.pem";
+ ca_cert_path = getenv("SSL_CA_CERT_PATH");
+ if (verbose) {
+ fetch_info("Peer verification enabled");
+ if (ca_cert_file != NULL)
+ fetch_info("Using CA cert file: %s",
+ ca_cert_file);
+ if (ca_cert_path != NULL)
+ fetch_info("Using CA cert path: %s",
+ ca_cert_path);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+ fetch_ssl_cb_verify_crt);
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, ca_cert_file,
+ ca_cert_path);
+ if ((crl_file = getenv("SSL_CRL_FILE")) != NULL) {
+ if (verbose)
+ fetch_info("Using CRL file: %s", crl_file);
+ crl_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
+ crl_lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(crl_store,
+ X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (crl_lookup == NULL ||
+ !X509_load_crl_file(crl_lookup, crl_file,
+ X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Could not load CRL file %s\n",
+ crl_file);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ X509_STORE_set_flags(crl_store,
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK |
+ X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure client certificate based on environment.
+ */
+static int
+fetch_ssl_setup_client_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose)
+{
+ const char *client_cert_file, *client_key_file;
+
+ if ((client_cert_file = getenv("SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE")) != NULL) {
+ client_key_file = getenv("SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE") != NULL ?
+ getenv("SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE") : client_cert_file;
+ if (verbose) {
+ fetch_info("Using client cert file: %s",
+ client_cert_file);
+ fetch_info("Using client key file: %s",
+ client_key_file);
+ }
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
+ client_cert_file) != 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Could not load client certificate %s\n",
+ client_cert_file);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, client_key_file,
+ SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Could not load client key %s\n",
+ client_key_file);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callback for SSL certificate verification, this is called on server
+ * cert verification. It takes no decision, but informs the user in case
+ * verification failed.
+ */
+int
+fetch_ssl_cb_verify_crt(int verified, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ X509 *crt;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ char *str;
+
+ str = NULL;
+ if (!verified) {
+ if ((crt = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)) != NULL &&
+ (name = X509_get_subject_name(crt)) != NULL)
+ str = X509_NAME_oneline(name, 0, 0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Certificate verification failed for %s\n",
+ str != NULL ? str : "no relevant certificate");
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
+ }
+ return (verified);
+}
+
+#endif
/*
* Enable SSL on a connection.
*/
int
-fetch_ssl(conn_t *conn, int verbose)
+fetch_ssl(conn_t *conn, const struct url *URL, int verbose)
{
#ifdef WITH_SSL
int ret, ssl_err;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ char *str;
/* Init the SSL library and context */
if (!SSL_library_init()){
@@ -339,8 +817,14 @@ fetch_ssl(conn_t *conn, int verbose)
conn->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(conn->ssl_meth);
SSL_CTX_set_mode(conn->ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+ fetch_ssl_setup_transport_layer(conn->ssl_ctx, verbose);
+ if (!fetch_ssl_setup_peer_verification(conn->ssl_ctx, verbose))
+ return (-1);
+ if (!fetch_ssl_setup_client_certificate(conn->ssl_ctx, verbose))
+ return (-1);
+
conn->ssl = SSL_new(conn->ssl_ctx);
- if (conn->ssl == NULL){
+ if (conn->ssl == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "SSL context creation failed\n");
return (-1);
}
@@ -353,22 +837,35 @@ fetch_ssl(conn_t *conn, int verbose)
return (-1);
}
}
+ conn->ssl_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl);
- if (verbose) {
- X509_NAME *name;
- char *str;
+ if (conn->ssl_cert == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No server SSL certificate\n");
+ return (-1);
+ }
- fprintf(stderr, "SSL connection established using %s\n",
+ if (getenv("SSL_NO_VERIFY_HOSTNAME") == NULL) {
+ if (verbose)
+ fetch_info("Verify hostname");
+ if (!fetch_ssl_verify_hname(conn->ssl_cert, URL->host)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "SSL certificate subject doesn't match host %s\n",
+ URL->host);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose) {
+ fetch_info("SSL connection established using %s",
SSL_get_cipher(conn->ssl));
- conn->ssl_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(conn->ssl);
name = X509_get_subject_name(conn->ssl_cert);
str = X509_NAME_oneline(name, 0, 0);
- printf("Certificate subject: %s\n", str);
- free(str);
+ fetch_info("Certificate subject: %s", str);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
name = X509_get_issuer_name(conn->ssl_cert);
str = X509_NAME_oneline(name, 0, 0);
- printf("Certificate issuer: %s\n", str);
- free(str);
+ fetch_info("Certificate issuer: %s", str);
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
}
return (0);
@@ -726,6 +1223,22 @@ fetch_close(conn_t *conn)
if (--conn->ref > 0)
return (0);
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+ if (conn->ssl) {
+ SSL_shutdown(conn->ssl);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(conn->ssl);
+ SSL_free(conn->ssl);
+ conn->ssl = NULL;
+ }
+ if (conn->ssl_ctx) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(conn->ssl_ctx);
+ conn->ssl_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ if (conn->ssl_cert) {
+ X509_free(conn->ssl_cert);
+ conn->ssl_cert = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
ret = close(conn->sd);
free(conn->cache.buf);
free(conn->buf);
Modified: stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.h
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.h Thu Oct 10 09:32:27 2013 (r256256)
+++ stable/9/lib/libfetch/common.h Thu Oct 10 09:42:41 2013 (r256257)
@@ -87,7 +87,10 @@ int fetch_bind(int, int, const char *)
conn_t *fetch_connect(const char *, int, int, int);
conn_t *fetch_reopen(int);
conn_t *fetch_ref(conn_t *);
-int fetch_ssl(conn_t *, int);
+#ifdef WITH_SSL
+int fetch_ssl_cb_verify_crt(int, X509_STORE_CTX*);
+#endif
+int fetch_ssl(conn_t *, const struct url *, int);
ssize_t fetch_read(conn_t *, char *, size_t);
int fetch_getln(conn_t *);
ssize_t fetch_write(conn_t *, const char *, size_t);
Modified: stable/9/lib/libfetch/fetch.3
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/lib/libfetch/fetch.3 Thu Oct 10 09:32:27 2013 (r256256)
+++ stable/9/lib/libfetch/fetch.3 Thu Oct 10 09:42:41 2013 (r256257)
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
.\"-
-.\" Copyright (c) 1998-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 1998-2013 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+.\" Copyright (c) 2013 Michael Gmelin <freebsd at grem.de>
.\" All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@
.\"
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
-.Dd September 27, 2011
+.Dd July 30, 2013
.Dt FETCH 3
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -392,6 +393,60 @@ method in a manner consistent with the r
library,
.Fn fetchPutHTTP
is currently unimplemented.
+.Sh HTTPS SCHEME
+Based on HTTP SCHEME.
+By default the peer is verified using the CA bundle located in
+.Pa /etc/ssl/cert.pem .
+The file may contain multiple CA certificates.
+A common source of a current CA bundle is
+.Pa \%security/ca_root_nss .
+.Pp
+The CA bundle used for peer verification can be changed by setting the
+environment variables
+.Ev SSL_CA_CERT_FILE
+to point to a concatenated bundle of trusted certificates and
+.Ev SSL_CA_CERT_PATH
+to point to a directory containing hashes of trusted CAs (see
+.Xr verify 1 ) .
+.Pp
+A certificate revocation list (CRL) can be used by setting the
+environment variable
+.Ev SSL_CRL_FILE
+(see
+.Xr crl 1 ) .
+.Pp
+Peer verification can be disabled by setting the environment variable
+.Ev SSL_NO_VERIFY_PEER .
+Note that this also disables CRL checking.
+.Pp
+By default the service identity is verified according to the rules
+detailed in RFC6125 (also known as hostname verification).
+This feature can be disabled by setting the environment variable
+.Ev SSL_NO_VERIFY_HOSTNAME .
+.Pp
+Client certificate based authentication is supported.
+The environment variable
+.Ev SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE
+should be set to point to a file containing key and client certificate
+to be used in PEM format. In case the key is stored in a separate
+file, the environment variable
+.Ev SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE
+can be set to point to the key in PEM format.
+In case the key uses a password, the user will be prompted on standard
+input (see
+.Xr PEM 3 ) .
+.Pp
+By default
+.Nm libfetch
+allows SSLv3 and TLSv1 when negotiating the connecting with the remote
+peer.
+You can change this behavior by setting the environment variable
+.Ev SSL_ALLOW_SSL2
+to allow SSLv2 (not recommended) and
+.Ev SSL_NO_SSL3
+or
+.Ev SSL_NO_TLS1
+to disable the respective methods.
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
Apart from setting the appropriate environment variables and
specifying the user name and password in the URL or the
@@ -516,6 +571,15 @@ variable is set.
Same as
.Ev FTP_PROXY ,
for compatibility.
+.It Ev HTTP_ACCEPT
+Specifies the value of the
+.Va Accept
+header for HTTP requests.
+If empty, no
+.Va Accept
+header is sent.
+The default is
+.Dq */* .
.It Ev HTTP_AUTH
Specifies HTTP authorization parameters as a colon-separated list of
items.
@@ -579,6 +643,31 @@ which proxies should not be used.
Same as
.Ev NO_PROXY ,
for compatibility.
+.It Ev SSL_ALLOW_SSL2
+Allow SSL version 2 when negotiating the connection (not recommended).
+.It Ev SSL_CA_CERT_FILE
+CA certificate bundle containing trusted CA certificates.
+Default value:
+.Pa /etc/ssl/cert.pem .
+.It Ev SSL_CA_CERT_PATH
+Path containing trusted CA hashes.
+.It Ev SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE
+PEM encoded client certificate/key which will be used in
+client certificate authentication.
+.It Ev SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE
+PEM encoded client key in case key and client certificate
+are stored separately.
+.It Ev SSL_CRL_FILE
+File containing certificate revocation list.
+.It Ev SSL_NO_SSL3
+Don't allow SSL version 3 when negotiating the connection.
+.It Ev SSL_NO_TLS1
+Don't allow TLV version 1 when negotiating the connection.
+.It Ev SSL_NO_VERIFY_HOSTNAME
+If set, do not verify that the hostname matches the subject of the
+certificate presented by the server.
+.It Ev SSL_NO_VERIFY_PEER
+If set, do not verify the peer certificate against trusted CAs.
.El
.Sh EXAMPLES
To access a proxy server on
@@ -610,6 +699,19 @@ as follows:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1
.Ed
+.Pp
+Access HTTPS website without any certificate verification whatsoever:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+SSL_NO_VERIFY_PEER=1
+SSL_NO_VERIFY_HOSTNAME=1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Access HTTPS website using client certificate based authentication
+and a private CA:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE=/path/to/client.pem
+SSL_CA_CERT_FILE=/path/to/myca.pem
+.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr fetch 1 ,
.Xr ftpio 3 ,
@@ -678,7 +780,8 @@ with numerous suggestions and contributi
.An Hajimu Umemoto Aq ume at FreeBSD.org ,
.An Henry Whincup Aq henry at techiebod.com ,
.An Jukka A. Ukkonen Aq jau at iki.fi ,
-.An Jean-Fran\(,cois Dockes Aq jf at dockes.org
+.An Jean-Fran\(,cois Dockes Aq jf at dockes.org ,
+.An Michael Gmelin Aq freebsd at grem.de
and others.
It replaces the older
.Nm ftpio
@@ -688,7 +791,9 @@ and
.An Jordan K. Hubbard Aq jkh at FreeBSD.org .
.Pp
This manual page was written by
-.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des at FreeBSD.org .
+.An Dag-Erling Sm\(/orgrav Aq des at FreeBSD.org
+and
+.An Michael Gmelin Aq freebsd at grem.de .
.Sh BUGS
Some parts of the library are not yet implemented.
The most notable
@@ -717,6 +822,10 @@ implemented, superfluous at this site" i
.Fn fetchStatFTP
does not check that the result of an MDTM command is a valid date.
.Pp
+In case password protected keys are used for client certificate based
+authentication the user is prompted for the password on each and every
+fetch operation.
+.Pp
The man page is incomplete, poorly written and produces badly
formatted text.
.Pp
Modified: stable/9/lib/libfetch/http.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/9/lib/libfetch/http.c Thu Oct 10 09:32:27 2013 (r256256)
+++ stable/9/lib/libfetch/http.c Thu Oct 10 09:42:41 2013 (r256257)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*-
- * Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2013 Dag-Erling Smørgrav
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ http_connect(struct url *URL, struct url
if (strcasecmp(URL->scheme, SCHEME_HTTPS) == 0 && purl) {
http_cmd(conn, "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1",
URL->host, URL->port);
+ http_cmd(conn, "Host: %s:%d",
+ URL->host, URL->port);
http_cmd(conn, "");
if (http_get_reply(conn) != HTTP_OK) {
fetch_close(conn);
@@ -1408,7 +1410,7 @@ http_connect(struct url *URL, struct url
http_get_reply(conn);
}
if (strcasecmp(URL->scheme, SCHEME_HTTPS) == 0 &&
- fetch_ssl(conn, verbose) == -1) {
+ fetch_ssl(conn, URL, verbose) == -1) {
fetch_close(conn);
/* grrr */
errno = EAUTH;
@@ -1581,7 +1583,7 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char
if (verbose)
fetch_info("requesting %s://%s%s",
url->scheme, host, url->doc);
- if (purl) {
+ if (purl && strcasecmp(URL->scheme, SCHEME_HTTPS) != 0) {
http_cmd(conn, "%s %s://%s%s HTTP/1.1",
op, url->scheme, host, url->doc);
} else {
@@ -1664,6 +1666,12 @@ http_request(struct url *URL, const char
}
/* other headers */
+ if ((p = getenv("HTTP_ACCEPT")) != NULL) {
+ if (*p != '\0')
+ http_cmd(conn, "Accept: %s", p);
+ } else {
+ http_cmd(conn, "Accept: */*");
+ }
if ((p = getenv("HTTP_REFERER")) != NULL && *p != '\0') {
if (strcasecmp(p, "auto") == 0)
http_cmd(conn, "Referer: %s://%s%s",
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